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ABSTRACT 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986) argue that the separation of 
ownership and control may generate agency problems between managers and 
shareholders. The equity-based compensation, by tying managerial wealth to firm long-
run stock performance, can incentivize managers to be more receptive to undertaking 
value-increasing financial policies and to improving firm performance therefore can be 
used as an effective tool to achieve consonance between managers actions and 
shareholders interest. Over the last two decades, the increased prevalence of equity-
based compensation, in the form of stock and options, is partially due to an increased 
acceptance of the alignment effect of equity-based compensation (Murphy, 1999; Perry 
and Zenner, 2000; Hall and Liebman, 1998; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). 
The current literature examining the effect of CEO pay-performance sensitivity on 
corporate payout policy and firm value produces inconclusive findings. In this 
dissertation, I revisit the effect of CEO pay-performance sensitivity on payout policy and 
firm performance. My dissertation consists of two essays. The first essay examines the 
effect of CEO pay-performance sensitivity on payout policy, including dividends and 
share repurchases, for a sample of 6,656 firm-year observations from 1995 to 2008. The 
second essay examines the relation between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and firm 
value for firms with different value for a sample of 19,313 firm-year observations from 
1992 to 2008. 
iii 
iv 
To increase the power of tests of the effect of equity-based incentives on payout 
policy and firm value, I use the dollar change in CEO wealth for a percentage change in 
firm value scaled by CEO's total annual pay as a proxy for CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity (Edmans et al., 2009). Percent-percent incentives equal dollar-dollar 
incentives (fractional CEO ownership) multiplied by firm value then scaled by CEO 
wage. This measure indicates that a small effective ownership can induce high level of 
incentives since firm value is substantially greater than the CEO's wage. Furthermore, in 
the first essay, I employ a Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure to reduce bias resulting 
from heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the regression residuals. In the second 
essay, I employ quantile regression methodology. Quantile regression models the 
relation between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and specific percentiles of the firm 
value, providing an opportunity to examine how changes in CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity affect the entire distribution of the firm value. 
In the first essay, I document that the likelihood of dividend payout is decreasing 
in CEO pay-performance sensitivity for the full sample and the subsample of firms that 
did not pay dividends in the previous year. This evidence is consistent with a substitution 
effect between dividend payout and CEO stock compensation. Conversely, I find that the 
propensity to pay dividends is increasing in CEO pay-performance sensitivity for the 
subset of firms that paid dividends in the previous year. For firms with positive dividends 
payout, the weight on the need to reduce the potential increase in external financing is 
greater than the weight on the need to reduce agency problems. 1 also find that the level 
of dividend payout is decreasing in CEO pay-performance sensitivity for dividend paying 
firms. The negative relation is nonlinear, stronger for CEOs with higher pay-performance 
V 
sensitivity, and stronger for firms with greater potential for free cash flows. Lastly, I 
document that dividend smoothing decreases in CEO pay-performance sensitivity. CEOs 
with greater equity-based incentives tend to deviate from past dividend levels to 
accommodate future investment opportunities. My results are robust to alternative sample 
selection procedures and model specifications that address causality. My models also 
perform well in both in-sample and out-of-sample predictions. 
In the second essay, I document a significantly inverted-U relation between CEO 
pay-performance sensitivity and Tobin's Q for all percentiles of the conditional 
distribution of Tobin's Q. Moreover, the strength of the coefficients on CEO pay-
performance sensitivity and its square are significantly increasing in the percentiles of the 
conditional distribution of Tobin's Q. The difference in the coefficient estimates is also 
statistically significant across the entire distribution of Tobin's Q. This suggests that the 
incentive alignment effect of higher CEO pay-performance sensitivity is more 
pronounced in firms with higher firm value, but so is the risk aversion effect of excess 
managerial ownership. My results are robust to alternative methodologies to control for 
unobservable firm fixed-effects, alternative model specifications that include proxies for 
board quality and effective monitoring, and alternative specifications that address 
causality. 
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CHAPTER 1 
CEO PAY-PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY 
AND PAYOUT POLICY 
Introduction 
Managers may have incentives to overinvest free cash flows in the absence of 
profitable investment opportunities at the expense of shareholders (Jensen, 1986). Such 
agency costs can be minimized through cash payouts to shareholders, which reduce 
excess cash available to managers (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). Equity-based 
compensation provides an alternative solution to agency costs by tying managerial wealth 
to the long-run stock performance of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; 
Hall and Liebman, 1998; Murphy, 1999). Thus, cash payouts and equity-based incentives 
are theoretical substitutes for reducing agency costs between managers and shareholders. 
However, evidence on the link between cash payouts and CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity is mixed. Studies find evidence of a substitution effect between CEO pay-
performance sensitivity and dividend payouts (Rozeff, 1982; Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn, 
1992; Agrawal and Jayaraman, 1994). Other studies document that managerial stock 
incentives encourage dividend payouts (White, 1996) or are unrelated to dividend 
payouts (Fenn and Liang, 2001; Hu and Kumar; 2004). 
The inconclusive findings may result from the methodologies employed in the 
prior literature. First, prior studies that only control for industry and year effects are likely 
1 
2 
to generate biased results because of the positive time-series correlation in payout 
policies and the non-constant variance in the regression residuals. Second, the commonly 
used measure for CEO pay-performance sensitivity, measured as percentage owned, has 
been demonstrated to have a strong negative correlation with firm size, making it an 
inappropriate measure in the context of payout policy (Baker and Hall, 2004; Edmans, 
Gabaix, and Landier, 2009).' 
To address these limitations, I employ a Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure ' 
to reduce bias resulting from heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the regression 
residuals and use scaled CEO wealth sensitivity (Edmans at al., 2009) as a proxy for pay-
performance sensitivity to increase the power of tests of the effect equity-based 
incentives on payout policy. I utilize this methodology to examine the effect of CEO pay-
performance sensitivity on payout policy, including dividends and share repurchases, for 
a sample of 6,656 firm-year observations from 1995 to 2008. I document that the 
propensity to pay dividends is decreasing in CEO pay-performance sensitivity for the full 
sample and the subsample of firms that did not pay dividends in the previous year. This is 
consistent with a substitution effect between dividends and equity-based incentives in 
Prior literature uses the fraction of outstanding shares directly held by CEO as a measure for CEO pay-
performance sensitivity (Rozeff, 1982; Jensen et al., 1992; Fenn and Liang,2001; Hu and Kumar, 2004). 
However, this measure is found to significantly decrease in firm size (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Gibbons 
and Murphy, 1992; Hall and Liebman 1998; Baker and Hall, 2004). Hu and Kumar (2004) further find that 
firm size is positively related to payouts and the negative relation between dividends and ownership 
disappears once size is included in the model. 
2
 Denis and Osobov (JFE, 2008) use Fama-MacBeth approach examining the determinants of dividend 
policy based on international data and find strong support for the life-cycle theory. Chay and Suh (JFE, 
2009) use Fama-MabBeth approach to examine the effect of cash-flow uncertainty on corporate dividend 
policy using worldwide data. They find that cash-flow uncertainty has a negative impact on the amount of 
dividends as well as the probability of paying dividends. 
J
 DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006) document that the earned/contributed capital mix has a significant 
positive relation with the decision to pay dividends using Fama and MacBeth approach. However, they did 
not consider the role of CEO stock incentives. 
3 
reducing agency costs of free cash flows. Conversely, I find that the propensity to pay 
dividends is increasing in CEO pay-performance sensitivity for the subset of firms that 
paid dividends in the previous year. This suggests that CEOs with high sensitivities to 
stock price may seek to avoid a negative market reaction to dividend omissions. 
I also find that the level of dividend payout is decreasing in CEO pay-
performance sensitivity for dividend paying firms. The negative relation is nonlinear, 
stronger for CEOs with higher pay-performance sensitivity, and stronger for firms with 
greater potential for free cash flow problems. Furthermore, I document a negative relation 
between CEO stock options and the propensity and level of dividends, but a positive 
relation between CEO stock options and share repurchases. This is consistent with 
increased popularity of stock option compensation and a corresponding preference for 
share repurchases relative to dividends over the last decade. Lastly, I document that 
dividend smoothing decreases in CEO pay-performance sensitivity. CEOs with greater 
equity-based incentives tend to deviate from past dividend levels to accommodate future 
investment opportunities. My results are robust to alternative sample selection procedures 
and model specifications that address causality. My models also perform well in both in-
sample and out-of-sample predictions. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I review the 
literature on the payout policies and develop hypotheses. Section 3 provides a discussion 
of the sample selection procedure, methodology, and a description of the sample firms. I 
report my primary empirical results in Section 4. Section 5 presents robustness tests, 
while Section 6 reports out-of-sample forecast tests of my models. Section 7 concludes 
the first study. 
4 
Literature Review 
Dividends as a Means of Cash Payout 
Four primary motives are identified in the finance literature for firms to distribute 
cash back to shareholders through dividends. Tax-preference theory argues that investors 
who receive favorable tax treatment on capital gains may prefer stocks with low dividend 
payouts. Therefore, different dividend policies may result in tax-induced clientele 
effects.4 Signaling theory (Bhattacharya, 1979; John and Williams, 1985; Miller and 
Rock, 1985) suggests that mangers use dividends to signal private information about the 
firm's future prospects that outside investors do not know; a rise in dividends typically 
signals that the firm will do better and a decrease suggests that it will do worse. 
However, support for signaling theory has been mixed. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986) note that managers, motivated by 
compensation and human capital considerations, have incentives to allocate resources to 
activities that benefit them privately but are not in the best interests of shareholders. This 
problem induces shareholders to incur agency costs to monitor manager's behavior. Free 
cash flow theory suggests that dividends are a means to mitigate value-destroying 
Consistent with this perspective, Kalay and Michaely (1993) and Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) 
find that pretax returns are related to dividend yield. However, Black and Scholes (1974) find no evidence 
of tax effect. 
5
 The supporting evidence includes that stock price changes following dividend change announcements 
have the same sign as the dividend changes and the magnitude of the price reaction is proportional to the 
magnitude of the dividend change (Asquith and Mullins, 1983; Kalay and Lowenstein, 1986), and that 
dividend changes and future profitability are related (Brooks, Charlton, and Hendershott, 1998; Nissim and 
Ziv, 2001). Other studies, however, have not supported the signaling theory by providing evidence that 
dividend changes are not related to future earnings (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner, 1996; Grullon, 
Michaely, and Swaminathan, 2002) or negatively related to future earnings (Benartzi, Michaely, and 
Thaler, 1997; Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi, and Thaler, 2005). Survey evidence indicates that managers 
reject the notion that they use dividends as a costly device to signal firms' future operating performance, 
but agree that they use dividends to signal their confidence in improving firm performance (Brav, Graham, 
Harvey, and Michaely, 2005). 
5 
activities by reducing the cash available for use at the discretion of management and 
forcing managers to raise more funds from external capital markets where they are 
subjected to the discipline of investment professionals (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). 
At the heart of free cash flow theory is the agency conflict between managers and 
shareholders over the distribution of free cash flow. For firms with sufficient free cash 
flow, an increase in dividend payout reduces the magnitude of the overinvestment 
problem and increases firm value. Lang and Litzenberger (1989) show that the stock 
return for firms announcing dividend increases is significantly higher for low Tobin's Q 
firms than for high Tobin's Q firms. DeAngelo et al. (2006) show that if high-dividend 
firms had not paid dividends over the past decades they would be debt free and their 
managers would be totally insulated from capital market discipline. 
Grullon et al. (2002) develop an investment opportunity hypothesis, which states 
that firms anticipate changes in future investment opportunities and change dividend 
policy accordingly. For example, Smith and Watts (1992) document that industries with 
fewer growth opportunities have higher dividend yield, suggesting that payouts are used 
as a bonding mechanism to control free cash flow problem. Gaver and Gaver (1993) 
obtain similar results at the firm level. Combining free cash flow theory and the 
investment opportunity explanation, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) propose a life-cycle 
theory, which posits that the trade-off between retention and distribution of cash evolves 
over time as profits accumulate and investment opportunities decline, therefore, dividend 
payout is changed optimally according to the need to distribute the firm's free cash flow. 
This theory predicts that firms pay fewer dividends when they are at the growth phase 
because of limited capital, but more dividends when they mature because the necessity to 
6 
mitigate the agency cost of free cash flows rises. DeAngelo et al. (2006) find support for 
this argument, documenting that the propensity to pay dividends is positively related to 
the proxy for firm's life-cycle, the mix of earned/ contributed equity (ratio of retained 
earnings to total equity or ratio of retained earnings to total assets). 
Dividends Smoothing 
Studies also indicate that firms smooth dividends by setting long-run target 
dividend payout ratios and then changing dividends partially in response to changes in 
earnings (Lintner, 1956; Fama and Baiak, 1968; Brav et al., 2005). Theories for why 
firms smooth dividends are related to the same market frictions associated with the 
choice of dividend levels. 
For instance, the first stream of asymmetric information models focus on the 
signaling effect of the dividend (Kumar, 1988; Guttmann, Kadan, and Eugene, 2007). 
The implication of this view is that firms tend to smooth more when they face greater 
information asymmetry. Information asymmetry may also lead to dividend smoothing 
through financial constraints. Future dividend cuts may be costly. Dividend smoothing 
can arise from an effort to avoid costly external finance (Almeida, Campello and 
Weisbach, 2004). 
Agency-based models argue that dividend smoothing arises as a means of 
mitigating the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1995) explain dividend smoothing based on incumbency rents. If managers enjoy 
private benefits from being in control, they will rationally smooth dividends. In periods 
of poor performance, they pay out higher dividends in order to lengthen their tenure. 
Conversely, in periods of good performance, they limit dividends for use in future poor 
7 
performance periods. Therefore, dividend smoothing is more popular in settings where 
agency problems are more severe. Consistent with this argument, they find that dividend 
smoothing is more prevalent among firms with weaker shareholder rights. Lastly, 
dividend smoothing may arise from the demands for controlling the agency costs of free 
cash flow. As such, dividend smoothing is positively related to the level of dividends and 
the severity of the free cash flow problem (Easterbrook, 1984; Allen, Bernardo and 
Welch, 2000). 
Share Repurchases as a Means of Cash Payout 
One of the most significant trends in corporate payout policy in the 1990s is the 
increased popularity of open-market stock repurchases (Jagannathan, Stephens, and 
Weisbach, 2000; Grullon and Michaely, 2002). Many theories offer potential reasons for 
this upward trend in repurchases as a means of cash payout. Tax-preference theory 
argues that the lower tax rate on capital gains makes repurchases more beneficial to 
shareholders than dividends (Black, 1976; Barclay and Smith, 1988; Allen and Michaely, 
2003; Green and Hollifield, 2003). Jolls (1988) and Weisbenner (1998) suggest that 
repurchases can also be used to fund option programs, the use of which increased during 
this time period. Denis (1990) indicates that share repurchase programs can increase 
stock price and therefore are a takeover defense. Undervaluation theory argues that share 
repurchases convey information to investors that management believes that the firm's 
shares are temporarily undervalued (Ofer and Thakor 1987; Bartov, 1991; Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1995; Lie, 2005). Signaling theory argues that the 
announcement of a stock repurchase signals unexpected future improvement in the firm's 
8 
earnings performance.6 Financial flexibility theory posits that share repurchases preserve 
financial flexibility relative to dividends because repurchases do not implicitly commit 
the firm to future payouts (Ikenberry and Vermaelen, 1996; Jagannathan et al., 2000; 
Guay and Harford, 2000; Lie, 2000). 
Stock repurchases, like dividends, can also help managers focus on maximizing 
firm value and resist the temptation to pursue growth at any cost. Free cash flow theory 
states that repurchases increase the value of cash-generating firms by controlling 
management's natural tendency to divert capital to activities that are not in the best 
interest of shareholders. Bagwell and Shoven (1988) and Dittmar (1997) show that 
repurchases are negatively related to growth opportunities. Lie (2000) finds that firms 
that announce repurchases have higher levels of cash than their industry peers, and that 
the market reaction to such announcements is positively related to the amount of excess 
cash in the announcing firms. Grullon and Michaely (2004) find that the market reaction 
to open market repurchases is negatively correlated with the firm's operating return on 
investment, indicating that the market reacts more favorably to firms with declined 
investment opportunities. 
6
 Consistent with the signaling hypothesis, the average firm experiences very positive repurchase 
announcement abnormal returns (Dann, Masulis, and Mayers, 1991; Comment and Jarrrell, 1991) and post-
repurchase announcement long-term abnormal returns (Peyer and Vermaelen, 2006). However, because 
managers have incentives to repurchase when their shares are undervalued, a repurchase may be associated 
with positive abnormal returns even if the managers' intent is not to signal (Maxwell and Stephens, 2003; 
Grullon and Michaely, 2004). Thus, abnormal returns are not conclusive evidence that managers 
intentionally use repurchases as signaling devices. Moreover, Wansley, William, and Sarkar (1989)'s and 
Brav et al. (2005)'s survey evidence both indicates that managers reject that they use repurchases to signal 
performance but agree that they use repurchases to signal their confidence in the firm. 
9 
Compensation as a Means of Reducing 
Agency Conflicts 
Shareholders cannot directly observe the firm's investment opportunities. This 
information asymmetry between corporate insiders and outsiders means that firms must 
motivate the executive to take actions that are in the best interests of shareholders. Tying 
executive compensation to shareholder wealth through equity-based compensation is one 
such mechanism to reduce agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The increased 
prevalence of equity-based compensation, in the form of stock and options, is partially 
due to an increased acceptance of the alignment effect of equity-based compensation 
(Murphy, 1999; Perry and Zenner, 2000; Hall and Liebman, 1998; Jensen and Murphy, 
1990). 
A substantial literature finds positive stock price reactions to the adoption of 
equity-based compensation plans (Brickley, Bhagat, and Lease, 1988; DeFusco, Johnson, 
and Zorn, 1990; Morgan and Poulen, 2001; Gerety, Hoi, and Robin, 2001; Martin and 
Thomas, 2005, Billet, Mauer, and Zhang, 2010). This suggests that the market views 
equity-based compensation as an effective mechanism to reduce agency conflicts 
between managers and shareholders. Similarly, Broussard, Buchenroth, and Piotte (2004) 
examine the effects of increases in pay-performance sensitivity on investment cash flow 
sensitivities, and find that CEO incentives can reduce agency costs by alleviating the 
overinvestment problem. 
Relation between Equity-Based Compensation 
and Payout Policy 
Equity-based incentives align managers with shareholders, while cash payouts 
serve as a bonding mechanism to reduce discretionary cash under manager' control. 
10 
Therefore, managerial equity-based compensation and payout policy theoretically are 
substitute means of reducing agency problems of free cash flow. However, empirical 
studies have been inconclusive. 
Rozeff (1982), and Jensen et al. (1992) find that dividend payout ratios are 
significantly decreasing in the level of managerial stock ownership. Agrawal and 
Jayaraman (1994) find a similar evidence for a sample of 71 all-equity firms in 1981. 
This suggests that higher managerial ownership lowers agency costs of equity and 
supports the substitution effect with dividends in reducing free cash flow. 
Conversely, White (1996) documents that managerial stock incentives encourage 
dividend payments. Furthermore, Fenn and Liang (2001) find no relation between cash 
payouts and management ownership for their full sample and a positive relation for a 
subsample of firms with the greatest potential for agency problems. Similarly, Hu and 
Kumar (2004) find that the likelihood of making a cash payout and the level of payout are 
not related to CEO ownership once size and leverage are controlled in the regressions. 
Studies also analyze whether the composition of a manager's compensation 
contract are important determinants of payout policy. Lambert, Lannen, and Larcker 
(1989) find that the addition of stock options to a manager's compensation package 
provides an incentive for the executive to reduce corporate dividends. Jolls (1998) and 
Weisbenner (1998) find that the probability of share repurchases is positively related to 
stock options. Fenn and Liang (2001) find a negative relation between dividends and 
stock options and a positive relationship between repurchases and stock options. 
However, the equivocal findings on effect of CEO pay-performance sensitivity on 
payout policy may result from the measures employed in previous studies. Namely, prior 
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studies measure pay-performance sensitivity using the percentage of shares owned by the 
CEO. However, CEO effective ownership is not a strong proxy for CEO pay-
performance sensitivity in the context of payout policy. For example, CEO effective 
ownership (measured as the dollar change in CEO wealth per dollar change in firm value) 
is significantly decreasing in firm size (Hall and Liebman, 1988; Schaefer, 1998; 
Murphy, 1999; Baker and Hall, 2004; Benson and Davidson, 2009; Edmans et al. 2009). 
As indicated in Baker and Hall (2004), a key assumption for effective ownership to be an 
accurate measure of incentives is that the marginal product of CEO effort on firm value is 
constant across different firm sizes. Consequently, the dollar-dollar incentives are most 
effective at deterring agency costs associated with decisions made by CEOs whose 
marginal products do not scale with firm size, such as perquisite consumption. When the 
marginal product of effort scales proportionally with firm size, such as when the decision 
is made on corporate strategy, the incentives should be measured by the product of 
effective ownership and the value of the firm (the dollar change in CEO wealth per 
percentage change in firm value). Furthermore, the positive time-serious correlation in 
payout policies are likely to generate autocorrelation and heterogeneity in the residuals of 
regressions that only control for firm and year fixed effects, leading to biased coefficient 
estimates. 
Hypothesis Development 
CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity and the 
Probability of Dividend Payout 
Managers have incentives to build a reputation for treating investors fairly in their 
payout decisions to be able to sell equity at higher prices in the future (Shleifer and 
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Vishny, 1997; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000; Shleifer, 2000; 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2007). One way to build such a reputation is to pay dividends. 
Furthermore, for this mechanism to work, a firm must continue paying dividends. 
Existing empirical studies indicate that due to asymmetric information firms view 
dividends continuation as a very important determinant of dividend policy; firms have 
been historically paying dividends will normally continue to do so (Michaely, Thaler, and 
Womack, 1995; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2007; Skinner, 2008; Denis and Osobov, 
2008). Brav et al. (2005) document survey evidence indicating that managers would 
rather pass up some positive net present value (NPV) projects than omit dividends due to 
the negative market reaction to dividend omission. 
Dividend payout depends on the tradeoff between the reduction in the agency 
costs of free cash flow and the incremental costs of external financing. Existing literature 
has found that the dividend decisions of firms that have not paid dividends differs from 
the dividend decisions of firms that paid dividends in the past (Allen and Michaely, 2003; 
Fama and French, 2001). For firms that paid dividends in the past, the severe penalty 
associated with dividend omissions increases the costs of external financing. However, 
for prior non-payers, the agency problem of free cash flow is associated with higher 
costs. This leads to two hypotheses based on the premise that CEO stock incentives 
better align the interest of mangers with shareholders. 
CEOs of prior payer firms will voluntarily choose to continue issuing dividends to 
stabilize the firms' market value, even if this may lead to external financing when cash 
flows are inadequate. Therefore, we will observe a positive relation between the 
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likelihood of paying dividends and CEO pay-performance sensitivity for firms that paid 
dividends in the past. 
HI a. The propensity of paying dividend is positively related to CEO pay-
performance sensitivity for prior payers. 
However, for prior non-payers, CEOs with stronger equity-based incentives may 
not initiate dividends because they do not have obligation to do so. If managerial stock 
incentives and dividends are substitute means of reducing agency problems of free cash 
flow, the likelihood of dividend payout will be negatively related to CEO pay-
performance sensitivity. 
Hlb. The propensity of paying dividend is negatively related to CEO pay-
performance sensitivity for prior nonpayers. 
CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity and the 
Level of Dividend Payout 
Dividend paying firms incur the cost of forgone positive NPV projects or the 
additional cost of raising external financing when the internal cash flows are inadequate. 
Therefore, a lower level of dividend payout offers CEOs with more financial flexibility. 
The reserved cash can be used for value-increasing investment opportunities which, for 
CEOs with high pay-performance sensitivity, will lead to increases CEO personal wealth. 
From this point of view, CEOs with higher stock incentives will choose to maintain lower 
dividend levels to increase their expected utility. Furthermore, adverse market reactions 
to potential dividend decreases if cash flows are inadequate in the future may make CEOs 
with higher equity-based incentives less likely to increase dividends in times of sufficient 
free cash flows. 
The effort exerted by CEOs and the skill level of the CEOs may not be fully 
known to the shareholders because asymmetric information exists between insiders and 
14 
outsiders. However, high-quality CEOs are more able to credibly convey the true value 
of the firm to outsiders, reducing the asymmetric information facing their firms in the 
financial market (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; Chemmanur, Paeglis, and Simonyan, 
2009). To the extent that high-quality CEOs are associated with higher pay-performance 
sensitivity in equilibrium, firms with higher CEO pay-performance sensitivity have lower 
levels of information asymmetry and agency conflicts. Consequently, firms with high 
quality CEOs will have less need to use dividends as a means of reducing asymmetric 
information, so that they will have lower dividend yields. Bhattacharyya (2007) develops 
a model in which uninformed shareholders use contracts to screen managers according to 
their productivity. The compensation contract is set up to induce higher-quality 
managers to invest the firm's cash in positive NPV projects and low-quality managers to 
pay out firm's cash as dividends. Given this, firms with high-quality CEOs will be 
associated with higher levels of investment, thus lower level of dividends. Additionally, 
the negative consequences of reducing dividends will deter CEOs with strong incentives 
from maintaining high payout levels. Consistent with this argument, Brav et al. (2005) 
survey evidence suggests that CEOs with strong incentives will not purposely use 
dividends as a costly signal to convey firm's value. The proposed argument yields the 
second hypothesis regarding the effect of CEO pay-performance sensitivity on the level 
of dividend payouts. 
H2. The level of dividend payout is negatively related to CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity. 
The negative influence of CEO pay-performance sensitivity on dividend payment 
should depend on the level of free cash flow in firms. If the firm has high free cash and 
few valuable investment opportunities, dividend levels are expected to be high to reduce 
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the possibility of using cash flows in value-destroying projects. On the other hand, when 
the firm has considerable growth opportunities and limited internal funding, CEOs with 
strong equity-based incentives will choose lower dividend payment levels, suggesting a 
stronger relation between CEO ownership and dividends levels. 
H3. The negative effect of CEO pay-performance sensitivity on the level of 
dividend payout is stronger when firms have more agency costs of free cash flow. 
CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity 
and Dividend Smoothing 
Hypothesis 4 focuses on the optimal decision of a self-interested manager to 
continue or change the existing dividend policy. A dividend cut can offer managers more 
financial flexibility when the cash flow is insufficient. However, the stock price drop 
following the dividend cut reduces the manager's expected utility by raising the cost of 
capital, reducing the value of stock-based compensation, and facilitating a potential 
takeover. The weight of the negative and positive effect of dividend cuts varies at CEO's 
discretion. 
Agency theory argues that in settings where incentive problems are more severe, 
such as when CEOs are poorly aligned with shareholders, dividend smoothing is more 
common and more valuable for firms (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995). In determining 
dividend policy, CEOs imperfectly aligned with shareholders choose to uphold the 
dividend commitment to show that they are not destroying shareholder value at the 
potential cost of giving up good investment opportunities. In the cases when firm cash 
flow increases, poorly aligned CEOs are cautious about the magnitude of dividend 
increases because of the fear of reducing dividends when the cash flow falls. On the 
other hand, better aligned CEOs choose to deviate from the past dividend level to 
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accommodate future investment opportunities. Shareholders react less adversely to the 
deviation decisions in the presence of good investment opportunities, since they believe 
temporary cuts will bring in a higher expected firm value. For example, Lang and 
Litzenberger (1989) find that average return in response to the announcement of a 
dividend reduction for firms with better investment opportunities is significantly higher 
than that for firms with poor investment opportunities. Liang, Moreau, and Park (2011) 
document that investors do not react significantly negatively to dividend omissions 
announced by firms with a good stream of investments. Therefore, better aligned CEOs 
can benefit from a more flexible dividend policy and are more likely to deviate from the 
past dividend level if they anticipate positive-NPV projects. 
H4. CEOs with higher stock pay-performance sensitivity have less incentive and 
discretion for dividend smoothing, holding investment opportunities constant. 
CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity 
and Share Repurchases 
The agency theory of payout policy does not distinguish between dividends and 
repurchases. The strong negative market response to dividend cuts or reductions makes 
dividends a stronger commitment. On the contrary, any deviation from the regular share 
repurchase policy is less consequential for the stock price. Therefore, the financial 
flexibility associated with repurchases make it more attractive for CEOs as a means of 
cash distribution. This will result in a positive relation between CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity and the decision to buy back shares. Conversely, decisions on share 
repurchases are made at the CEO's discretion on a period-by-period basis and therefore 
depend on the availability of free cash flows, investment and liquidity requirements. 
When the residual cash flow is insufficient, better-aligned CEOs may choose to avoid 
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buying back shares, resulting in a negative relation between CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity and the decision to repurchase shares. We therefore treat the relation between 
CEO pay-performance sensitivity and share repurchases as an open empirical issue. 
Sample Selection and Data Description 
Sample Selection 
My initial sample includes all firms in the Compustat Annual Industrial file for 
the period of 1992-2008. I exclude financial and utility firms (Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes 4900-4949 and 6000-6999. I exclude firms that incorporate 
abroad (incorporation code 99) and LBSs (stock code 4). I also limit my sample to 
ordinary common shares (CRSP share code 10 or 11). This excludes certificates, 
Americus trust components, closed-end funds, ADRs, shares of beneficial interest, units, 
and REITs from analysis. 
I obtain information on CEO stock incentives from Execucomp, which includes 
executive compensation data for firms in the S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400, and S&P 
Smallcap 600 indices, institutional ownership data from Thomson 13F (13F), and board 
and governance characteristics from the IRRC database. Due to data limitations in IRRC, 
board characteristics are only available from 1995 onward. I require that all observations 
have nonmissing values for dividends and repurchases on Compustat, CEO pay-
performance sensitivity and option holdings on Execucomp, institutional ownership on 
Thomson 13F, and board and governance characteristics on IRRC. The final merged full 
sample contains 6,656 firm-year observations from 1995-2008. 
Regressions on the likelihood of cash payout use the full sample, which includes 
both payers and non-payers. A firm is defined as a dividend payer if a dividend payout 
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occurred at least once during the entire sample period. Similarly, share repurchase payers 
refer to the firms that bought back shares at least once in the sample period. Regressions 
on the level of cash payout are limited to payer firms. Therefore, the sample for the 
likelihood of cash payout is different from that for the payout level. Similarly, the sample 
for dividend policy is different from that for the share repurchases. This sample selection 
strategy reduces sample selection bias because large and mature firms with stable cash 
flows are more likely to be defined as payers for both dividend and share repurchases. 
The subsamples for investigating the determinants of dividend yield, repurchase yield, 
and total payout yield are 5,034, 6,181, and 6,258 observations, respectively. Lastly, to be 
included in the dividend-smoothing sample, a firm must have at least five continuous 
years of positive dividend payouts during the sample period. This results in a subsample 
of 4,030 firm-year observations. 
Variable Construction 
Appendix A provides a precise definition of the dependent and independent 
variables used in my analysis. 
Dividend, Share Repurchase, 
and Total Payout 
In regressions to examine the effect of CEO pay-performance sensitivity on the 
likelihood and the level of payout, the dependent variables include dummy variables for 
payout policy constructed on firm-year basis and payout ratio. Dividend, repurchase, or 
total payout payer dummies are equal to one for firm i in year / if the payout is positive, 
and zero otherwise. Following Fenn and Liang (2001), I define payout ratio as the cash 
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dividends on the common stock, share repurchases,7 and total payout (cash dividends + 
share repurchases) scaled by market value of equity. 
Dividend Smoothing 
Dividend smoothing is measured using the speed of adjustment (SOA) from the 
partial adjustment model of Lintner (Fama and Babiak, 1968; Brav et al., 2005; Skinner, 
2008). The SOA is estimated from the following regression: 
ADn = a + y(D;t - T>lt_£ + sic = a + y(TP X Elt - Dit_±) + slt, (1) 
where &Dlt is the change in dividend for firm i from period t-1 to t, TP is the target 
payout ratio, Eit is the earnings in period t, y is the speed of adjustment (SOA), and slt is 
a random error term. 
This model implies that firms have a target payout that is a fraction of their 
earnings. This regression can be rewritten as: 
ADlt = a + j31Elt + p2Dtt_t + sit, 9 (2) 
where pt is the product of the target payout ratio and the speed of adjustment and 
P2 is the negative of the SOA. Smaller values for SOA indicate a smoothing dividend 
policy. I adjust the model above by including CEO pay-performance sensitivity, the 
interaction between lagged dividends and CEO pay-performance sensitivity, and other 
Following Fama and French (2001), share repurchases are measured as the increase in common treasury 
stock. If this item is zero, share repurchases are measured as the difference between repurchases and stock 
issuances. The negative values are set to zero. 
81 also use multiple alternative measures. First, following Chay and Suh (2009), 1 use cash payout to 
earnings ratio, where earnings are proxied by net income, to measure the cash payout ratio. All the 
observations with negative net income are dropped. The payout ratios for the observations with negative 
net income and positive cash payout are set to zero. Second, 1 use total book asset as the scaled factor. 
Finally, 1 use the ratio of dividend payouts to operating cash flows to measure dividend payout, and the 
ratio of share repurchases to non-operating cash flows as the measure for share repurchase ratio (see 
Jagannathan et al. (2000)). 
9
 Alternatively, we estimate SOA from the regression ADS = a -f yiTP x Flt — Di:_.J + fir. where TP is 
defined as the firm-median dividend payout ratio over the sample period (see Leary and Michaely, 2010). 
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control variables. The interaction term captures the effect of CEO stock incentives on 
dividend smoothing and is expected to enter the regression with a significant negative 
coefficient. The null hypothesis is that CEO pay-performance sensitivity is insignificant 
and that all firms smooth their dividends to the same degree. In this case, the interaction 
term will not be significantly different from zero. I control for scale effects by dividing 
both dividends and earnings by the number of common shares outstanding (see Fama and 
French,1968; Brav et al, 2005).10 Both dividends and earnings are adjusted for stock 
splits and stock dividends. 
CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity 
Edmans et al. (2009) develop a measure for CEO pay-performance sensitivity 
using percent-percent incentives, measured as the dollar change in CEO wealth for a 
percentage change in firm value scaled by CEO's total annual pay. This measure is 
shown to be insensitive to firm size and risk. Percent-percent incentives equal dollar-
dollar incentives (fractional CEO ownership) multiplied by firm value then scaled by 
CEO wage. This measure indicates that a small effective ownership can induce high 
level of incentives since firm value is substantially greater than the CEO's wage. 
However, they note that such incentives are only effective at deterring agency costs 
proportional to firm value, such as a corporate strategy. 
I use this percent-percent incentives measure as a proxy for CEO pay-
performance sensitivity. Using data from Execucomp database, I estimate each CEO's 
portfolio of stock and options following the methodology developed in Core and Guay 
Some prior studies scale by book assets (Fama and French, 2001) However, survey evidence in Brav et 
al (2005) suggests that the level of dividends per shaie is the key metnc for dividend policy 
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(2002). The detailed calculation of the CEO pay-performance sensitivity is represented 
in Appendix A. 
Control Variables 
CEO option holdings. The convex payoff function of option-based compensation 
increases the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility, therefore may persuade 
managers to take on more risky projects.'1 By adjusting the risk-taking behavior, CEO 
stock options can affect firm's investment policy as well as dividend policy (Guay, 1999; 
Coles, Deniel, and Naveen, 2006). I use the shares underlying options held by CEOs to 
the total shares outstanding as the measure for option-based incentives. 
Governance. I measure the effectiveness of corporate governance through a 
variety of CEO-specific and board structure-related variables motivated by the existing 
literature. Longer CEO tenure in the firm increases the level of managerial influence 
over the board (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989). Furthermore, CEOs with longer 
tenures may be entrenched and are more likely to be risk averse (Berger, Ofeck, and 
Yermack, 1997; Coles et al., 2006). CEO tenure is defined as the time the CEO has been 
in the current position. When the CEO also chairs the board, agency problems are more 
severe because power may be concentrated in the CEO over the board of directors, 
(Jensen, 1993; Goyal and Park, 2002).12 
The level of monitoring efficiency is expected to increase with the independence 
of the board. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that independent directors are likely to have 
The effectiveness of encouraging CEO to take on greater risk depends on the CEO's utility function. If 
the concavity of the manger's utility function overcomes the convexity of the payoff, managers maybe 
more risk averse (Guay, 1999; Ross, 2004). 
12
 Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell (1997) provide contrasting evidence that the costs of separating the CEO and 
COB position may exceed the benefits. More specifically, they argue that awarding CEOs chair positions 
is a normal part of the succession process. 
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an incentive to ensure the effective running of a company. I define independent directors 
as those that are not current or former employees, are not direct family members or 
relatives of the CEO, and have no business ties with the firm. Institutional shareholders 
have greater incentives to monitor the management, therefore the higher percentage of 
institutional ownership increase the efficiency of monitoring.13 
Jensen (1993), Yermack (1996), and Core, Holthausen, and Lacker (1999) argue 
that managers have more power in the larger boards because it is easier for CEO to 
control the board, and individual board members are less likely to be held accountable. 
Managers in firms with more takeover defenses are more immune to the disciplinary 
force of the takeover market and are likely be more powerful. Therefore, ceteris paribus, 
the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders is more severe at firms with 
more anti-takeover provisions The market for corporate control is measured by Gindex 
developed in Gompers, Ishii.and Metrick (2003). The study is based on the anti-takeover 
provisions reported in IRRC. Higher values of Gindex indicate lower shareholder 
protection 14 
To facilitate the analysis when employing governance variables, I employ factor 
analysis to extract the commonalities of internal and external governance characteristics 
,J
 The relation between dividend payout and institutional ownership is unclear The restrictions in 
institutional charters, such as the "prudent man" rules, make it more difficult for many institutions to 
purchase stocks that pay eithei no dividends oi low dividends However, institutional shareholders may 
find less of a need for using dividends as disciplining mechanisms if they have strong voting positions and 
board repiesentation Fluck (1999) and Allen et al (2000) find that institutional ownership increases 
payout Grinsem and Michaely (2005) leports that institutions avoid firms that do not pay dividends and 
prefer firms that pay fewer dividends among dividend-paying firms 
14
 I assume that during the years between two consecutive publications, firms have the same G-index as in 
the pievious publication year The calculation of G-index is only up to year 2006 In order to match my 
sampler period, I assume that G-mdex in yeai 2008 has the same value as in year 2006 This procedure 
does generate senal correlation foi individual fiims, but as the empirical tests use the Fama and Macbeth 
approach this serial con elation should have little impact on the results 
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and to construct composite governance measures for subsequent analysis. The results of 
factor analysis indicate that the corporate governance environment is captured by three 
factors: CEO entrenchment (CEO tenure and CEO duality), monitoring efficiency 
(institutional ownership and percentage of independent directors), and managerial power 
(board size and Gindex). Theories and empirical studies suggest that strong corporate 
governance is associated with low CEO entrenchment, high monitoring efficiency, and 
low managerial power. If high quality corporate governance facilitates effective 
monitoring of the CEO, the need for using cash payout as a mechanism to reduce the 
agency costs of free cash flow may be reduced. 
Other firm characteristics. I control for several variables that are previously found 
to be primary determinants of payout policy in the literature. I use retained earnings 
scaled by total assets to measure the life stage of the firm (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 
2006). Profitability is measured by return on assets, which is computed as earnings 
before extraordinary items plus interest and income statement deferred tax, scaled by 
total assets (Fama and French, 2001). Cash holdings are cash scaled by total assets. 
Growths of sales and Market-to-book asset are used to capture investment opportunities 
as well as the information asymmetry about the firm. Firm size, a proxy for the 
maturity and external financing costs, is measured by the logarithm of total assets. Larger 
firms are generally considered to have more stable cash flows and less asymmetric 
information, resulting in lower external financing costs (Smith and Watts, 1992). Net 
operating cash flow, measured as operating income minus capital spending scaled by 
Prior studies use the same variable or its variant, Tobin"s q, as a proxy for investment opportunities 
(Fama and French, 2001; Grullon and Michaely, 2002; DeAngelo et al., 2006). 
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total assets, is controlled for when examining dividend payout level.16 I control for net 
cash flow, measured as operating income before depreciation minus taxes, interest 
expense, common dividends, and preferred dividends scaled by total assets, when 
examining the repurchase level and the total payout level (see, Fama and French, 2001). 
Leverage is measured as the ratio of long-term debt and debt due in first year to total 
assets. Earnings volatility, a proxy for cash flow uncertainty, is measured by the standard 
1 Q 
deviation of annually earnings over past 3 years. Lastly, when examining the impact of 
CEO pay-performance sensitivity on the propensity and the level of payout, I use a 
different set of accounting variables based on the prior literature. 
All payout and accounting variables are winsorized at upper and lower 1% of the 
sample distribution to address potential problems associated with extreme observations. 
All negative values of book equity are set to zero. Panel A of Table 1.1 reports 
descriptive statistics for the full sample. The results are largely consistent with prior 
studies. Panel B reports correlations for the main variables. CEO pay-performance 
sensitive is negatively related to the propensity of dividend payout and the ratio of cash 
payouts. The three governance variables resulting from factor analysis are not 
significantly correlated with each other, suggesting that they capture different dimensions 
of corporate governance. 
As indicated in Jagannathan et al. (2000), dividends are paid out of operating cash flow. 
17
 Alternatively, 1 use operating income before depreciation scaled by book value of total assets. 
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 Many prior studies use similar measure, such as standard deviation of operating cash flow over four or 
five years (Jagannathan et al. 2000; Guay and Harford, 2000; Jensen et al., 1992; Crutchley and Hansen, 
1989). 
Table 1.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Panel A 
Percentile 
mean sd mm p25 median p75 max 
Pavout level measures 
di vidend_payout_ratio 1 
repurchase_payout_ratio 1 
total_payout_ratio 1 
Payout smoothing measures 
dividend__per_share 
Managerial stock incentives 
CEO stock ownership 
CEO option holdings 







Proportion of independent directors 
Duality 
Percentage of institutional ownership 
Earned equity to common equity 
ROA 
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Net cash flow 
leverage 
Earnings volatility 














0 . 0 0 8 
0 . 0 0 8 
0 . 0 2 4 
0 . 0 1 8 
0 . 0 3 3 
0 . 0 4 8 
0 .413 0 .000 0 .000 0.160 0.508 
2 .649 
0 .618 
2 . 6 6 1 
2 . 0 8 0 
0 . 4 2 9 
1 . 0 1 8 
0 . 0 2 2 
0 . 0 2 7 
0 . 0 0 5 
9 . 4 2 6 
8 . 5 4 0 
8 . 4 6 4 
0 . 3 1 5 
0 . 6 3 7 
7 3 . 1 8 8 
0 . 6 7 5 
0 . 0 7 3 
0 . 1 0 6 
2 . 0 6 7 
7 . 5 0 6 
0 . 1 2 4 
0 . 1 0 0 
0 . 0 9 4 
0 . 1 9 3 
0 . 0 2 9 
1 . 2 3 1 
1 . 4 9 5 
1 . 1 2 9 
0 . 9 6 7 
0 . 7 1 7 
0 . 7 6 2 
2 . 640 
7 . 3 1 2 
7 . 3 9 0 
0 . 1 6 9 
0 . 4 8 1 
1 9 . 3 7 9 
0 . 8 2 1 
0 . 0 7 6 
0 . 2 0 3 
1 . 2 3 3 
1 . 3 9 6 
0 . 1 5 0 
0 . 0 8 0 
0 . 0 6 0 
0 . 146 
0 . 0 2 9 
1 . 5 8 4 
0 . 0 0 0 
0 . 0 0 0 
- 2 . 5 0 1 
- 3 . 2 4 1 
- 2 . 8 8 0 
2 . 0 0 0 
1 . 0 0 0 
1 . 0 0 0 
0 . 0 0 0 
0 . 0 0 0 
5 . 0 5 8 
- 6 . 2 9 1 
- 0 . 4 3 5 
- 0 . 4 4 7 
0 . 7 5 6 
4 . 2 9 4 
0 . 0 0 1 
- 0 . 3 0 0 
- 0 . 2 4 4 
0 . 0 0 0 
0 . 0 0 2 
- 8 . 6 1 0 
0 . 0 4 5 
0 . 2 6 5 
- 0 . 6 6 4 
- 0 . 4 4 3 
- 0 . 4 8 0 
8 . 0 0 0 
3 . 0 0 0 
3 . 0 0 0 
0 . 182 
0 . 0 0 0 
6 0 . 6 2 5 
0 . 4 4 0 
0 . 0 4 7 
0 . 0 1 3 
1 . 3 0 3 
6 . 4 8 8 
0 . 0 2 1 
0 . 0 5 9 
0 . 0 6 2 
0 . 0 6 7 
0 . 0 1 0 
0 . 5 1 0 
0 . 0 8 2 
0 . 6 8 3 
0 . 0 6 1 
0 . 0 8 4 
0 . 0 8 7 
9 . 0 0 0 
6 . 0 0 0 
6 . 0 0 0 
0 . 2 8 6 
1 . 0 0 0 
7 4 . 4 2 2 
0 . 7 4 3 
0 . 0 7 9 
0 . 0 8 2 
1 . 677 
7 . 4 0 5 
0 . 0 6 3 
0 . 0 9 9 
0 . 0 9 2 
0 . 1 8 6 
0 . 0 1 9 
1 . 1 3 0 
0 . 1 7 9 
1 . 3 5 8 
0 . 7 3 2 
0 . 5 8 2 
0 . 5 5 0 
1 1 . 0 0 0 
1 1 . 0 0 0 
1 1 . 0 0 0 
0 . 4 2 9 
1 . 0 0 0 
8 5 . 8 2 8 
0 . 9 6 8 
0 . 1 1 1 
0 . 1 6 7 
2 . 3 7 1 
8 . 4 1 4 
0 . 1 7 3 
0 . 1 4 3 
0 . 1 2 5 
0 . 2 9 3 
0 . 0 3 6 
1 . 8 8 0 
1 1 . 3 7 3 
6 . 7 6 2 
2 . 3 7 3 
1 . 8 2 3 
3 . 9 6 3 
1 8 . 0 0 0 
3 7 . 0 0 0 
3 9 . 0 0 0 
1 . 0 0 0 
1 . 0 0 0 
1 9 6 . 9 9 6 
2 . 8 2 8 
0 . 2 5 6 
1 . 3 3 8 
8 . 4 0 9 
1 0 . 8 2 1 
0 . 7 1 5 
0 . 3 3 7 
0 . 2 7 2 
0 . 7 5 0 
0 . 2 1 4 
6 . 8 7 0 
K> 
Ui 
Table 1.1 (Continued) 
The sample includes all Compustat Industrial Annual firms excluding firms in financial and utilities industries (SIC code 6000-6999 and 4000-4949), firms 
Incorporated outside US (incorporation code 99), firms with CRSP share code other than 10 or 11, firms are LBOs (stock code 4). Firms with missing CEO 
Stock incentives data on Execucomp, missing governance data on IRRC, missing institutional ownership data on Thomson 13F, and missing financial data 
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2 0 4 2 * 
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2 1 4 7 * 
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0 1 3 9 
3 9 5 1 * 


















5 9 1 7 * 
0 1 1 1 
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2 8 8 0 * 
1 9 9 1 * 
0 1 0 2 
0 1 8 8 
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1 1 6 5 * 
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0 0 5 1 
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0 2 5 3 * 
2 0 2 5 * 











0 0 6 3 
7 3 8 1 * 
0 1 8 1 
0 2 6 8 * 
0 6 6 2 * 
0 4 1 9 * 
0 9 5 2 * 











6 7 0 0 * 
1 2 1 3 * 
0 4 9 8 * 
0 8 9 4 * 
0 1 1 3 
0 0 0 8 













0 9 5 3 * 
0 5 3 5 * 
0 1 1 2 
0 3 8 7 * 
0 7 1 2 * 







0 1 1 2 
0 7 8 0 * 
0 2 7 8 * 
1 5 2 7 * 









1 0 8 8 * 
1 5 4 1 * 
1 6 6 0 * 







1 5 8 0 * 
2 1 2 4 * 













0 9 1 4 






. 1 6 1 8 
This table represents the pairwise correlations of the dependent variables, CEO stock incentives variables, and governance variables. Correlations significant 
at 5% are marked with stars. The sample includes all Compustat Industrial Annual firms for the period of 1995-2008 excluding: firms in financial and utilities 
industries (SIC code 6000-6999 and 4000-4949), firms incorporated outside US (incorporation code 99), firms with CRSP share code other than 10 or 11, 
firms are LBOs (stock code 4). Firms with missing CEO stock incentives data on Execucomp, missing governance data on IRRC, missing institutional 




I begin by employing univariate tests designed to assess whether CEO pay-
performance sensitivity is correlated with the propensity and the level of dividend payout. 
I then report results from regressions of payout policy on CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity to examine the relation using a multivariate framework. 
Univariate Analysis 
Table 1.2 presents results of univariate tests of firms with and without cash 
payouts. I document that firms with higher CEO pay-performance sensitivity are less 
likely to make dividend payments. For example, CEO pay-performance sensitivity for 
dividend payer firms is 0.412, whereas it is 0.517 for nonpayers. The difference is 
statistically significantly at 1% level. However, I fail to document a similar relation 
exists in case of repurchases. Consistent with the argument that options encourage 
repurchases and discourage dividends, CEOs of firms choosing to pay dividends have 
option holdings 0.030 smaller on average than those choosing not to pay dividends, 
whereas CEOs of firms choosing to repurchase shareshave option holdings 0.044 larger 
on average than those do not repurchase. 
I also document that firms with positive cash payout, in the form of dividend or 
repurchase, have stronger managerial power than firms without cash payout. The 
efficiency of monitoring also has a pronounced effect on the structure of cash 
distributions. For instance, firms not paying dividends are associated with higher 
monitoring intensity than firms paying dividends, but firms repurchasing shares are 
associated with higher monitoring intensity than firms not repurchasing shares. 
Table 1.2 Univariate Analysis on the Difference in Firms with and without Positive Cash Payout 
CEO PPS 












Earned equity to 
common equity 
ROA 
Sales growth rate 
Market to book ratio 
Size 
Cash holding 
Net operating cash flow 




0 . 4 1 2 
0 . 7 7 2 
0 . 0 1 2 
0 . 2 3 9 
- 0 . 0 4 7 
9 . 8 6 6 
8 . 1 4 6 
1 0 . 1 2 1 
0 . 3 1 1 
0 . 693 
7 0 . 4 6 5 
0 . 8 5 9 
0 . 0 8 3 
0 . 0 8 7 
1 . 9 9 5 
7 . 8 5 1 
0 . 0 8 4 
0 . 1 0 7 
0 . 0 9 9 
0 . 2 0 6 
0 . 0 2 3 
[IT]D iv.dummy=0 
0 . 5 1 7 
1 . 4 3 0 
0 . 0 4 0 
- 0 . 3 5 1 
0 . 0 9 9 
8 . 5 7 9 
9 . 645 
8 . 2 7 1 
0 . 3 3 2 
0 . 5 5 0 
7 7 . 6 8 2 
0 . 3 4 7 
0 . 0 5 6 
0 . 1 3 8 
2 . 1 9 4 
6 . 9 7 3 
0 . 1 8 6 
0 . 0 8 1 
0 . 0 9 2 
0 . 1 7 9 
0 . 0 3 8 
["] " [I] 
0 . 1 0 5 * * * 
0 . 0 3 0 * * * 
0 . 0 2 8 
- 0 . 5 9 1 * * * 
. 1 4 6 * * * 
- 1 . 2 8 7 * * * 
1 . 4 9 8 * * * 
- 1 . 8 5 0 * * * 
0 . 0 2 1 * * * 
- 0 . 1 4 3 * * * 
7 . 2 1 6 * * * 
- 0 . 5 1 2 * * * 
- 0 . 0 2 7 * * * 
0 . 0 5 1 * * * 
0 . 1 9 9 * * * 
- 0 . 8 7 7 * * * 
0 . 1 0 1 * * * 
- 0 . 0 2 5 * * * 
- 0 . 0 0 7 * * * 
- 0 . 0 2 7 * * * 
0 . 0 1 5 * * * 
[III] Rep.dummy=l 
0 . 4 3 8 
1 . 0 2 3 
0 . 0 2 2 
0 . 0 7 0 
0 . 0 2 0 
9 . 4 2 5 
8 . 5 1 2 
9 . 6 8 0 
0 . 3 1 3 
0 . 6 5 0 
7 3 . 2 4 6 
0 . 8 0 7 
0 . 0 8 5 
0 . 0 9 2 
2 . 1 5 2 
7 . 6 5 7 
0 . 119 
0 . 1 1 3 
0 . 1 0 2 
0 . 1 8 7 
0 . 0 2 7 
[IV] Rep.dummy=0 
0 . 4 7 1 
0 . 9 7 9 
0 . 0 2 0 
- 0 . 0 5 4 
- 0 . 0 2 4 
9 . 3 6 5 
9 . 0 1 4 
9 . 0 3 0 
0 . 3 3 0 
0 . 6 2 6 
7 2 . 6 8 3 
0 . 4 2 3 
0 . 0 5 0 
0 . 1 3 1 
1 . 9 0 3 
7 . 3 0 3 
0 . 1 2 5 
0 . 0 6 8 
0 . 0 7 9 
0 . 2 1 4 
0 . 0 3 3 
[IV] - [HI] 
0 . 0 3 3 
- 0 . 0 4 4 * 
- 0 . 0 0 2 
- 0 . 1 2 4 * * * 
- 0 . 0 4 4 * * 
- 0 . 0 6 0 
0 . 5 0 2 * * * 
- 0 . 6 5 0 * * * 
0 . 0 1 7 * * * 
- 0 . 0 2 3 * * 
- 0 . 5 6 3 
- 0 . 3 8 4 * * * 
- 0 . 0 3 5 * * * 
0 . 0 3 9 * * * 
- 0 . 2 4 8 * * * 
- 0 . 3 5 5 * * * 
0 . 0 0 7 * 
- 0 . 0 4 5 * * * 
- 0 . 0 2 3 * * * 
0 . 0 2 7 * * * 
0 . 0 0 6 * * * 
The sample includes all Compustat Industrial Annual firms for the period of 1995-2008 excluding: firms in financial and utilities industries (SIC code 6000-
6999 and 4000-4949), firms incorporated outside US (incorporation code 99), firms with CRSP share code other than 10 or 11, firms are LBOs (stock code 4). 
Firms with missing CEO stock incentives data on Execucomp, missing governance data on IRRC, missing institutional ownership data on Thomson 13F, and 
missing financial data on Compustat are excluded. Two-sample t-tests of means are performed on firms with dividend dummy equal to one versus dividend 
dummy equal to zero, and on firms with repurchase dummy equal to one versus repurchase dummy equal to zero. The null hypothesis is that the difference of 
the mean is zero. Means for each group and the differences of the means are reported. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels, respectively. 
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This finding supports the notion that firms with higher monitoring efficiency are 
more likely to adopt repurchase as the form of cash payout. Furthermore, Firms choosing 
to payout cash have weaker internal as well as external governance than firms without 
cash payout, as indicated the Gindex, CEO tenure, board size, proportion of independent 
director, duality, and percentage of institutional ownership. 
Table 1.2 also shows that firms with positive cash payout are more profitable and 
have higher level of retained earnings than firms choose not to pay out cash, which 
typically exhibit more investment opportunities (see sales growth) and higher cash ratios. 
To the extent that market-to-book ratio represents not only investment opportunities but 
also overvalued equity, firms with lower market-to-book ratio could choose to repurchase 
shares to take advantage of low equity price. These findings are consistent with the life-
cycle theory in DeAngelo et al. (2006). Finally, the net operating cash flows and net cash 
flows are significantly larger for firms with positive cash payouts than they are for other 
firms. The standard deviation of operating income is significantly lower for firms pay 
dividend or repurchases. To the extent that higher standard deviations of cash flow 
reflect cash flow volatility, the result suggests that uncertainty about future cash flows 
causes firms to keep more cash internally. 
In Table 1.3, firms are classified into the group II, III, and IV if their CEO pay-
performance sensitivity belongs to the bottom, middle, and top terciles, respectively. T-
test and Wilcoxon rank sum statistics are used to test the differences in the means and 
medians of dividend payout policies between firms with low CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity (group II) and high CEO pay-performance sensitivity (group IV) , 
respectively. 
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Table 1.3 Univariate Analysis on the Relation between CEO Pay-Performance 
Sensitivity and Dividend 
Panel A: The possibility of dividend payout for whole sample 
Difference (II - IV) 
[I] Dividends payout dummy for the full sample 
[II] Dividend payout dummy for firms with low 
CEO stock ownership 
[111] Dividend payout dummy for firms with 
average CEO stock ownership 
[IV] Dividend payout dummy for firms with 
high CEO stock ownership 
Mean 
0 . 6 4 1 
0 . 6 7 6 
0 . 6 6 9 







0 . 0 9 7 * * * 
( 6 . 2 0 ) 
Median 
0 . 0 0 0 * * * 
( 6 . 1 8 ) 
Panel B: The possibility of dividend payout for prior payers 
Difference (II - IV) 
[1] Dividends payout dummy for the full sample 
[II] Dividend payout dummy for firms with low 
CEO stock ownership 
[III] Dividend payout dummy for firms with 
average CEO stock ownership 
[IV] Dividend payout dummy for firms with 
high CEO stock ownership 
Mean 
0 . 9 8 3 
0 . 9 7 1 
0 . 9 8 7 







- 0 . 0 1 9 * * * 
( - 3 . 6 8 ) 
Median 
- 0 . 0 0 0 * * * 
( - 3 . 6 7 ) 
Panel C: The possibility of dividend payout for prior nonpayers 
Difference (II - IV) 
[I] Dividends payout dummy for the full sample 
[11] Dividend payout dummy for firms with low 
CEO stock ownership 
[III] Dividend payout dummy for firms with 
average CEO stock ownership 
[IV] Dividend payout dummy for firms with 
high CEO stock ownership 
Mean 
0 . 0 4 6 
0 . 0 5 2 
0 . 0 5 0 







0 . 0 1 5 
( 1 . 4 5 ) 
Median 
0 . 0 0 0 
( 1 . 4 5 ) 
Panel D: The level of dividend payout for dividend payers 
Difference (1I-IV) 
[I] Dividends payout ratio for the full sample 
[II] Dividend payout ratio for firms with low 
CEO stock ownership 
[111] Dividend payout ratio for firms with 
average CEO stock ownership 
[IV] Dividend payout ratio for firms with high 
CEO stock ownership 
Mean 
0 . 0 1 7 
0 . 0 2 2 
0 . 0 1 7 
0 . 0 1 3 
Median 
0 . 0 1 3 
0 . 0 1 6 
0 . 0 1 4 
0 . 0 0 9 
Mean 
0 . 0 0 9 * * * 
( 5 . 9 4 ) 
Median 
0 . 0 0 7 * * * 
( 1 4 . 8 3 ) 
This table reports the univariate relation between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and dividend policy. 
Firms are classified into the group II, III, and IV if their CEO pay-performance sensitivity belongs to the 
bottom, middle, and top terciles of sample distribution, respectively. I report t-test and Wilcoxon rank 
sum statistics on the differences in the means and medians, respectively. The t-values for the t-test and z-
value for the Wilcoxon rank test are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 
percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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The null hypothesis is that there is no difference in the proportion or level of cash payout 
between firms with high CEO performance sensitivity and firms with low CEO 
performance sensitivity. 
Panel A of Table 1.3 reveals a strong monotonic and negative relation between 
the proportion of firms paying dividends and CEO pay-performance sensitivity. The 
proportion of dividend-paying firms with low CEO pay-performance sensitivity is 9.7% 
larger than that with high CEO PPS, which is statistically significantly. However, when 
examining firms that paid dividends in the previous year (Panel B), the average 
proportion of dividend-paying firms monotonically increases with the level of CEO pay-
performance sensitivity. The difference in the proportion of dividend-paying firms for 
firms with low and high CEO pay-performance sensitivity is -1.9% (significant at 1% 
level). For firms that did not pay dividend in the prior year, the average proportion of 
dividend-paying firms with low CEO pay-performance sensitivity is greater than that for 
firms with high CEO PPS, but the difference is not statistically significant. Panel D 
examines the dividend payout ratio across groups with different level of CEO 
performance sensitivity for dividend payer subsample. The dividend payout ratio 
decreases monotonically with the increases in pay-performance sensitivity. On average, 
firms with high CEO pay-performance sensitivity pay 9 dollars less for every 1000 
dollars of market equity than those with low CEO PPS. In summary, these univariate test 
results suggest that CEO pay-performance sensitivity is positively related to the 
likelihood of dividend payout for prior payers, while CEO PPS is negatively related to 
the level of dividend payout for dividend payers. 
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Regression Analysis 
In this section, I explore the relation between CEO pay-performance sensitivity 
and payout policy in a multivariate framework. The methodology employed to examine 
corporate payout policy requires special care because dividend policies are time-series 
correlated. To reduce the problems associated with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
in the regression residual, I employ the Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach for all 
regressions. More specifically, in the first stage, I run year-by-year, cross-sectional 
regressions using all the observations in that year. In the second stage, I compute the 
average regression coefficients from a time series of fitted coefficients, which are inputs 
to /-statistics that gauge the statistics significance of the variables. Because the Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) approach understates standard errors when both firm effects and time 
effects are present in panel data (Petersen, 2007), I compute /-statistics adjusted for serial 
correlation using the Newey and West (1987) procedure by allowing for 3 lags.1 All 
payout ratios are left censored from below at zero. To examine the substitution effect 
between dividends and repurchases, I use the composition of payout, which is measured 
by the ratio of share repurchases to total payout , censored from below at zero and above 
at 1 (Fenn and Liang, 2001). 
CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity and 
the Probability of Dividend Payout 
Table 1.4 presents results of Fama-MacBeth logit regressions where the 
dependent variable is the choice of making or omitting dividends in a given year, and the 
independent variables are CEO pay-performance sensitivity, CEO option holdings, 
19
 For robustness test, I also compute /-statistics by allowing no lag and 6 lags. The /-statistics for main 
explanatory variables are slightly reduced when higher lag is used but remain significant. 
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corporate governance, and other determinants of the propensity to pay dividends 
according to life-cycle theory from DeAnglo et al. (2006). The results from Table 1.4 
strongly support Hypothesis 1. The estimated coefficient on CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity is negative and significant (at the 10% level) in model 1. CEO pay-
performance sensitivity is negatively related to the propensity to pay dividends for the 
full sample. In model 2, I investigate whether this negative relation is nonlinear by 
expanding the analysis to include a dummy variable (High sensitivity) that takes a value 
of one if a CEO's pay-performance sensitivity belongs to the top 25% of the sample 
distribution and zero otherwise. The estimated coefficient on high sensitivity is negative 
and significant (at the 1% level) after controlling for CEO pay-performance sensitivity, 
indicating a nonlinear relation. CEOs with higher pay-performance sensitivities are less 
likely to pay dividends than those with lower pay-performance sensitivities. Models 3 
and 4 include only firms that paid dividends in the previous year. Contrary to the 
findings from the full sample, the estimated coefficients on CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity are positive and significant (at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively). The 
positive coefficient on high sensitivity indicates that the likelihood of dividend payout is 
stronger for CEO with higher PPS than those with lower PPS. Models 5 and 6 include 
only non-payers. The estimated coefficients on CEO pay-performance sensitivity are now 
negative and significant (at the 5% and 10% levels). The propensity to pay dividends 
decreases in CEO pay-performance sensitivity for non-dividend paying firms. 
34 


























- 0 . 0 1 5 * 
( - 1 . 8 1 ) 
- 0 . 3 1 4 * * * 
( - 6 . 1 9 ) 
0 . 0 6 1 
( 1 . 1 3 ) 
1 . 0 2 0 * * * 
( 2 1 . 5 8 ) 
- 0 . 5 2 8 * * * 
( - 5 . 3 0 ) 
1 . 1 2 8 * * * 
4 . 4 5 ) 
4 . 6 1 2 * * * 
( 8 . 5 8 ) 
- 1 . 9 1 3 * * * 
( - 4 . 7 7 ) 
0 . 2 3 * * * 
( 8 . 9 5 ) 
- 3 . 6 8 3 * * * 
( - 5 . 9 4 ) 
- 0 . 9 6 9 * * * 
( - 3 . 4 4 ) 
6 6 5 6 . 0 0 
- 2 9 8 2 . 0 1 
6 2 7 2 . 0 3 
6 9 0 4 . 0 2 
2 
- 0 . 0 3 4 
( - 1 . 2 4 ) 
- 0 . 5 1 1 * * * 
( - 4 . 2 1 ) 
- 0 . 2 9 9 * * * 
( - 5 . 2 1 ) 
0 . 1 0 8 * 
( 1 . 9 2 ) 
1 . 0 0 8 * * * 
( 2 1 . 7 9 ) 
- 0 . 6 0 8 * * * 
( - 6 . 5 5 ) 
1 . 1 6 1 * * * 
( 4 . 3 1 ) 
4 . 8 5 2 * * * 
( 8 . 2 7 ) 
- 1 . 8 8 7 * * * 
( - 4 . 6 5 ) 
0 . 2 4 2 * * * 
( 8 . 4 4 ) 
- 3 . 6 3 5 * * * 
( - 5 . 9 3 ) 
- 1 . 0 1 6 * * * 
( - 3 . 3 5 ) 
6 6 5 6 . 0 0 
- 2 9 5 5 . 9 2 
6 2 4 7 . 8 4 
6 9 3 7 . 2 9 
3 
8 . 6 9 7 * * 
2 . 6 8 ) 
- 0 . 9 6 9 * 
( - 2 . 0 5 ) 
- 1 . 3 7 8 
( - 0 . 6 5 ) 
3 . 0 1 3 
( 1 . 3 8 ) 
1 . 8 3 8 
( 0 . 9 4 ) 
6 . 0 6 9 * * 
( 2 . 3 3 ) 
1 8 . 7 7 9 * * 
( 2 . 3 7 ) 
- 6 . 4 6 4 
( - 0 . 7 6 ) 
- 0 . 0 7 5 
( - 0 . 0 7 ) 
- 1 3 . 9 8 4 
( - 1 . 0 3 ) 
1 3 . 1 2 * 
( 1 . 8 7 ) 
4 2 3 1 . 0 0 
- 1 9 5 . 3 5 
6 9 8 . 6 9 
1 2 6 3 . 5 2 
4 
6 . 9 0 3 * 
( 1 . 8 6 ) 
7 . 6 2 1 * * 
( 2 . 9 5 ) 
- 1 . 8 0 9 * * 
( - 2 . 4 1 ) 
- 0 . 9 3 4 
( - 0 . 4 9 ) 
1 . 4 1 8 
( 1 . 0 5 ) 
3 . 5 8 7 * 
( 2 . 0 4 ) 
5 . 2 8 3 * * 
( 2 . 6 1 ) 
1 7 . 1 6 7 
( 1 . 3 9 ) 
- 4 . 9 2 7 
( - 0 . 6 1 ) 
0 . 5 5 3 
( 0 . 5 7 ) 
- 7 . 6 0 2 
( - 0 . 7 5 ) 
9 . 3 6 5 * 
( 2 . 1 4 ) 
4 2 1 3 . 0 0 
- 1 8 2 . 7 2 
7 0 1 . 4 4 
1 3 1 7 . 6 1 
5 
- 2 . 1 5 1 * * 
( - 2 . 4 5 ) 
- 3 . 4 2 1 
( - 1 . 1 8 ) 
2 . 5 2 4 
( 1 . 4 6 ) 
2 . 6 9 3 * * 
( 3 . 0 8 ) 
- 1 . 4 3 4 * 
( - 2 . 0 2 ) 
1 . 7 7 8 
( 0 . 6 0 ) 
1 6 . 3 1 7 * * 
( 2 . 3 9 ) 
- 1 . 6 9 7 
( - 0 . 8 1 ) 
1 . 0 2 1 * * 
( 2 . 6 0 ) 
- 1 5 . 8 3 3 
( - 1 . 2 5 ) 
- 1 9 . 8 9 1 * * 
( - 2 . 7 1 ) 
2 4 2 5 . 0 0 
- 3 1 2 . 0 9 
9 3 2 . 1 9 
1 3 9 5 . 4 8 
6 
- 4 . 0 6 5 * 
( - 1 . 8 1 ) 
- 0 . 6 0 7 
( - 0 . 2 5 ) 
- 2 . 2 2 7 
( - 1 . 0 7 ) 
2 . 4 6 7 
( 1 . 4 3 ) 
2 . 1 4 4 * * * 
( 3 . 5 1 ) 
- 2 . 2 2 
( - 1 . 5 5 ) 
2 . 5 3 2 
( 0 . 7 9 ) 
1 7 . 9 5 3 * 
( 1 . 8 9 ) 
- 1 . 2 5 3 
( - 0 . 5 6 ) 
1 . 1 3 3 * * 
( 2 . 4 1 ) 
- 1 6 . 1 6 6 
( - 1 . 2 9 ) 
- 2 1 . 9 1 4 * * 
( - 2 . 5 5 ) 
2 4 2 5 . 0 0 
- 3 0 5 . 0 6 
9 4 6 . 1 2 
1 4 5 1 . 3 5 
The table reports Fama-MacBeth logit regression results on the likelihood of dividend payout over the 
period 1995-2008. The coefficients are average regression coefficients from a time series of fitted logit 
coefficients, and the /-statistics are calculated from the time series of fitted logit coefficients with the 
adjustment for serial correlation using the Newey and West procedure by allowing 3 lags. Models 1-2 
are based on the full sample. Models 3 and 4 are based on the prior payers. Models 5 and 6 are based on 
the prior nonpayers. The dependent variable is a dummy variable with a value of one if the dividend 
payout is positive in a given year, and zero otherwise. High sensitivity is a dummy variable with a value 
of one if a CEO's PPS belongs to the top 25% of the sample distribution and zero otherwise. The /-
statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 
10 percent levels, respectively. 
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It is also noteworthy that the intercepts in the logistic models for firms that paid 
dividends in the previous year are positive and significant, while they are negative and 
significant for firms with no dividend payout in the previous year. These findings imply 
a stickiness of dividend policies observed originally in Linter (1956) and Fama and 
Babiak (1968). That is, firms that currently pay dividends have an inclination for 
continuing to do so, while firms that do not currently pay dividends prefer not to initiate 
them. 
Examining the other control variables, I find that firms where CEOs receive more 
stock options have lower propensity to pay dividends. This is consistent with the notion 
that stock options are not dividend protected and may discourage CEOs from using 
dividends as a form of cash payout. Strong managerial power is associated with higher 
likelihood of dividend payout and more efficient monitoring appears to decrease the 
likelihood of dividend payout. This finding is consistent with the argument that corporate 
governance mechanisms and dividend policy are substitutes in reducing agency cost of 
free cash flow. Consistent with the life-cycle theory, the likelihood of dividend 
payments exhibits positive and significant relations with the ratio of earned to total 
common equity, profitability, and size, and negative and significant relations with growth 
opportunities and cash holdings. 
LLSV (2000), examine the relation between agency problems and dividend policy around the world and 
develop two models "outcome model" and "substitute model" In the outcome model, dividend payout is 
the outcome of effective governance, thus fiims with better governance pay highei dividends The 
substitute model aigues that dividend can be used as a substitute for other form of governance to eliminate 
fiee-cash-flow problem, thus films with pool governance pay higher dividends 
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CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity 
and the Probability of Repurchase 
and Total Payout 
Table 1.5 presents results of Fama-MacBeth logit regressions where the 
dependent variable is the choice of initiating a repurchase in a given year. The 
independent variables are the same as in Table 1.4. Table 1.5 reveals that CEO pay-
performance sensitivity is not related to the likelihood of repurchase for the full sample. 
The coefficients on CEO pay-performance sensitivity and high CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity for firms that did not buy back shares in the prior year, models 5 and 6, are 
negative and significant. The propensity to buy back shares probability is decreasing in 
CEO PPS. Also consistent with the literature, I document that CEO option holdings have 
significantly positive impact on the likelihood of repurchase for the full sample. A closer 
look indicates that this effect is driven by the firms that did not repurchase shares in the 
prior year. 
With the exception of a negative and significant coefficient on monitoring 
efficiency in models 1 and 2, none of the governance variable appears to affect 
repurchase decisions. However, the coefficients for many of the life-cycle-based 
independent variables affect the repurchase in a qualitatively similar manner as the 
dividend payment decision. In general, the likelihood of repurchasing is positively related 
to profitability and size, and negative related to growth opportunities, consistent with the 
survey evidence in Brav et al. (2005). Separate regressions for firms with different lagged 
repurchases status reveal different determinants of continuing repurchasing and initiating 
repurchase. However, the model fit for repurchase decisions is weaker than the dividend 
decision model as indicated by the log likelihood, AIC, and Schwarz Criterion values. 



















0 . 1 6 1 
( 0 . 8 6 ) 
0 . 2 4 3 * * * 
( 1 2 . 0 2 ) 
- 0 . 0 7 8 
( - 1 . 5 4 ) 
- 0 . 1 2 5 
( - 1 . 5 9 ) 
- 0 . 1 2 7 * * * 
( - 3 . 6 6 ) 
0 . 7 1 2 * * * 
( 5 . 1 4 ) 
6 . 4 1 5 * * * 
( 1 1 . 7 ) 
- 1 . 4 2 1 * * * 
( - 6 . 8 ) 
0 . 2 1 8 * * * 
( 4 . 9 6 ) 
0 . 8 7 6 * * * 
( 4 . 2 5 ) 
- 2 . 0 7 3 * * * 
( - 7 . 3 7 ) 
6 6 5 6 
- 3 7 4 1 . 8 0 
7 7 9 1 . 6 0 
8 4 2 3 . 6 0 
2 
- 0 . 1 1 9 
( - 0 . 9 9 ) 
- 0 . 2 1 5 * * 
( - 2 . 3 8 ) 
0 . 2 5 0 * * * 
( 1 1 . 5 8 ) 
- 0 . 0 5 8 
( - 1 . 1 2 ) 
- 0 . 1 1 
( - 1 . 4 0 ) 
- 0 . 1 5 3 * * * 
( - 3 . 4 4 ) 
0 . 7 1 8 * * * 
( 5 . 1 4 ) 
6 . 5 1 7 * * * 
( 1 1 . 8 9 ) 
- 1 . 4 1 2 * * * 
( - 6 . 6 5 ) 
0 . 2 2 3 * * * 
( 5 . 1 0 ) 
- 0 . 2 1 5 * * 
( - 2 . 3 8 ) 
- 2 . 0 8 8 * * * 
( - 7 . 4 8 ) 
6 6 5 6 
- 3 7 3 2 . 0 6 
7 8 0 0 . 1 2 
8 4 8 9 . 5 7 
3 
- 0 . 1 7 6 
( - 0 . 8 7 ) 
0 . 7 3 7 
( 1 . 3 0 ) 
- 1 . 1 4 7 
( - 1 . 1 ) 
- 0 . 9 2 7 
( - 0 . 7 8 ) 
- 2 . 2 0 4 
( - 1 . 0 6 ) 
1 . 0 7 * * 
( 2 . 5 2 ) 
7 . 8 6 9 * 
( 1 . 8 4 ) 
- 9 . 5 6 1 
( - 1 . 1 2 ) 
1 . 0 9 6 
( 1 . 2 4 ) 
0 . 63 
( 1 . 1 6 ) 
- 5 . 2 4 4 
( - 1 . 1 4 ) 
4 2 5 4 
- 1 3 9 4 . 3 9 
3 0 9 6 . 7 9 
3 6 5 9 . 3 9 
4 
0 . 2 6 2 
( 1 . 6 4 ) 
- 1 . 1 5 7 
( - 1 0 . 9 3 ) 
0 . 7 6 9 
( 1 . 3 5 ) 
- 1 . 1 1 2 
( - 1 . 0 6 ) 
- 0 . 9 9 1 
( - 0 . 8 1 ) 
- 2 . 2 9 6 
( - 1 . 0 9 ) 
1 . 0 9 4 * * 
( 2 . 5 3 ) 
8 . 4 5 9 * 
( 1 . 8 6 ) 
- 9 . 7 7 4 
( - 1 . 1 2 ) 
1 . 1 2 5 
( 1 . 2 4 ) 
0 . 8 6 5 
( 1 . 1 6 ) 
- 5 . 3 8 
( - 1 . 1 4 ) 
4254 
- 1 3 7 9 . 4 6 
3 0 9 4 . 9 2 
3 0 7 8 . 6 7 
5 
- 0 . 1 3 1 * * 
( - 2 . 3 6 ) 
0 . 1 5 1 * * * 
( 3 . 3 3 ) 
0 . 0 6 3 
( 1 . 1 8 ) 
- 0 . 1 4 1 
( - 1 . 1 4 ) 
0 . 1 0 0 
( 1 . 0 5 ) 
0 . 4 9 6 * * 
( 2 . 2 5 ) 
5 . 7 4 7 * * * 
( 7 . 0 9 ) 
- 2 . 1 5 1 * * * 
( - 3 . 0 1 ) 
0 . 1 0 8 * * 
( 2 . 6 7 ) 
0 . 4 1 1 
( 0 . 9 2 ) 
- 2 . 4 1 1 * * * 
( - 6 . 9 7 ) 
2 4 0 2 
- 1 2 8 5 . 0 6 
2 8 7 8 . 1 3 
3 3 4 8 . 7 7 
6 
- 0 . 0 4 6 
( 1 . 1 5 ) 
- 0 . 0 5 8 * * 
( - 2 . 3 4 ) 
0 . 1 5 2 * * * 
( 3 . 1 6 ) 
0 . 0 7 8 
( 1 . 2 8 ) 
- 0 . 1 4 2 
( - 1 . 0 8 ) 
0 . 0 9 
( 0 . 8 8 ) 
0 . 5 0 4 * * 
( 2 . 2 9 ) 
5 . 8 9 7 * * * 
( 7 . 2 6 ) 
- 2 . 1 8 7 * * * 
( - 2 . 9 8 ) 
0 . 1 0 6 * * 
( 2 . 6 4 ) 
0 . 3 5 5 
( 0 . 8 1 ) 
- 2 . 3 8 * * * 
( - 6 . 5 2 ) 
2 4 0 2 
- 1 2 7 8 . 7 3 
2 8 9 3 . 4 7 
3 4 0 6 . 9 0 
The table reports Fama-MacBeth logit regression results on open market repurchase and total payout over the period 1995-2008. The coefficients are 
average regression coefficients from a time series of fitted logit coefficients, and the /-statistics are calculated from the time series of fitted logit coefficients 
with the adjustment for serial correlation using the Newey and West procedure by allowing 3 lags. Models 1 -2 are based on the full sample. Models 3 and 
4 are based on the firms that repurchased shares in the previous year. Models 5 and 6 are based on the firms that did not purchase shares in the previous 
year. The dependent variable is a dummy variable with a value of one if the adjusted open market repurchase is positive in a given year, and zero 
otherwise. The /-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
^ i 
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Table 1.6 presents results of Fama-MacBeth logit regressions where the 
dependent variable is the choice of initiating any payout in a given year. The independent 
variables are the same as those used in the previous tables. Several aspects of the total 
payout logistic regression results are noteworthy. For firms who are prior non-payers, 
CEO pay-performance sensitivity has a negative and significant effect on the decision for 
total payouts. However, we do not observe this negative effect in models 3 and 4 for 
firms with positive cash payout in the previous year. CEO stock options have weaker 
positive impact on the likelihood of total payout when compared to repurchase firms in 
Table 1.5, as indicated by the smaller coefficients and the statistical significance. This 
corroborates argument that the option-induced increase in share repurchase is stronger 
than the negative effect of stock options on dividends. Also, the negative coefficients on 
monitoring and entrenchment suggest that firms with intensive monitoring and strong 
shareholder protection have lower need to use total cash payout to discipline 
discretionary managerial behaviors. Other variables affect total payout behavior similar 
to the dividend regressions in Table 1.4. Firms with higher retained earnings, higher 
profitability, and larger size are more likely to distribute cash. On the other hand, 
investment opportunities have a negative effect on the likelihood of cash payout. 
Table 1.6 Logit Analysis of the Determinants of Total Payout 
CEO pay-performance sensitivity 
High sensitivity 
















































































































































































The table lepoits Fama-MacBeth logit legiession lesults on open market lepurchase and total payout over the period 1995-2008 The coefficients are average regression 
coetficients tiom a time senes of fitted logit coefficients, and the /-statistics are calculated from the time series of fitted logit coefficients with the adjustment for serial 
con elation using the Newey and West procedure by allowing 3 lags Models 1 and 2 are based on the full sample Models 3 and 4 are based on the firms with positive cash 
payout in the pievious year Models 5 and 6 are based on the firms without cash payout in the previous yeai The dependent variable is a dummy variable with a value of one 
if the total payout is positive in a given yeai. and zeio otheiwise The /-statistics aie reported in paientheses ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 
10 peiccnt levels, lespectivelv 
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CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity and 
the Level of Dividend Payout 
I explore the relation between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and the level of 
dividend payout in this section. Table 1.7 presents results of Fama-MacBeth Tobit 
regressions where the dependent variable is the dividend yield. I use a different set of 
accounting variables as independent variables. Firms facing high risk are likely to keep 
low dividends (Jagannathan et al., 2000; Chay and Suh, 2009). Cash flow volatility over 
the past three years is employed to control for firm risk. I use net operating cash flow to 
control for the level of free cash flow (see Jagannathan et al., 2000). Following Fenn and 
Liang (2001), I use size and leverage to proxy for the costs of external financing. 
Investment opportunities are measured by the market-to-book asset ratio (see Smith and 
Watts, 1992; Opler and Titman, 1993).21 The sample includes only firms that have 
positive dividends at least once in the whole sample period. 
The results in Table 1.7 support Hypothesis 2. The coefficient on CEO pay-
performance sensitivity is negative and significant. Higher CEO PPS is associated with 
lower levels of dividend payments. Similar to the results for the likelihood of dividend 
payout in Table 1.4, the negative relation appears to be nonlinear. CEOs with high pay-
performance sensitivities pay out significantly lower levels of dividends than CEOs with 
low pay-performance sensitivities. This results is consistent with the agency theory. CEO 
pay-performance sensitivity and dividends are complementary mechanisms and both can 
be used as effective tools in mitigating free cash flow problem. The estimated coefficient 
on CEO stock options is also negative and significant. 
Alternatively, 1 use sales growth over previous year as the proxy for investment opportunities. The 
results remain unchanged. 
Table 1.7 Tobit Analysis of the Determinants of Dividend Yield 
C E O pay-performance 
sensitivity 
High sensitivity 
C E O option holdings 
C E O ent renchment 
Manageria l power 
Moni tor ing efficiency 
M B A 
Size 
Net operat ing cash flow 
Earnings volatility 
Leverage 
Dividends in prior year 
Intercept 
- 0 . 1 0 8 * 
( -2 .94) 
- 0 . 3 6 1 * 
( -2 .31) 
- 0 . 4 0 1 
( -1 .45 ) 
0 .676* 
(3 .93) 
- 0 . 6 7 7 * 
( -3 .40 ) 
- 0 . 4 9 3 * 







- 1 . 2 6 1 * 
( -2 .26) 
1.362 
(1 .17) 
- 0 . 1 6 2 * * 
( -2 .29) 
- 0 . 5 2 4 * * 
( -2 .22) 
- 0 . 3 3 3 * 
( -2 .13) 
- 0 . 3 6 5 
( -1 .34) 
0 .652** J 
(4 .11) 
- 0 . 7 5 6 * * J 
( -3 .41) 
- 0 . 4 6 9 * * J 







- 2 . 5 9 7 




































































N 5034 5034 
log likelihood -10578 .20 -10561 .00 
AIC 21491.02 21486 .31 
Schwarz Criterion 22137.79 22182 .56 
The table lepoits Fama-MacBeth Tobit legiessions foi the dividend yield over the period 1995-2008 The sample includes only dividend payeis The coefficients are average 
icgiession coelficients tiom a time senes of fitted Tobit coetficients, and the /-statistics aie calculated fiom the time series of fitted Tobit coefficients with the adjustment for 
senal con elation using the Newey and West procedure by allowing 3 lags The dependent variable is the dividend payout ratio, censored trom below at 0 High sensitivity is a 
dummy vanable with a value ot one if a CEO's pay-peitoimance sensitivity belongs to the top 25% of the sample distiibution and zero otheiwise Dividends in pnoi year are 
the di\ idend yields in pnoi yeai The /-statistics aie leported in paientheses ***. *", and * denote significance at the 1 peicent. 5 peicent, and 10 percent levels, lespectively 
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The negative effect of CEO stock options on dividend yield supports the 
hypothesis that options can discourage dividend payments because the value of stock 
options is negatively related to future dividend payments (Lambert et al., 1989). 
Consistent with the results in Table 1.4, the estimated coefficients on managerial power 
are positive and significant, while the estimated coefficients on monitoring efficiency are 
negative and significant. Firms with more influential management and weaker monitoring 
are associated with higher dividend yields. The results are quantitatively similar when 
the dividend yield in the prior year is controlled for in models 3 and 4. Finally, consistent 
with agency theory, growth opportunities are negatively associated with dividend levels. 
The dividend yield is negatively correlated with cash flow uncertainty in models 3 and 4. 
This result is consistent with the predictions that managers in firms with more 
unpredictable cash flows tend to avoid paying high dividends because they are less 
confident in maintaining them (Chay and Suh, 2009). The results for prior payers are 
similar to those for the full sample (untabulated). 
The level of free cash may exacerbate agency costs. Therefore, I examine the 
influence of CEO pay-performance sensitivity on dividend yield for firms with high free 
cash flow and those with low free cash flow. I construct a dummy variable (High FCF) 
with a value of one if a firm simultaneously has both net operating cash flow above 
sample median and market to book ratio below or equal to sample median, and zero 
otherwise. I then estimate specifications that include this dummy variable and its 
interaction with pay-performance sensitivity to capture the different effect of CEO PPS 
on dividend yield for firms with high and low free cash flow. This is equivalent to 
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estimating two separate regression models, while pooling the observations can maximize 
the power of the tests and force a common intercept. 
Table 1.8 presents results of Fama-MacBeth Tobit regressions where the 
dependent variable is the dividend yield. The independent variables are the same as those 
used in Table 1.7. The results for the full sample in models 1 and 2 and the subsample of 
firms with positive dividend payouts in the prior year in models 3 and 4 are remarkably 
similar. The estimated coefficients on CEO pay-performance sensitivity are negative and 
significant (at the 1 and 10% levels) in models 1 through 4. The estimated coefficient on 
the interactions between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and high free cash flow are 
positive and significant (at the 10% level) in models 1 and 3. CEOs with higher 
incentives pay higher dividends when firms suffer more severe free cash flow problem, 
relative to firms with less cash flow problems. This finding provides further support for 
the notion that CEO pay-performance sensitivity is an effective mechanism for reducing 
agency problems. In models 2 and 4, I replace CEO PPS with dummy variable for high 
sensitivity. The estimated coefficients on the interaction term between high CEO PPS 
and high FCF are positive and significant (at the 1 % level). 
Overall, the results suggest that CEOs with higher PPS are willing to distribute 
more cash in the form of dividends when the firm has extra cash flow, after controlling 
for investment opportunity. This evidence supports Hypothesis 3. 
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High sensitivity *High FCF 















- 1 . 7 0 4 * 
( - 1 . 9 3 ) 
0 . 2 3 2 * * 
( 2 . 3 2 ) 
1 . 7 9 3 * 
( 1 . 9 7 ) 
- 0 . 1 2 2 * 
( - 1 . 9 5 ) 
0 . 3 0 4 
( 1 . 1 3 ) 
0 . 7 8 9 * * * 
( 6 . 3 3 ) 
- 0 . 3 6 7 * * 
( - 2 . 9 5 ) 
- 0 . 0 9 8 
( - 0 . 1 8 ) 
0 . 0 8 6 * 
( 1 . 9 5 ) 
8 . 3 0 3 
( 1 . 1 6 ) 
- 8 . 1 2 2 * 
( - 2 . 1 3 ) 
- 0 . 9 3 7 * * 
( - 2 . 7 0 ) 
1 . 7 9 4 
( 1 . 7 3 ) 
1 2 5 0 
- 1 6 1 4 . 6 5 
3 8 6 7 . 3 5 
4 3 2 6 . 3 7 
2 
0 . 2 1 2 * 
( 1 . 8 8 ) 
- 0 . 9 1 1 * * * 
( - 2 . 9 5 ) 
1 . 1 4 5 * * * 
( 4 . 2 6 ) 
- 0 . 2 2 8 * * 
( - 2 . 6 9 ) 
0 . 3 6 0 
( 1 . 1 3 ) 
0 . 8 3 2 * * * 
( 5 . 0 7 ) 
- 0 . 4 1 4 * * * 
( - 4 . 4 3 ) 
- 0 . 1 4 9 
( - 0 . 3 1 ) 
0 . 0 2 2 * 
( 1 . 8 5 ) 
1 1 . 0 9 2 
( 1 . 1 4 ) 
- 7 . 5 3 5 
( - 1 . 0 6 ) 
- 1 . 2 7 2 * 
( - 2 . 0 7 ) 
2 . 0 2 2 * * 
( 2 . 5 7 ) 
1 2 5 0 
- 1 6 2 5 . 7 
4 3 5 3 . 9 9 
3 8 9 4 . 9 7 
3 
- 1 . 6 0 0 * 
( - 1 . 9 4 ) 
0 . 0 5 * * 
( 2 . 4 4 ) 
0 . 1 9 9 * 
( 2 . 0 8 ) 
- 0 . 1 9 7 * 
( - 1 . 9 5 ) 
0 . 2 2 2 
( 0 . 8 6 ) 
0 . 5 5 * * * 
( 1 1 . 4 3 ) 
- 0 . 2 1 5 
( - 1 . 6 4 1 ) 
- 0 . 0 2 5 
( - 0 . 0 4 ) 
0 . 1 0 8 * * 
( 2 . 3 0 ) 
6 . 4 1 6 
( 1 . 1 2 ) 
- 5 . 0 6 8 * 
( - 1 . 8 6 ) 
- 0 . 5 1 6 * * 
( - 2 . 3 3 ) 
2 . 1 4 8 
( 1 . 6 2 ) 
9 8 5 
- 1 2 6 5 . 6 1 
3 1 4 4 . 9 4 
3 5 5 8 . 7 5 
4 
0 . 2 3 2 
( 1 . 5 6 ) 
- 0 . 8 6 4 * * * 
( - 4 . 6 9 ) 
1 . 2 1 0 * * * 
( 2 . 8 3 ) 
- 0 . 1 6 4 * * 
( - 2 . 4 8 ) 
0 . 2 7 7 
( 0 . 8 8 ) 
0 . 6 4 8 * * * 
( - 4 . 8 6 ) 
- 0 . 2 8 7 * * * 
- 3 . 6 9 ) 
- 0 . 1 1 9 
- 0 . 2 3 ) 
0 . 1 5 2 * * 
( 2 . 3 4 ) 
1 0 . 4 6 7 
( 1 . 0 7 ) 
- 4 . 2 2 6 
( - 0 . 6 3 ) 
- 1 . 1 8 4 * 
( - 1 . 8 9 ) 
2 . 4 5 4 * * 
( 2 . 4 1 ) 
9 8 5 
- 1 2 7 7 . 2 0 
3 1 7 1 . 9 3 
3 5 8 8 . 7 4 
The table reports Tama-MacBeth Tobit regressions for the dividend yield with the consideration of the level of free 
cash flow over the period 1995-2008 The coefficients are average regression coefficients from a time series of 
fitted Tobit coefficients, and the /-statistics are calculated from the time series of fitted Tobit coefficients with the 
ad|ustment for serial correlation using the Newey and West procedure by allowing 3 lags Models 1 and 2 include 
all the dividend payers Models 3 and 4 only include dividend payer firms who have positive cash dividend on 
common stock in the prior year The dependent variable is the dividend payout ratio, censored form below at zero 
High FCr is a dummy variable equals to one if a firm simultaneously has net operating cash flow above sample 
median and market to book ratio below or equal to sample median, and zero otherwise High sensitivity is a dummy 
variable with a value of one if a CEO's pay-performance sensitivity belongs to the top 25% of the sample 
distribution and zero otherwise Dividends in prior year are the dividend yields in prior year The /-statistics are 
reported in parentheses *** **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively 
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CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity 
and the Level of Repurchase 
and Total Payout 
In this section, I examine the relation between CEO pay-performance sensitivity 
and the level of repurchase and total payout. Table 1.9 presents results of Fama-MacBeth 
togit regressions where the dependent variable is the level of repurchase in a given year. 
I used net cash flow to replace net operating cash flow to control for the level of free cash 
(see Fama and French, 2001). All the other independent variables are the same as those 
for dividend yield regression. The sample only includes firms repurchased shares at least 
once in the sample period. 
Models 1-4 of Table 1.9 examine the level of repurchase for all share repurchases. 
None of the estimated coefficients on CEO pay-performance sensitivity are significant. 
The results suggest that no apparent link exists between CEO pay-performance sensitivity 
and the level of repurchases. Conversely, the estimated coefficients on CEO option 
holdings are positive and significant (at the 1% level) in all models. CEO option holdings 
have pronounced positive effects on repurchases. This effect holds after controlling for 
the amount of repurchase in the prior year in models 3 and 4. 
None of the estimated coefficients on the governance variables are significant. 
Governance appears to have no effect on repurchase. The estimated coefficient on net 
cash flow is positive and significant (at the 1% level) in all models. Higher free cash 
flows are associated with higher levels of repurchase. 
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Table 1.9 (Continued) 
The table reports Fama-MacBeth Tobit regressions for the level of repurchase over the period 1995-2008. The sample only includes firms that repurchased 
shares at least once in the sample period. The coefficients are average regression coefficients from a time series of fitted Tobit coefficients, and the /-
statistics are calculated from the time series of fitted Tobit coefficients with the adjustment for serial correlation using the Newey and West procedure by 
allowing 3 lags. Models 1-4 examine the level of repurchases for all share repuchasers. The Dependent variable is the repurchase payout ratio, censored 
from below at zero. Models 5-6 examine the substitutability effect between dividends and repurchase. The dependent variable is the ratio of adjusted open 
market share repurchase to total payout, censored from below at zero and above at one. High sensitivity is a dummy variable with a value of one if a CEO's 
pay-performance sensitivity belongs to the top 25% of the sample distribution and zero otherwise. Repurchase in prior year is the repurchase payout ratio in 
prior year. The /-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Agency theory of free cash flow posits that dividends and repurchases both may 
reduce the amount of discretionary cash and serve as substitutes in mitigating agency 
problems. Models 5-6 examine the substitutability effect between dividends and share 
repurchase. In models 5 and 6, I provide some insight into substitutability. The 
dependent variable is the ratio of repurchase to total payout, censored at zero from below 
and 1 from above. I find that CEO pay-performance sensitivity has no impact on the mix 
of repurchases and dividends. However, CEO stock options are positively correlated with 
the payout mix, indicating that stock options encourage cash payout in the form of 
repurchases at the costs of dividends. Conversely, CEO entrenchment and strong 
managerial power encourage dividends at the cost of repurchases. This indicates that 
dividends are a more efficient mechanism for constraining managerial behavior. 
The market-to-book ratio has a positive and significant relation with the payout 
mix. Firms with greater investment opportunities require more flexible payout policies 
and therefore rely more heavily on repurchases than dividends. The strong positive 
correlation between payout mix and earnings volatility and net cash flow also confirm 
this finding. These results are also in line with the flexibility hypothesis (Jagannathan et 
al. 2000): increases in the volatility of cash flow and free cash flow significantly increase 
the share of payouts made through repurchases. Finally, the negative coefficient on 
leverage suggests that firms reduce repurchase before dividends when the internal cash 
flow is not sufficient. 
Table 1.10 presents results of Fama-MacBeth togit regressions where the 
dependent variable is the total payout in a given year. The sample only includes firms 
associated with positive total cash payout at least once in the entire sample period. 
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Table 1.10 Tobit Analysis of the Determinants of Total Payout 










Net cash flow 
Earnings volatility 
Leverage 
Payout in prior year 
Intercept 
- 0 . 0 0 5 * * * 
( - 5 . 1 9 ) 
0 . 5 2 1 * * 
( 2 . 3 7 ) 
- 0 . 3 2 6 * * 
( - 2 . 1 7 ) 
0 . 6 2 6 * * * 
( 3 . 6 8 ) 
- 0 . 3 4 5 
( - 1 . 4 8 ) 
- 0 . 3 1 4 * * * 
( - 7 . 4 5 ) 
0 . 3 5 3 
( 1 . 6 6 ) 
1 5 . 6 9 2 * * * 
( 4 . 4 4 ) 
2 . 5 9 8 
( 0 . 1 7 ) 
1 . 9 0 4 
( 0 . 9 3 ) 
0 . 8 8 7 
( 0 . 6 0 ) 
- 0 . 0 8 9 * 
( - 1 . 9 5 ) 
- 0 . 9 0 5 * * 
( - 2 . 6 2 ) 
0 . 5 7 3 * * 
( 2 . 3 0 ) 
- 0 . 2 7 8 
( - 1 . 6 9 ) 
0 . 5 8 5 * * * 
( 3 . 9 1 ) 
- 0 . 4 6 6 
( - 1 . 4 9 ) 
- 0 . 3 5 2 * * * 
( - 6 . 5 0 ) 
0 . 3 6 6 
( 1 . 7 0 ) 
1 6 . 1 0 7 * * 
( 2 . 3 7 ) 
1 . 9 9 3 
( 0 . 1 4 ) 
1 . 8 6 9 
( 0 . 9 0 ) 
0 . 8 4 8 
( 0 . 5 7 ) 
- 0 . 0 6 2 * * * 
( - 5 . 6 6 ) 
0 . 4 4 6 * * 
( 2 . 3 1 ) 
- 0 . 3 0 6 * 
( - 1 . 9 7 ) 
0 . 3 6 9 * 
( 1 . 9 2 ) 
- 0 . 2 9 9 
( - 1 . 3 9 ) 
- 0 . 2 6 8 * * * 
( - 6 . 8 6 ) 
0 . 3 3 3 * 
( 1 . 8 1 ) 
1 5 . 8 3 7 * * * 
( 3 . 3 3 ) 
1 . 1 8 0 
( 0 . 0 9 ) 
1 . 5 2 7 
( 0 . 8 4 ) 
0 . 4 0 1 * * * 
( 5 . 6 8 ) 
- 0 . 0 3 9 
( - 0 . 0 3 ) 
- 0 . 1 5 0 * 
( - 1 . 9 4 ) 
- 0 . 8 8 9 * * 
( - 2 . 7 3 ) 
0 . 5 0 1 * * 
( 2 . 2 3 ) 
- 0 . 2 6 7 
( - 1 . 5 6 ) 
0 . 3 2 7 
( 1 . 7 1 ) 
- 0 . 4 2 3 
( - 1 . 3 6 ) 
- 0 . 2 9 9 * * * 
( - 5 . 9 3 ) 
0 . 3 4 4 
( 1 . 8 5 ) 
1 6 . 2 4 3 * * 
( 2 . 8 5 ) 
0 . 5 4 3 
( 0 . 0 4 ) 
1 . 4 8 9 
( 0 . 8 1 ) 
0 . 4 0 7 
( 5 . 3 0 ) 
- 0 . 0 8 1 
( - 0 . 0 6 ) 
N 6258 6258 6258 6258 
log likelihood -17267.30 -17251.5 -16799.70 -16781.00 
AIC 34874.00 34864.00 34004.00 34000.00 
Schwarz Criterion 35551.00 35597.00 34696.00 34745.00 
The table reports Fama-MacBeth Tobit regressions for the level of total payout over the period 1995-
2008. The sample only includes firms that have positive cash payout at least once in the sample period. 
The coefficients are average regression coefficients from a time series of fitted Tobit coefficients, and 
the /-statistics are calculated from the time series of fitted Tobit coefficients with the adjustment for 
serial correlation using the Newey and West procedure by allowing 3 lags. The dependent variable is 
the total payout ratio, censored form below at zero. High sensitivity is a dummy variable with a value 
of one if a CEO's pay-performance sensitivity belongs to the top 25% of the sample distribution and 
zero otherwise. Total payout in prior year is the total payout ratio in prior year. The /-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. 
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I find that the level of total payout is significantly decreasing in CEO pay-
performance sensitivity. However, the relation between total payouts and CEO stock 
option holdings is positive. This suggests that the option-induced increase in repurchase 
overcomes the option-induced reduction in dividends. Similar to the results of dividend 
yield, firms with higher level of agency conflicts between managers and shareholders 
have higher level of total cash payout. This suggests that cash payouts can be used as a 
mechanism in reducing agency problem. The results for the sample including only prior 
payers are similar to those for the full sample (not reported in the table). 
CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity 
and Dividend Smoothing 
I examine the effect of CEO pay-performance sensitivity on dividend smoothing 
in this section. Table 1.11 presents results from Fama-MacBeth regressions of a dividend 
smoothing model for firms that pay dividends continuously for a 5-year period over my 
sample period. I used the Fama-MacBeth procedure to estimate the traditional dividend 
smoothing, or speed of adjustment model (Lintner, 1956; Fama and Babiak, 1968) and an 
adjusted dividend smoothing model that incorporates CEO pay-performance sensitivity. 
Higher absolute value of estimated coefficients on lagged dividends reflect a lower level 
of dividend smoothing. 
I replicate traditional dividend smoothing model in model 1. The estimated 
coefficient on lagged dividends is negative and significant (at the 1% level). The results 
indicate that the speed of adjustment is 0.074. 
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Table 1.11 Dividend Smoothing and CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity 
Divlag 

















- 0 . 
( - 6 . 
0 . 
( 9 . 
0 . 
( 5 . 
1 
. 0 7 4 * * * 
. 5 3 ) 
. 0 2 1 * * * 
. 1 2 ) 
. 0 2 5 * * * 
. 0 5 ) 
7 0 4 3 
7 . .6% 
- 0 
( - 6 . 
0 
( 9 . 
0 . 
( 2 . 
- 0 . 
( - 2 . 
0 . 
( 4 . 
2 
. 0 6 6 * * * 
. 6 6 ) 
. 0 2 1 * * * 
. 0 4 ) 
. 0 0 9 * * 
. 2 1 ) 
. 0 1 3 * * 
. 8 7 ) 
. 0 3 0 * * * 
. 5 0 ) 
7 0 4 3 
8 . .7% 
- 0 
( - 6 
0 




( - 2 
0 . 
( 3 . 
3 
. 0 6 5 * * * 
. 5 8 ) 
. 0 2 1 * * * 
. 1 3 ) 
. 0 1 8 * 
. 8 9 ) 
. 0 3 3 * 
. 0 0 ) 
. 0 3 0 * * * 
. 9 2 ) 
7 0 4 3 
8 .8% 
4 
- 0 . 0 7 4 * * * 
( - 5 . 3 2 ) 
0 . 0 2 3 * * * 
( 5 . 2 1 ) 
0 . 0 0 7 
( 0 . 6 8 ) 
- 0 . 0 0 6 * * 
( - 2 . 4 9 ) 
0 . 0 0 6 * * 
( 2 . 4 2 ) 
- 0 . 0 0 0 
( - 0 . 0 1 ) 
- 0 . 0 0 5 * 
( - 1 . 8 8 ) 
- 0 . 0 0 3 
( - 0 . 5 5 ) 
- 0 . 0 8 3 
( - 1 . 0 0 ) 
0 . 0 0 7 
( 1 . 6 2 ) 
0 . 0 1 4 * * * 
( 3 . 8 2 ) 
- 0 . 0 3 8 
( - 1 . 1 0 ) 
4 0 3 0 
1 4 . 9 % 
5 
- 0 . 0 6 6 * * * 
( - 4 . 9 6 ) 
0 . 0 2 2 * * * 
( 4 . 8 9 ) 
0 . 0 1 1 
( - 0 . 5 5 ) 
- 0 . 0 0 5 * * 
( - 2 . 7 2 ) 
0 . 0 0 7 * * * 
( 4 . 0 0 ) 
- 0 . 0 0 3 
( - 0 . 5 2 ) 
- 0 . 0 0 5 
( - 1 . 4 5 ) 
- 0 . 0 0 5 
( - 1 . 1 5 ) 
- 0 . 0 7 1 
( - 0 . 8 8 ) 
0 . 0 0 7 
( 1 . 7 5 ) 
0 . 0 1 3 * * * 
( 3 . 4 9 ) 
- 0 . 0 3 7 
- 1 . 2 1 ) 
4 0 3 0 
1 4 . 8 % 
The table reports Fama-MacBeth regression results of dividend smoothing model for firms that pay 
dividends continuously in at least 5 years over the sample period 1995-2008. The coefficients are average 
regression coefficients from a time series of fitted OLS coefficients, and the /-statistics are calculated 
from the time series of fitted OLS coefficients with the adjustment for serial correlation using the Newey 
and West procedure by allowing 3 lags. The dependent variable is current dividend per share minus 
lagged dividend per share. Div lag is the lagged dividend per share. High sensitivity is a dummy variable 
with a value of one if a CEO's pay-performance sensitivity belongs to the top 25% of the sample 
distribution and zero otherwise. The /-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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This number is slightly larger than the literature and represents the declining trend 
in dividend smoothing in recent years. Model 2 investigates the prediction that CEOs 
with higher pay-performance sensitivity smooth dividends less. The traditional model is 
adjusted to include an interaction term for dividends per share in the prior year and CEO 
pay-performance sensitivity. The estimated coefficient on CEO PPS is positive and 
significant (at the 5% level). Higher CEO PPS is associated with larger dividend changes. 
However, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term (-0.013) is negative and 
significant (at the 5% level). The model indicates that a 1% increase in CEO pay-
performance sensitivity increases the speed of adjustment by 0.013. CEOs with higher 
pay-performance sensitivities smooth dividend less. 
Model 3 replaces CEO pay-performance sensitivity with a dummy variable for 
high CEO pay-performance sensitivity. The estimated coefficient on the interaction term 
between lagged dividends and high CEO PPS is negative and significant (at the 10% 
level). Again, this suggests that higher CEO pay-performance sensitivity is associated 
with greater speed of adjustment and less dividend smoothing. Lastly, models 4 and 5 
incorporate controls for size, profitability, and investment opportunities into the basic 
regressions. My conclusions are unchanged. Higher CEO pay-performance sensitivity is 
associated with less dividend smoothing. 
Moreover, in untabulated results I also document that the speed of adjustment when CEO pay-
performance sensitivity is held constant at the mean value plus one standard deviation is larger than the 
speed of adjustment when CEO pay-performance sensitivity is held constant at the mean value minus one 
standard deviation. The difference of 0.036 is significant (at 1% level). 
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Robustness Test 
I conducted several tests for the robustness of my results in this section. I used 
different proxies for firm characteristics, different scale factors for variables, and 
different control variables in the regression. My conclusions are unchanged. 
Alternative Sample Selection 
Including firm-years when firms are not likely to be payers may bias tests of the 
relation between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and payout policy. To explore the 
robustness of the logistic regression model, I employ an alternative sample selection 
strategy by focusing only on the firms that are predicted to pay dividends. This model is 
estimated using firm fundamentals as in DeAngelo et al. (2006). More specifically, I run 
a logistic regression model with a dividend dummy as the dependent variable and 
retained earnings, return on assets, sale growth rate, firm size, and cash holdings as 
independent variables. The estimated coefficients are then used to predict the likelihood 
of dividend payment. A firm is predicted to be a dividend-paying firm if the estimated 
probability exceeds 50% and a non-paying firm otherwise. This methodology provides a 
more homogenous sample when examining the relation between CEO stock incentives 
and the propensity of dividend payout. I also apply the same sample selection method to 
the case of total payout. My primary results are unchanged and reported in Table 1.12. 
_J
 I did not apply this sample selection method in case of repurchase because CEO PPS appears to have no 
effect on the likelihood of repurchase (see Table 2.5). 
Table 1.12 Logit Analysis of the Determinants of Cash Payouts Using Alternative Sample 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
- 0 . 1 3 9 * - 0 . 0 3 9 - 0 . 0 3 0 - 0 . 2 1 1 * - 0 . 2 3 8 * * - 0 . 2 6 4 * 
C E O pay-performance sensitivity ( -1 .83) ( -1 .31) ( -1 .04) ( -2 .08) ( -2 .25) ( -2 .14) 
High sensitivity - 0 . 8 0 5 * * * - 0 . 4 7 2 * * - 0 . 6 1 3 * * * - 0 . 5 7 5 * * * - 0 . 3 5 4 * - 0 . 7 1 5 * * 
( -9 .39) ( -2 .77) ( -3 .08) ( -3 .77) ( -1 .95 ) ( -2 .88 ) 
C E O option holdings - 0 . 3 1 8 * * * - 0 . 3 2 1 * * * - 0 . 0 4 6 0 .077 
( -7 .05) ( -6 .41) ( -1 .60) (1 .46) 
C E O ent renchment 0 .126*** 0 .147*** - 0 . 0 8 4 - 0 . 0 9 8 
(4 .71) (5 .17) ( -1 .13) ( -1 .21) 
Manager ia l power 1.343*** 1.I6O*** 0 .805*** 0 .483** 
(29.48) (28.46) (33.72) (6 .19) 
Moni to r ing efficiency - 0 . 5 5 5 * * * - 0 . 5 9 0 * * * - 0 . 3 2 8 * * - 0 . 4 0 3 * " 
( -4 .68) ( -5 .01) ( -2 .92) ( -4 .03) 
Earned to total equity 1.706*** 1.824** 
(3.07) (6 .29) 
ROA 5.142*** 8.362** 
(5.43) (13 .12) 
Sale growth - 1 . 8 7 * * * - 2 . 3 6 9 * * 
( -6 .98) ( -5 .78) 
Size 0 .264*** 0.367** 
(5 .22) (11.11) 
Cash holdings - 5 . 8 6 7 * * * - 0 . 4 5 2 
( -3 .79) ( -0 .53) 
Intercept 1.432*** 1.719*** - 1 . 3 0 2 * * 2 .059*** 2 .238*** - 1 . 8 0 3 * * 
(6 .20) (10.07) ( -2 .33) (13.38) (21.52) ( -5 .92) 
N 5095 5095 5095 5095 5095 5095 
log likelihood - 2 7 0 3 . 9 4 - 2 2 9 4 . 2 5 - 2 1 1 6 . 8 3 - 2 4 6 3 . 0 6 - 2 3 0 2 . 0 7 - 1 9 4 9 . 0 3 
AIC 5491.87 4784.94 4569.65 5010 .11 4800.14 4234.05 
Schwarz Criterion 5653.48 5176.57 5216.07 5180 .63 5198 .03 4916.15 
Table 1.12 (Continued) 
The table reports from using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach to logit regression on the likelihood of dividend and total payout over the period 1995-2008. 
The sample only includes the firms that predicted to be dividend payers, estimated using firm fundamentals as indicated in DeAngelo et al. (2006). The 
coefficients are average regression coefficients from a time series of fitted logit coefficients, and the /-statistics are calculated from the time series of fitted 
logit coefficients with the adjustment for serial correlation using the Newey and West procedure by allowing 3 lags. Models 1-3 examine the likelihood of 
dividend payout. Models 4-6 examines the likelihood of total payout. High sensitivity is a dummy variable with a value of one if a CEO's PPS belongs to the 
top 25% of the sample distribution and zero otherwise. The /-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Exploring Endogeneity 
My analysis assumes that CEO ownership structure is exogenous. Alternatively, 
CEO ownership structure could be determined endogenously with dividend policy and 
other corporate governance mechanisms. The possibility that CEO stock ownership is 
endogenous gives rise to two related concerns. First, the model specification suffers an 
omitted variable bias. Thus, the model does not capture all determinants of dividend 
payout policy and there are unobserved firm-specific or CEO-specific characteristics that 
influence both payout policy and managerial ownership simultaneously. Accordingly, 
any observed correlation between CEO stock incentives and dividend policy is purely 
spurious. However, Fama-MacBeth regression reduces this type endogeneity bias. 
Second, the direction of causality between CEO stock ownership and payout 
policy is difficult to infer. It is possible that changes in payout policy change firm value, 
which in turn requires the adjustment of CEO stock incentives to move towards optimal 
level. From this perspective, the contemporaneous relation between CEO ownership and 
payout policy is subject to the concern that changes in payout policy lead to changes in 
CEO pay-performance sensitivity. I address this concern by re-estimating regression 
models using lagged rather than contemporaneous CEO pay-performance sensitivity. If 
CEO pay-performance sensitivity causes dividends we will observe a relation between 
CEO PPS in year t-\ and the propensity of dividend payment in year t. Similarly, if CEO 
pay-performance sensitivity impacts the level of cash payout, we will observe a relation 
between CEO PPS and the level of payout in the subsequent year. I report the results of 
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robustness tests for causality in Tables 1.13 through 1.16. The results are quantitatively 
similar to those reported in Tables 1.4, 1.6, 1.7, and 1.10. 24 
Out-of-Sample Forecast Performance 
Following Hu and Kumar (2004), I examine the out-of-sample forecast 
performance of the logistic models on the likelihood of positive cash payout and the 
Tobit models on the level of the payout. The in-sample period is defined as year 1995-
2006 and the out-of-sample period is defined as year 2007-2008. 
Out-of sample Forecast Performance 
of Logistic Regressions 
To assess the predictability of the logistic regressions, I estimate the coefficients 
of base models (model 1 in Tables 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5) for the in-sample period. I then used 
the coefficients to compute the probability of a firm paying dividends, repurchasing 
shares, or having a positive cash payout for the out-of-sample period. If the estimated 
probability of a cash payout is larger than (less than or equal to) 50%, a firm is predicted 
to be a paying (non-paying) firm. These predictions are then compared to the actual 
payout records to generate the accuracy of predictability, which is computed as the ratio 
of number of actual firms in each category scaled by the number of predicted firms in 
each category. 
Table 1.17 reports the results of the forecasting performance of logistic 
regressions. Consistent with the findings in Hu and Kumar (2004), the model performs 
better for the likelihood of dividend payout (Panel A) compared with the likelihood of 
repurchase (Panel B) and total payout (Panel C). 
As indicated in Tables 1.5 and 1.9, CEO PPS does not have significantly effect on the decision of 
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Table 1.13 (Continued) 
The table reports Fama-MacBeth logit regression results on the likelihood of dividend payout over the period 1995-2008. The coefficients are average 
regression coefficients from a time series of fitted logit coefficients, and the ^-statistics are calculated from the time series of fitted logit coefficients with the 
adjustment for serial correlation using the Newey and West procedure by allowing 3 lags. Models 1-2 are based on the full sample. Models 3 and 4 are based 
on the prior payers. Models 5 and 6 are based on the prior nonpayers. The dependent variable is a dummy variable with a value of one if the dividend payout is 
positive in a given year, and zero otherwise. Lagged high sensitivity is a dummy variable with a value of one if a CEO's lagged PPS belongs to the top 25% of 
the sample distribution and zero otherwise. The ^-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels, respectively. 
Table 1.14 Lagged CEO PPS and the Likelihood of Total Payout 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Lagged CEO pay-performance sensitivity 
Lagged high sensitivity 









0 . 3 2 6 
( 1 . 6 0 ) 
0 . 0 4 9 
( 1 . 5 4 ) 
- 0 . 2 1 6 * 
( - 2 . 0 9 ) 
0 . 4 7 7 * * * 
( 6 . 7 4 ) 
- 0 . 1 9 4 
( - 1 . 3 7 ) 
0 . 8 6 9 * * * 
( 4 . 9 7 ) 
6 . 1 8 * * * 
( 8 . 0 5 ) 
- 1 . 8 7 9 * * * 
( - 3 . 9 4 ) 
0 . 3 1 6 * * * 
( 1 1 . 3 8 ) 
- 0 . 8 2 0 
- 0 . 3 9 5 * * 
( - 2 . 3 6 ) 
- 0 . 4 3 5 * * 
( - 2 . 1 2 ) 
0 . 0 5 5 
( 1 . 4 0 ) 
- 0 . 1 9 3 
( - 1 . 7 1 ) 
0 . 4 6 5 * * * 
( 6 . 7 6 ) 
- 0 . 2 4 7 * 
( - 1 . 8 5 ) 
0 . 8 8 3 * * * 
( 4 . 9 4 ) 
6 . 4 8 7 * * * 
( 7 . 7 4 ) 
- 1 . 9 1 5 * * * 
( - 3 . 8 7 ) 
0 . 3 2 4 * * * 
( 1 0 . 7 4 ) 
- 0 . 8 2 5 
5 . 8 1 2 
( 1 . 1 9 ) 
0 . 8 3 5 
( 1 . 2 3 ) 
- 0 . 3 0 4 
( - 0 . 6 6 ) 
1 . 1 6 6 * * * 
( 3 . 6 3 ) 
- 0 . 8 5 3 * * 
( - 2 . 2 7 ) 
1 . 6 7 6 * 
( 2 . 1 7 ) 
1 3 . 7 5 9 * * * 
( 3 . 5 0 ) 
1 . 3 2 5 
( 0 . 2 7 ) 
0 . 7 3 4 * * 
( 2 . 2 8 ) 
4 . 4 1 3 
5 . 6 7 9 
( 1 . 1 6 ) 
- 0 . 1 7 6 
( - 0 . 2 9 ) 
0 . 8 0 9 
( 1 . 3 0 ) 
- 0 . 2 4 3 
( - 0 . 5 5 ) 
1 . 2 5 5 * * * 
( 3 . 1 6 ) 
- 1 . 0 4 7 * * 
( - 2 . 1 7 ) 
1 . 8 0 9 * * 
( 2 . 2 0 ) 
1 3 . 6 1 6 * * * 
( 3 . 9 7 ) 
0 . 5 2 1 
( 0 . 1 1 ) 
0 . 9 1 8 * 
( 2 . 0 4 ) 
4 . 5 8 4 
- 5 . 9 2 2 * 
( - 2 . 1 0 ) 
1 . 0 0 0 
( 1 . 3 5 ) 
1 . 3 3 6 
( 0 . 6 0 ) 
0 . 5 8 3 
( 0 . 1 6 ) 
6 . 2 1 6 
( 1 . 4 3 ) 
1 . 0 5 1 
( 1 . 6 6 ) 
1 4 . 7 2 * 
( 1 . 8 2 ) 
- 6 . 0 5 9 
( - 1 . 1 9 ) 
- 1 . 5 3 9 
( - 0 . 8 3 ) 
- 1 7 . 2 3 4 
3 . 5 8 3 
( 1 . 1 7 ) 
- 0 . 0 3 7 * * 
( - 2 . 5 3 ) 
0 . 3 8 2 
( 0 . 8 9 ) 
1 . 676 
( 0 . 8 5 ) 
0 . 0 6 8 
( 0 . 0 2 ) 
6 . 4 4 7 
( 1 . 4 7 ) 
0 . 4 8 6 
( 0 . 7 4 ) 
3 0 . 0 8 4 * 
( 2 . 0 4 ) 
- 5 . 4 5 5 
( - 1 . 2 4 ) 
- 1 . 1 5 0 
( - 0 . 6 8 ) 
- 1 3 . 1 5 3 
















































The table reports Fama-MacBeth logit regression results on open market repurchase and total payout over the period 1995-2008 The coefficients are average 
regression coefficients from a time series of fitted logit coefficients, and the /-statistics are calculated from the time series of fitted logit coefficients with the 
adjustment for serial correlation using the Newey and West procedure by allowing 3 lags Models 1 and 2 are based on the full sample Models 3 and 4 are 
based on the firms with positive cash payout in the previous year Models 5 and 6 are based on the firms without cash payout in the previous year The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable with a value of one if the total payout is positive in a given year, and zero otherwise Lagged high sensitivity is a 
dummy variable with a value of one if a CEO's lagged PPS belongs to the top 25% of the sample distribution and zero otherwise The ^-statistics are reported 
in parentheses ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively 
Table 1.15 Lagged CEO PPS and Dividend Yield 
Lagged CEO pay-performance sensitivity 
Lagged high sensitivity 
CEO option holdings 
CEO entrenchment 




- 0 080* 
( - 1 88) 
- 0 187 
( - 0 63) 
- 0 209 
( 1 10) 
0 5 3 6 * 
(3 90) 
- 0 5 3 3 * 
( - 3 35) 
- 0 4 7 3 * 
( - 1 0 24) 
- 0 1 6 7 * 
- 0 1 0 4 * 
( - 1 90) 
- 0 2 7 8 * 
( -2 72) 
- 0 175 
( - 0 60) 
- 0 182 
( - 0 94) 
0 5 2 6 * 
(4 02) 
- 0 5 7 1 * 
( - 3 76) 
- 0 4 5 5 * 
( - 9 59) 





























- 0 2 0 4 * * 
( -2 31) 
- 0 0 1 1 
( - 0 04) 
- 0 184 
( - 0 91) 
0 2 3 7 * * 
(2 39) 
- 0 4 5 4 * * 
( -2 32) 
- 0 2 9 9 * * * 
( - 3 96) 
- 0 129 
OS 
O 
Table 1 15 (Continued) 
Net cash flow 
Earnings volatility 
Leverage 
Dividends in prior year 
Intercept 























































0 5 0 1 * * * 
(3 64) 














The table reports Fama-MacBeth Tobit regressions for the dividend yield over the period 1995-2008 The sample includes only dividend payers The 
coefficients are average regression coefficients from a time series of fitted Tobit coefficients, and the ^-statistics are calculated from the time series of fitted 
Tobit coefficients with the adjustment for serial correlation using the Newey and West procedure by allowing 3 lags The dependent variable is the dividend 
payout ratio, censoied from below at zero Lagged high sensitivity is a dummy variable with a value of one if a CEO's lagged PPS belongs to the top 25%> of 
the sample distribution and zero otherwise Dividends in prior year are the dividend yields in prior year The /-statistics are reported in parentheses ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively 
Table 1.16 Lagged CEO PPS and Total Payout 
Lagged CEO pay-performance sensitivity 
Lagged high sensitivity 
CEO option holdings 
CEO entrenchment 
(-2 32) 
0 2 9 6 * * 
(2 29) 
- 0 1 1 9 * 
- 0 044 
( - 1 54) 
- 0 3 7 0 * 
( -2 72) 
0 2 9 2 * 
(2 92) 











- 0 055 
( -0 73) 
- 0 2 5 7 * * 
(-2 50) 
0 2 5 4 * * 
(2 56) 
- 0 100 
Table 1.16 (Continued) 




Net cash flow 
Earnings volatility 
Leverage 
payout in prior year 
Intercept 
( - 1 . 8 1 ) 
0 . 5 1 0 * 
( 2 . 9 7 ) 
- 0 . 2 9 7 * 
( - 2 . 7 5 ) 
- 0 . 8 4 4 * 
( - 5 . 5 9 ) 
0 . 1 2 1 
( 1 . 2 8 ) 
2 0 . 1 6 8 * 
( 1 5 . 8 4 ) 
5 . 9 7 5 
( 0 . 7 9 ) 
4 . 2 5 6 * 
( 1 . 8 9 ) 
1 . 2 5 1 












































































The table reports Fama-MacBeth Tobit regressions for the level of total payout over the period 1995-2008. The sample only includes firms that have positive 
cash payout at least once in the sample period. The coefficients are average regression coefficients from a time series of fitted Tobit coefficients, and the t-
statistics are calculated from the time series of fitted Tobit coefficients with the adjustment for serial correlation using the Newey and West procedure by 
allowing 3 lags. The dependent variable is the total payout ratio, censored form below at zero. Lagged high sensitivity is a dummy variable with a value of one 
if a CEO's lagged PPS belongs to the top 25% of the sample distribution and zero otherwise. Total payout in prior year is the total payout ratio in prior year. 
The /-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Table 1.17 Out-of-Sample Predictability of the Logistic Regression for 2007-2008 
Panel A Oiit-ot-Sample predictive accuracy for the probability of dividend 
Actual dividend for year 2007-2008 
Model Prediction Non-payment Payment Number of observations Total accuracy 
Non-payment 100 (83.33%) 20 120 (71.32%) 
Payment 200 447 (69.09%) 647 
Panel B Out-ot-Sample predictive accuracy for the probability of repurchase 
Actual repurchase tor year 2007-2008 
Model Prediction Non-payment Payment 
Non-payment 6 (50.00%) 6 
Payment 161 594 (78.68%) 
Panel C Out-ot-Sample predictive accuracy for total payout 
Actual total payout for year 2007-2008 
Model Prediction Non-payment Payment Number of observations 
Non-payment 5 ( 4 4 . 4 4 % ) 11 16 
Payment 85 666(78.77%) 751 
This table represents the predictability of the logistic regressions as model 1 in Tables 4, 5, and 6 for the out-of-sample period of 2007-2008 For each firm in the in-sample period of 1995-2006 I 
estimale the logistic regiessions of the likelihood of dividend, repurchase, and total payout, the coefficients of which are used to predict payment or non-payment using independent variable values 
lor the out-of-sample period The firm is predicted to have a positive payout if the estimated probability is larger than 0 5, and to have zero payout it the estimated probability is less than or equal to 
0 5 These piedictions are then compaied with the actual payout records to generate the accuracy of predictability, which is computed as the ratio of number of actual firms in each category scaled by 
the number of predicted firms in each category The percentages of correctly predicted firms are reported in the parentheses 






The predication is also more accurate at predicting non-paying firms than paying-
firms for the likelihood of dividend payout, but is more accurate in predicting paying 
firms than non-paying firms in case of the likelihood of repurchase and total payout. For 
example, the predictive accuracy for dividend non-paying firms is 83.33%, whereas for 
dividend paying firms is 69.09%. However, the predictive accuracy for repurchasing 
firms is greater than firms without repurchasing by 28.68%. For the likelihood of both 
dividends and share repurchases, the overall predictive accuracy is over 70%. This 
suggests that the model is creditable since my sample includes both dividend initiations 
and resumptions, which are infrequent events and generates noise in the prediction (Hu 
and Kumar, 2004). 
Out-of Sample Forecast Performance 
of Tobit Regressions 
The forecast performance of Tobit regressions are measured by the difference in 
the mean standard deviation of estimation error and mean absolute value of estimation 
error of the in-sample period model predictions and the out-of-sample period model 
predictions. More specifically, I estimate the Tobit regressions using the independent 
variables for the in-sample period. The estimated coefficients are then used to compute 
the predicted dividend yield, repurchase yield, and total payout yield for both in-sample 
period and out-of-sample period. I then compute the standard deviation and the absolute 
deviation of the predicted payout yield from the actual payout yield for each year. The 
mean standard deviation of estimation error and the mean absolute deviation of 
estimation error of the in-sample model predictions are compared with the corresponding 
mean absolute deviation of estimation error of the out-of-sample model predictions. The 
t-statistic and the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are used to test whether the mean and median 
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value of both measures from in-sample period and out-of-sample period are statistically 
different. If the model's out-of-sample forecast performance is poor, one would expect 
both the mean standard deviation and the mean absolute deviation of estimation error to 
be significantly larger for the out-of-sample period than for the in-sample period. 
As indicated in Table 1.18, the difference between in-sample and out-of-sample 
performance of Tobit regression for dividend yield and total payout yield is not 
significant. However, out-of-sample performance for the repurchase yield is significant 
worse than the in-sample performance. This indicates the Tobit regression model is a 
more accurate predictor for dividends than for share repurchases. 
Conclusions 
In this study, I examine the effect of CEO pay-performance sensitivity on payout 
policy. Cash payouts have the potential to reduce the amount of discretionary cash under 
managerial control, thus providing protection for shareholders against self-interested 
managers. CEO stock ownership, by tying CEO wealth directly to shareholders, also 
mitigates potential agency conflicts. Thus, payout policy and CEO stock incentives are 
theoretical substitutes for controlling agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders. 
The propensity to pay dividends is decreasing in CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity for the full sample and the subsample of firms that did not pay dividends in the 
previous year. This is consistent with a substitution effect between dividends and equity-
based incentives in reducing agency costs of free cash flows. 
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Table 1.18 Out-of-Sample Predictability of the Tobit Regression for 2007-2008 
Panel A: Tobit model for dividend yield 
Standard deviation of estimation error 
[I] In sample 
[II] Out of sample 
Difference ([I] - [II]) 
Mean 
0 . 8 3 5 
0 . 9 7 4 
- 0 . 1 3 8 
- 0 . 8 3 ) 
Median 
0 . 5 5 5 
0 . 5 1 1 
0 . 0 4 4 
( 1 . 7 9 ) 
Absolute value of estimation error 
[I] In sample 
[II] Out of sample 
Difference ([I] - [II]) 
1 . 1 8 1 
1 . 3 7 7 
- 0 . 1 9 6 
- 0 . 8 3 ) 
0 . 7 8 5 
0 . 7 2 3 
0 . 0 62 
( 1 . 7 9 ) 
Panel B: Tobit model for repurchase yield 
Standard deviation of estimation error 
[I] In sample 
[II] Out of sample 
Difference ([I] - [II]) 
Mean 
1 . 5 6 0 
2 . 2 4 5 
- 0 . 6 8 6 * 
- 6 . 7 6 ) 
Median 
0 . 9 2 0 
1 . 0 9 6 
- 0 . 1 7 5 * * < 
( - 6 . 3 5 ) 
Absolute value of estimation error 
[I] In sample 
[II] Out of sample 
Difference ([!]-[II]) 
2 . 2 0 6 
3 . 1 7 5 
- 0 . 9 7 0 * 
- 6 . 7 6 ) 
1 . 3 0 2 
1 . 5 5 0 
- 0 . 2 4 8 * 
( - 6 . 3 5 ) 
Panel C: Tobit model for total payout yield 
Standard deviation of estimation error 
Mean 
[I] In sample 
[II] Out of sample 










Absolute value of estimation error 
[I] In sample 
[II] Out of sample 
Difference ([I] - [II]) 
3 . 1 4 4 
3 . 3 1 7 
- 0 . 1 7 3 
- 1 . 2 3 3 ) 
2 . 4 3 8 
2 . 4 3 8 
0 .000 
( 0 . 6 5 ) 
This table represents the predictability of the Tobit regressions as Model 1 in Tables 7, 9, and 10 for the 
out-of-sample period of 2007-2008. 1 estimate the Tobit regressions using independent variable value 
for the in-sample period of 1995-2006. The estimated coefficients are used to compute the predicted 
dividend yield, repurchase yield, total payout yield for each firm in the in-sample period and out-of-
sample period. Then for each firm year, I compute the standard deviation and the absolute deviation of 
the predicated payout yield value from the actual payout yield value. The mean standard deviation of 
estimation error and mean absolute value of estimation error of the in-sample model predictions are 
compared with the corresponding mean standard deviation of estimation error and mean absolute value 
of estimation error of the out-of-sample model predictions. The /-statistics from two sample t-test and 
the z-scores from two sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test are reported in the parentheses. The null 
hypothesis is the performance measures are equal for the in-sample period and out-of-sample period. 
***denote significance at the 1% level. 
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Conversely, the propensity to pay dividends is increasing in CEO pay-
performance sensitivity for the subset of firms that paid dividends in the previous year. 
This suggests that CEOs with high sensitivities to stock price may seek to avoid a 
negative market reaction to dividend omissions. 
The level of dividend payout is decreasing in CEO pay-performance sensitivity 
for dividend paying firms. The negative relation is nonlinear, stronger for CEOs with 
higher pay-performance sensitivity, and stronger for firms with greater potential for free 
cash flow problems. Furthermore, a negative relation exists between CEO stock options 
and the propensity and level of dividends, but there is a positive relation between CEO 
stock options and share repurchases. This is consistent with increased popularity of stock 
option compensation and a corresponding preference for share repurchases relative to 
dividends over the last decade. Lastly, the dividend smoothing decreases in CEO pay-
performance sensitivity. CEOs with greater equity-based incentives tend to deviate from 
past dividend levels to accommodate future investment opportunities. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, consistent with 
recent studies on payout policy (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz, 2006; Denis and 
Osobov, 2008; Chay and Suh, 2009), I employ a Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure to 
reduce the bias resulting from heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the regression 
residuals to examine the influence of CEO pay-performance sensitivity on the likelihood 
and the level of cash payout. Second, I employ a measure of CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity that is insensitive to firm size to avoid bias in the regressions resulting from 
the size effect on both CEO pay-performance sensitivity and dividends. Finally, the 
extant literature does not separately examine the likelihood of dividend payouts for firms 
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with and without dividends in the prior year. However, theory suggests that prior 
dividend payers and prior non-dividend payers may place different weights on the ability 
of dividends to reduce the agency costs of free cash flow and the cost of external 
financing. Therefore, the payout behavior for these two groups may be different. 
Accordingly, there is a sharp contrast in the relation between CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity and the likelihood of cash payout for prior payers and non-payers. 
CHAPTER 2 
CEO PAY-PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY 
AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: DOES 
ONE RELATION FIT ALL? 
Introduction 
The separation of ownership and control may create agency costs between 
managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Higher levels of managerial 
stock ownership are seen as one mechanism to align the interests of management with 
that of shareholders. Theoretically, increasing the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock 
price, pay-performance sensitivity, may better align managerial behavior with the 
interests of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Haugen and Senbet, 
1981). High levels of managerial ownership, however, also exposed managers to more 
risk relative to diversified shareholders, making them more risk averse (Guay, 1999; 
Ross, 2004). Despite numerous empirical studies on the relation between managerial 
ownership and firm value, the actual relation between managerial ownership and firm 
value remains an open empirical question. 
Studies find a positive correlation between managerial ownership and firm 
performance (Mehran, 1995; Core and Larker, 2002) or a positive, but decreasing relation 
between managerial ownership and firm performance (Morck, Schleifer, and Vishney, 
1988; McConnell and Servaes 1990, 1995; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Hubbard and 
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Palia, 1995; Holderness, Krosner, and Sheehan, 1999; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Tian, 
2004; Davies, Hillier, and McColgan, 2005; Adams and Santos, 2006; Pukthuanthong, 
and Roll, Walker, 2007; McConnell, Servaes, and Lins, 2008; Tong, 2008; Benson and 
Davidson, 2009). Others find no relation between managerial ownership and firm 
performance (Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; 
Lorderer and Martin, 1997; Cho, 1998; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Himmelberg, 
Hubbard, and Palia, 1999; Palia, 2001; Coles, Lemmon, and Meschke, 2007; Brick, Palia, 
and Wang, 2005; Cheung and Wei, 2006). The former set of studies is more consistent 
with higher levels of pay-performance sensitivity imparting an incentive alignment effect 
at low levels and a risk-aversion effect at higher levels; whereas, the latter is consistent 
with firms optimally contracting with management after controlling for observable and 
unobservable firm and managerial specific variables. 
However, the difficulty in documenting a consistent relation between managerial 
ownership and firm value suggests that the data may not be well-described by a single 
story. The need for equity-based incentives may vary across firms and a uniform relation 
between managerial ownership and firm value may not exist. Rather, CEO pay-
performance sensitivity is likely to have a differential effect on financial performance 
across the conditional distribution of firm value. For instance, CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity may be increasing in CEO quality and high quality CEOs are likely to be 
selected by firms with higher value and more growth opportunities. Therefore, an 
increase in CEO pay-performance sensitivity may induce a greater value-increasing effect 
in high-value firms simply because high-quality CEOs have access to more positive NPV 
projects. Small increments in CEO talent can result in large benefits to larger firms 
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resulting from the "scale of operations" under the CEO's control (Neal and Rosen, 2000). 
If CEO pay-performance sensitivity represents CEO talent, the marginal effect of CEO 
PPS would be larger for larger firms. To the extent that firm size is negatively correlated 
with Tobin's Q, this suggests that CEO pay-performance sensitivity may have a larger 
impact on firm value for firms with lower Q. Lastly, the majority of prior studies 
examine the effect of managerial ownership on financial performance using Tobin's Q as 
a measure for firm value. This variable is highly skewed to right, violating an assumption 
on the error distribution in the conditional-mean regression. This also may lead to 
inconsistent parameter estimates and further confound results. 
To address these concerns, I employed quantile regression to examine the relation 
between firm value and CEO pay-performance sensitivity. While the linear-regression 
model specifies the change in the conditional mean of the dependent variable associated 
with a change in independent variables, the quantile regression model specifies changes 
in the conditional percentile. Therefore, quantile regression is particularly useful when 
the rate of change in the conditional percentile depends on the percentile. Used in this 
context, a quantile regression approach has inherent merits. Namely, it models the 
relation between the set of independent variables and specific percentiles of the response 
variable, providing an opportunity to look beyond the mean effect on firm value and 
examine how changes in CEO pay-performance sensitivity affect the entire distribution 
of the firm value. Furthermore, the method avoids assumptions about the parametric 
distribution of regression errors, which improves the robustness of the model. 
Employing quantile regression on a sample of 19,313 firm-year observations from 
1992 to 2008, I document a significantly inverted-U relation between CEO pay-
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performance sensitivity and Tobin's Q for all percentiles of the conditional distribution of 
Tobin's Q. Moreover, the strength of the coefficients on CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity and its square are significantly increasing in the percentiles of the conditional 
distribution of Tobin's Q. The difference in the coefficient estimates is also statistically 
significant across the entire distribution of Tobin's Q. My results are robust to alternative 
methodologies to control for unobservable firm fixed-effects, alternative model 
specifications that include proxies for board quality and effective monitoring, and 
alternative specifications that address causality. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, in the context of the 
relation between firm value and CEO pay-performance sensitivity, traditional OLS 
regression models address the question: '''Are CEO equity-based incentives important?", 
while quantile regression models tackle the question "Do CEO equity-based incentives 
influence firm value differently for firms with different values?" Accordingly, I 
document that the effect of CEO pay-performance sensitivity on firm value and the 
concavity of the relation increase in the conditional distribution of firm value. This 
suggests that the incentive alignment effect of higher CEO pay-performance sensitivity is 
more pronounced in firms with higher firm value, but so is the risk aversion effect of 
excess managerial ownership. From a policy standpoint, the implication for high value 
firms is that increases in managerial ownership at lower levels may substantially increase 
firm value, but that boards of directors should be vigilant in monitoring whether higher 
ownership levels increase managerial risk aversion. The benefits of increasing managerial 
ownership, as well as the risks, appear to be less pronounced for firms with lower firm 
values. Second, while previous empirical finance studies examine the relation between 
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total annual CEO compensation and market value of equity using quantile regression 
(Hallock, Madalozzo, and Reck, 2010), this is the first study to apply this methodology to 
the relation between the entire portfolio of CEO equity-based incentives and firm value. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the 
past literature on this topic. Section 3 explains the estimation methodology and provides 
justification for using quantile regression in examining the relation between CEO pay-
performance sensitivity and Tobin's Q. Section 4 describes the data and the different 
variables used in the empirical tests. Section 5 presents empirical results. Section 6 
assesses the robustness of model specifications and endogeneity issues. Section 7 
summarizes my findings. 
Literature Review 
Studies on the relation between ownership structure and firm value generally 
make one of two assumptions. Under the assumption that ownership structure is 
exogenously determined, existing theories suggest that managerial ownership may have a 
positive or positive but decreasing effect on firm performance. According to the interest-
alignment hypothesis (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), higher managerial ownership gives 
managers stronger incentives to work for the best interests of shareholders, thus reducing 
agency costs and increasing firm value. However, an unintended effect of a high 
managerial ownership is that it may expose managers, whose portfolios are less 
diversified, to more risk relative to that of diversified shareholders. Those managers may 
forgo positive net present value (NPV) projects to avoid taking on higher risk (Amihud 
and Lev, 1981, Smith and Stulz, 1985).25 This risk-aversion-hypothesis predicts a 
25
 Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that when a manager owns a sufficiently large stake, they become more 
entrenched and are more likely to pursue personal benefits. 
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negative relation between high levels of managerial ownership and firm value. The 
combination of these two hypotheses results in an inverted-U relation between 
managerial ownership and firm value. When managerial ownership is low, the alignment 
effect dominates the risk-aversion effect and increases in ownership lead to higher firm 
value. However, when managerial ownership is high, the risk-aversion effect overcomes 
the alignment effect and increases in ownership reduce firm value. 
Empirically, the literature finds a strong relation between managerial ownership 
and firm performance. Morck et al. (1988) examine the relation between firm valuation 
(measured by Tobin's Q) and board ownership. In a cross-sectional regression setting, 
they fit a piecewise linear model in which Q first rises as ownership increases to 5%, then 
falls for ownership levels between 5% and 25%, and finally rises again as ownership 
continues to increase. The authors argue that the entrenchment effects dominate the 
alignment effects in the 5% to 25% board ownership range. Holderness et al. (1999) 
obtain similar results for their sample of year 1935. McConnell and Servaes (1990, 1995) 
find a significant quadratic relation between Q and managerial ownership, with the 
turning point for insider ownership at 49% in their sample of year 1976 and 38% in their 
sample of year 1986. Anderson and Reeb (2003) report a similar quadratic relation 
between founding-family ownership and firm performance. Benson and Davdison (2009) 
used the dollar change in CEO wealth for a dollar change in firm value to proxy pay-
performance sensitivity in the fixed-effect model and find a significant inverted U-shaped 
relation between managerial ownership and Tobin's Q. These studies support a 
significant effect of ownership structure on firm value. However, they also indicate that 
75 
the empirical results are sensitive to the definitions of the sample period, the ownership 
structure, and the control variables. 
Although this observed empirical relation is consistent with the agency view, 
there is considerable controversy regarding whether this nonlinear relation arises because 
of the incentive effects of managerial ownership or because of the inherent endogeneity 
of ownership. 
Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) conjecture that when the 
transaction costs of re-contracting are small, firms and managers contract optimally, and 
that managerial ownership levels are set at or near the value-maximizing level, on 
average. Hence, all else constant, a positive relation between managerial ownership and 
firm value does not exist; any observed relation between managerial ownership and firm 
value arises because the firm's environment is inadequately captured. Furthermore, the 
observed variations in pay-performance sensitivity are determined by firms' monitoring 
requirements. Therefore, firms with low pay-performance sensitivity are not necessarily 
expected to perform poorly because these firms do not require high-powered equity 
incentives to reduce agency conflicts. 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) supports an endogenous relation between Q and 
managerial ownership using fixed-effects models. This approach has been shown to have 
serious limitations. Fixed-effect models require substantial year-to-year changes in 
managerial ownership in order to generate enough within variance to obtain valid 
statistical inference. However, fractional managerial ownership changes slowly over 
time, which may mask a significant ownership effect because of the low power of the test 
(Zhou, 2001; Coles, et al., 2003; Benson and Davdison, 2009). Fixed-effect models also 
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assume that the unobservable firm characteristics, especially a firm's contracting 
environment, are time-invariant. However, without changes in the contracting 
environment, there are also no changes in managerial incentives. 
The endogeneity can also arise from the unobservable time-variant component in 
the error term that is simultaneously related to both firm performance and managerial 
pay-performance sensitivity. However, this time-variant component is not canceled out 
by using fixed-effect model. A number of empirical papers have used simultaneous 
equations model to control for this type of endogeneity. Still, current theory provides 
little guidance on the specification of models. Furthermore, the economic literature 
suggests that the results from simultaneous equations are extremely sensitive to model 
specification; model misspecification may results in serious bias across the system of 
equations (Rhodes and Westbrook, 1981). Alternatively, some studies attempt to address 
this problem using an instrumental variable method (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; 
Villalonga and Amit, 2006). The limitation associated with this approach is due to 
difficulties in identifying potential exogenous variables that are strongly correlated with 
managerial pay-performance sensitivity but uncorrected with firm performance. Coles et 
al. (2003) provide examples of instrumental variable estimations in a structural model in 
which the instrumental variable approach finds a relation between Tobin's Q and 
managerial ownership, while the structural model fails to support such a relation. 
Core and Larcker (2002) try to reconcile these two schools of thought by 
proposing a transaction cost theory of managerial ownership and firm value. They argue 
that it is inappropriate to implicitly assume that the adjustment costs are so great that 
firms cannot re-contract when incentives are not properly aligned (Morck et al, 1988), or 
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assume that firms can continuously re-contract because there are no adjustment costs 
(Demsetz, 1983). They suggest that firms choose optimal managerial ownership when 
they contract, but managerial ownership may deviate from the optimal level after 
contracting because of the changing environment. However, firms can only periodically 
re-optimize managerial ownership because of the re-contracting costs. Any deviations 
from an endogenously determined optimal managerial ownership may result in the 
reduction in firm value. Therefore, when sub-optimal managerial ownership is lower 
than the optimal one, higher ownership leads to higher firm value. On the other hand, 
when sub-optimal managerial ownership is above the optimal level, higher ownership 
generates lower firm value. This transaction theory links the two stands in the literature, 
and is complementary to the theories that identify the mechanisms by which managerial 
ownership affects firm value. 
What is Quantile Regression? 
Brief Comparison between Quantile Regression and 
Standard OLS Regression 
Standard OLS regression is a useful tool for summarizing the average relation 
between the dependent variable and a set of independent variables, based on the 
conditional mean function E(y\x). However, quantile regression (QR) allows different 
estimates to be calculated at different points on the conditional distribution of dependent 
variable. 
A firm is said at the rth quantile if its value is higher than a fraction of r of 
sample firm value and lower than a fraction of (1-r) of sample firm value. Let el denote 
the model prediction error. Recall that ordinary least squares (OLS) minimizes ~Et er 
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with the assumption that the expected value of the error term conditional on the 
independent variables is zero (Eiu^x^ = 0) and median regression minimizes EJeJ . 
Both of these error functions impose the same penalty for prediction error of a given 
magnitude regardless of the direction of the prediction error. Quantile regression 
minimizes an asymmetrically weighted sum of absolute errors: 
S ' = " ,= i r[yE-x;jSTt + r = K E = 1 , ( l - r ) | y t - r ( ' / ? t | , (1) 
where y is the dependent variable (in our case firm value), x is a matrix of independent 
variables, /? is a vector of estimated coefficients, x is the weight given to any 
observations that are above their predicted values, and 1- r is the weight given to any 
observations that are below their predicted values. Using Eq. (1), one can estimate 0 for 
any given level of r between 0 and 1. Also note that this estimation method does not 
make the assumption that estimates for different conditional distribution of firm value are 
the same. 
Consider a simple case when the standard OLS regression model has only one 
independent variable, yt = j30 + ptxz -f up where the conditional mean function is 
E(yt |x£) = /?0 + P-yX. and the error satisfies Efjujxj) = 0. Following this notation, we 
can write the conditional quantile function as (?r(vJxE) = fiB + p±x, + F~X(T), where r 
refers to Tth quantile of y and i-^fV) is the distribution function of uL. When the errors 
are independent and identically distributed, Fa~1(r) does not vary and is absorbed in the 
intercept. In this case, QR is unnecessary because the quantile slope coefficient ($± does 
not change across different quantiles of dependent variable. However, in the case where 
eiTor term is heterogeneous and changes with the independent variable, quantile 
regression is optimal by allowing both the intercept J3C and the slope coefficient f>x to 
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vary with the quantiles. In the multiple regression case, the QR coefficients for 
independent variables that appear only in the conditional mean but not in the conditional 
variance do not change with quantiles, while coefficients for other independent variables 
that appear in both change with quantiles. 
It is also worth pointing out that quantile regression is different from segmenting 
the distribution of the dependent variable into different quantiles and then obtaining least-
squares fits for each quantile. Cutting data and then calculating separate estimates only 
uses partial data for each set of estimates, which may lead to serious estimation bias. In 
contrast, quantile regression uses all the information for fitting quantiles, even the 
extreme quantiles. 
In linear regression, the coefficient on CEO pay-performance sensitivity 
represents the average change in the firm value produced by a one unit change in the 
CEO pay-performance sensitivity. The quantile regression estimates the change in a 
specified quantile of the entire distribution of firm value produced by a one unit change 
in the CEO pay-performance sensitivity. Thus, the quantile regression method allows for 
comparison of different quantiles of firm value, providing insight into how some 
quantiles may be affected by CEO pay-performance sensitivity more than other quantiles. 
This special feature is particular useful in this study because the need for CEO stock 
incentives is likely to vary with changes in firm value and growth opportunities. To the 
extent that firms with different values demand different levels of CEO stock incentives, 
the effect of CEO pay-performance sensitivity on firm value for firms with higher values 
is expected to be different from that for firms with lower values. In addition, quantile 
regression is robust to the non-normal distribution of firm value and the heterogeneity in 
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regression error term. Thus, by estimating the entire distribution of firm value, the QR 
procedure provides a more complete picture of the effect of CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity on firm value. 
Why Should We Use Quantile Regression 
in This Context? 
One important reason for coefficients differing across quantiles is the presence of 
heterogeneous errors. The heterogeneity may arise from the possibility that there are 
unobservable firm-specific or CEO-specific time-invariant characteristics that are 
absorbed in the error term. This issue is generally addressed by using a fixed-effect or 
first-differencing model. Both of these methods, however, are accused of having low test 
power when CEO fractional ownership is employed as the proxy for CEO pay-
performance sensitivity. Another possibility for the existence of heterogeneity is that 
error term contains a time-variant component, resulting from changes in CEO skills over 
time or, the changes in CEO risk aversion levels. This time-variant component in the 
error term is not captured in the regression model, yet has effect on firm value, resulting 
in the omitted variable bias. Because it cannot be canceled out by using a fixed-effect or 
first-differencing model, researchers attempt to address this problem using instrumental 
variables. However, this approach has been shown to have serious limitations due to 
difficulties in finding exogenous variables that are both strongly correlated with CEO 
pay-performance sensitivity but uncorrelated with firm value. In either case, however, 
the robustness to the heterogeneity in the error terms makes quantile regression an 
empirical desirable method in certain situations. 
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Differential Effects of Managerial Ownership 
Across the Firm Value Distribution 
Several possible explanations exist for why CEO pay-performance sensitivity 
may have a different effect on firm value when firm value is located at different points of 
its distribution. Tobin's Q, the proxy for firm value in most studies, captures the 
difference in firm value measured by the value of fixed assets and the market value 
resulting from the investors' expectations. Firms with higher Tobin's Q generally have 
better investment opportunities than firms with lower Tobin's Q. A one unit increase in 
CEO pay-performance sensitivity may increase firm value with a larger magnitude for 
firms that already have superior projects available than those with limited positive NPV 
projects. This may result in a stronger positive relation between CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity and firm value for firms with higher value. Furthermore, in equilibrium, the 
market for corporate control allocates higher quality CEOs to firms with better growth 
opportunities. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that the increase in CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity will produce greater increases in firm value for firms with higher value 
because CEOs in those firms are more skilled. 
On the other hand, it is also possible that CEO pay-performance sensitivity 
increases firm value with a greater magnitude for firms with lower value. Small 
increments in CEO talent can result in large benefits to larger firms resulting from the 
"scale of operations" under the CEO's control (Neal and Rosen, 2000). To the extent that 
CEO pay-performance sensitivity matches CEO talent, the marginal effect of CEO PPS 
on firm value will be larger for larger firms. Furthermore, smaller CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity in larger companies may still provide CEOs with strong incentives to raise 
firm value, since a smaller change in the stock price changes the CEO's wealth 
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substantially (Baker and Hall, 2004; Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier, 2009). If stronger 
incentives are associated with larger increases in firm value, same amount of CEO PPS 
may induce a large-company CEO to increase firm value by greater amount than a small-
company CEO. To the extent that firm size is negatively correlated with Tobin's Q, we 
would expect CEO pay-performance sensitivity to have larger impact on firm value for 
firms with lower value. 
Furthermore, according to the agency theory, the positive incentive alignment 
effect of CEO pay-performance sensitivity on firm value depends on the extent to which 
outside investors can monitor managers. Thus, in the equilibrium, pay-performance 
sensitivity may be higher if the agency cost of free cash flow is more severe. This type of 
agency problem may vary with a firm's life cycle. During growth phases, firms have 
more growth opportunities, low agency problems, and high Tobin's Q. However, when 
the firm matures, the shrinking investment opportunity set leads to high levels of free 
cash flow and low Tobin's Q. From this perspective, firms with higher Tobin's Q do not 
require CEO pay-performance sensitivity as much as firms with lower Tobin's Q do to 
maximize firm value. Consequently, the marginal effect of CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity on firm value may be higher for firms with lower value. 
Figure 2.1 graphs the distribution of Tobin's Q. It is clear that the distribution is 
highly skewed to the right. Thus, any regressions focusing only on the conditional mean 
are likely to generate inconsistent estimates because of the violation of OLS regression 
assumptions. Moreover, the resulting estimates of various effects on the conditional 
mean of Tobin's Q are not necessarily indicative of the CEO pay-performance and the 
nature of these effects on the both tails of the distribution. 
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Histogram for Tobin's Q 
Figure 2.1 Distribution of Tobin's Q 
This figure illustrates the distribution of Tobin's Q, defined as the market value of equity plus the book 
value of total assets minus book value of common equity, divided by the book value of total assets. The 
sample consists of 19313 firm-year observations from 1992 to 2008. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the boxplot of Tobin's Q as a function of CEO pay-
performance sensitivity. Sample firms are split into ten groups of equal size according to 
their CEO pay-performance sensitivity. For each group, the box represents Tobin's Q 
lying between the first and the third quartiles. The horizontal line near the middle of each 
box represents the median value of Tobin's Q for each group. The horizontal bars at the 
end of the vertical lines represent the full range of Tobin's Q. The observations that 
extend more than 1.5 times the interquartile range are truncated. Several features can be 
discerned from this plot. Tobin's Q appears to rise with CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity. In addition, there is an observable tendency for dispersion, as measured by 
the interquartile range of Tobin's Q, to increase with CEO pay-performance sensitivity. 
By characterizing the entire distribution of Tobin's Q for each group, the plot provides a 
much more complete picture than would be offered by only plotting the group means. As 
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the number of independent variables increases, segmenting the sample into homogeneous 
groups with a sufficient number of observations for estimation would be more difficult. 
Quantile regression, therefore, provide us with an opportunity to overcome the estimation 
biases resulting from the heterogeneous sample and to understand the true relation 
between firm value and CEO pay-performance sensitivity. 
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Figure 2.2 Tobin's Q for Different Percentiles of CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity 
This figure presents the box-plot of Tobin's Q for different percentiles of CEO Pay-Performance 
sensitivity. The sample consists of 19313 firm-year observations from 1992 to 2008. Tobin's Q is the 
market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus book value of common equity, divided by 
the book value of total assets. CEO pay-performance sensitivity is the dollar change in CEO wealth for a 
percentage change in firm value, scaled by CEO total annual pay, then divided by 1000. The sample firms 
are split into ten groups of equal size according to their CEO Pay-Performance sensitivity. For each group, 
the box represents the Tobin's Q lying between the first and the third quartiles. The horizontal line in each 
box represents the median value of Tobin's Q for each group. The full range of the Tobin's Q in each 
group is represented by the horizontal bars at the end of the "whiskers". The whiskers that extend more 
than 1.5 times the interquartile range are truncated. 




Sample and Data Description 
Sample Selection 
To examine the relation between managerial ownership and firm performance we 
obtain our initial sample from Standard and Poor's Execucomp database for the period of 
between 1992 and 2008. Execucomp includes annual compensation data from proxy 
statements for the five highest paid executives for firms in the S&P 500, the S&P 
MidCap 400, and the S&P SmallCap 600. I focus attention on the Chief Executive 
Officer of each firm in this study because the CEO is the most influential manager in the 
decision-making process. The initial sample is then merged with Compustat to obtain 
accounting information. In order to be included in the sample, firm has to have non-
missing observations for variables in both Execucomp and Compustat. I also exclude 
financial firms (SIC Codes 6000 to 6999) and utilities firms (SIC Codes 4000 to 4999) to 
account for differences in ownership and corporate governance structure due to different 
regulations. After these screening procedures, my final sample is an unbalanced panel of 
19,313 firm-year observations. 
Variable Construction 
Firm Value 
Prior research on the relation between ownership structure and corporate 
performance has employed Tobin's Q as the measure of firm value (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985, Morck et al., 1988, Lang and Stulz, 1994, Yermack, 1996, Himmelberg et al., 
1999, Palia, 2001, Coles et al., 2003). Tobin's Q is computed as the book value of total 
assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity, divided by total 
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assets. To test the robustness of reported results, I used return on assets (ROA) 26 as an 
alternative performance measure, which is computed as earnings before extraordinary 
items plus interest and income statement deferred tax scaled by total assets (Fama and 
French, 2001). 
CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity 
I used the dollar change in CEO wealth for a percentage change in firm value 
scaled by CEO's total annual pay as a proxy for CEO pay-performance sensitivity 
(Edmans et al., 2009). This percent-percent incentives measure is shown to be insensitive 
to firm size and risk. Prior literature uses the fraction of outstanding shares directly held 
by CEO as a measure for CEO pay- performance sensitivity (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). 
However, this measure may lead to inconsistent empirical results.27 Using data from 
Execucomp database, I estimate each CEO's portfolio of stock and options following the 
methodology developed in Core and Guay (2002). The detailed calculation of the CEO 
pay-performance sensitivity is represented in Appendix B. 
Other Firm Characteristics 
My regression models include a variety of control variables related to the 
contracting environment to ensure that the effects I attribute to CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity are not due to other correlated factors. 
26
 When ROA is employed as the proxy for firm value, the Pseudo Rsquare increases significantly for all 
the quantile regressions. The statistical significance for the difference in CEO pay-performance sensitivity 
across different quantiles is reduced, but remains significant in most cases. 
27
 Fractional ownership suffers from lack of variation; therefore, it cannot fully explain the dramatic 
changes in firm value in panel data (Zhou, 2001; Benson and Davidson, 2009). In addition, this measure is 
found to significantly decrease with firm size (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; Hall 
and Liebman, 1998; Baker and Hall, 2004). To the extent that firm value is nonlinearly related to firm size, 
this measure may lead to inconsistent empirical results. 
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Capital structure. Most of the theoretical and empirical literature has shown that 
capital structure is significantly related to firm value because creditors are able to lessen 
managerial agency problems (McConnell and Servaes, 1995; Harvey, Lins, and Roper, 
2004). Accordingly, I control for debt to equity ratio, defined as the book value of long-
term debt to the book value of total assets. 
Growth opportunity. I used the growth rate of sales over the previous year as the 
proxy for firm's growth opportunities. 
Soft capital. Given that intangible assets should affect firm value and might not be 
captured by current Tobin's Q, prior research (Morck et al. 1988; McConnell and 
Servaes, 1990) found intangible assets to be positively related to firm value. Firms with 
more intangible assets should have higher desire for CEO stock incentives because of the 
existence of more managerial discretion. I used the ratio of the sum of research and 
development expenses and advertising expenses scaled by total assets as the measure of 
soft capital. 
Capital intensity. To the extent that tangible assets are observable and easily 
monitored, firms with a larger concentration of tangible assets will have less desire for 
managerial stock incentives (Gertler and Hubbard, 1993). In addition, firms with more 
fixed assets are associated with lower firm value. I used the ratio of plant, property and 
I also use the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liability scaled by total assets as an alternative 
proxy for capital structure, the results remain unchanged. 
29
 Given that Compustat does not report expenses on intangible assets for all firms in all years, I also 
include dummy variables with a value of one whenever the relevant expense is missing, and zero otherwise. 
The dummy variables are included to control for the possibility that nonreporting firms are discretely 
different from reporting firms (Himmelberg et al., 1999). In the regression models, those dummy variables 
are not statistically significant and are not reported. 
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equipment to total assets as the measure for the less discretionary spending in firm's 
investment policy. 
Firm size. The literature has found firm size to be negatively related to firm value 
(Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Smith and Watts, 1992). I used the 
logarithm of book value of total assets to proxy for firm size. I also include the squared 
firm size to control for the potential nonlinearity. 
Cashflow. Agency theory suggests that CEO stock incentives can be used as alignment 
mechanism to reduce agency cost of free cash flow, resulting in a negative relation between CEO 
pay-performance sensitivity and the level of free cash flow. Although free cash flow is 
empirically unobservable, I used the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets as 
empirical proxy. ' 
Earnings volatility. Contracting theory suggests that optimal contract involves a 
trade-off between managerial incentives and managerial risk aversion in the way that the 
earnings volatility decreases the power of stock incentives to managers. Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) suggest that higher volatility of the firm is associated with the higher 
managerial discretion, and therefore managers have to be given more variable 
compensation. I estimate earnings volatility as the standard deviation of the ratio of 
income before extraordinary items to total assets in the prior three years. 
'' Using the logarithm of sales as an alternative measure for firm size does not change empirical results. 
j l
 I use three alternative measures for free cash flow. First, I use earnings before interest and tax scaled by 
total assets. Second, 1 use income before extraordinary item minus capital expenditure scaled by total 
assets. Third, I use earnings before interest and tax minus capital expenditures scaled by total assets. The 
results are all quantitatively similar. 
J
~ I also use the standard deviation of quarterly earnings over the past 12 quarters for each fiscal year as an 
alternative measure for cash flow volatility. The results are consistent. 
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Summary Statistics 
Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics for my sample. The mean value of 
Tobin's Q is 2.119 and the median value is 1.647. Both values are slightly larger than 
studies using earlier sample period, suggesting that firms have become more profitable 
with valuable investment opportunity sets. CEO pay-performance sensitivity has an 
average value of 0.416 and a median value of 0.074, and ranges from 0 to 11.373, 
indicating the distribution is very dispersed and highly skewed to the right. The mean 
(median) CEO pay-performance sensitivity indicates that the ratio of a CEO's wealth to 
his annual pay increases by $416 ($74) for a 1% increase in shareholder wealth, 
indicating a strong CEO stock incentives. 
Firms in my sample have an average value of long-term debt to total assets ratio 
of 0.181 with standard deviation of 0.165, which is consistent with other studies on the 
relation between firm value and managerial ownership (Coles, et al., 2003). I find that 
sample firms have a mean (median) sale growth rate of 14.0% (9.1%), a mean (median) 
size of 7.039 (6.901), a mean (median) of the sum of research and development expenses 
and advertising expenses of 5% (2.3%) of total assets, and a mean (median) capital 
intensity of 27.7% (22.2%) of total assets. The firms have an average of 3.6 % assets in 
cash flow, and a mean earnings volatility of 0.037. All of the descriptive statistics are 
largely consistent with prior studies (Palia, 2001; Coles, et al. 2003; Tong, 2008). 
"" All the continuous variables are winsorized at the top and the bottom 1% of the sample distiibution to 
address the potential problem with extreme observations. All the negative values of book equity are set to 
zero. 
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2 . 1 1 9 
0 . 4 1 6 
0 . 1 8 1 
0 . 1 4 0 
0 . 0 5 0 
0 . 2 7 7 
3 7 2 1 . 8 8 8 
7 . 0 3 9 
0 . 0 3 6 
0 . 0 3 7 
Standard 
deviation 
1 . 4 6 6 
1 . 4 6 0 
0 . 165 
0 . 2 8 9 
0 . 0 7 1 
0 . 2 1 2 
7 8 8 9 . 8 5 4 
1 . 4 9 9 
0 . 121 
0 . 0 4 2 
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0 . 7 4 2 
0 . 0 0 0 
0 . 0 0 0 
- 0 . 4 9 9 
0 . 0 0 0 
0 . 0 0 0 
4 5 . 1 2 9 
3 . 8 1 0 
- 0 . 6 5 0 
0 . 0 0 2 
p25 
1 . 2 4 6 
0 . 0 3 6 
0 . 0 2 0 
0 . 0 0 8 
0 . 0 0 0 
0 . 1 1 5 
3 8 6 . 6 4 4 
5 . 9 5 8 
0 . 0 1 6 
0 . 0 1 2 
Percentile 
median 
1 . 647 
0 . 0 7 4 
0 . 1 5 9 
0 . 0 9 1 
0 . 0 2 3 
0 . 2 2 2 
9 9 3 . 3 0 0 
6 . 9 0 1 
0 . 0 5 3 
0 . 0 2 3 
p75 
2 . 4 0 5 
0 . 1 7 8 
0 . 2 8 5 
0 . 2 0 7 
0 . 0 7 1 
0 . 3 8 7 
2 9 7 5 . 8 0 4 
7 . 9 9 8 
0 . 0 9 1 
0 . 0 4 4 
Maximu 
9 . 6 2 4 
1 1 . 3 7 3 
0 . 7 3 4 
1 . 6 6 7 
0 . 3 8 4 
0 . 8 8 9 
5 2 6 4 9 . 0 0 0 
1 0 . 8 7 1 
0 . 2 6 0 
0 . 2 5 5 
The table reports univariate statistics. The sample consists of 19313 firm-year observations from 1992 to 2008. Tobin's Q is the market value of equity plus 
the book value of total assets minus book value of common equity, divided by the book value of total assets. CEO pay-performance sensitivity is the dollar 
change in CEO wealth for a percentage change in firm value, scaled by CEO total annual pay, then divided by 1000. Leverage is the long-term debt scaled by 
total assets. Sale growth is the current sales minus sales in the previous year, divided by sales in the previous year. Soft capital is the ratio of the sum of 
research and development expenses and advertising expenses scaled by total assets. Plant, property and equipment is the ratio of PPE to total assets. Size is 
the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. Cash flow is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets. Earnings volatility is the 
standard deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets in the prior three years. 
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Empirical Results 
I begin by briefly pinpointing why using the fixed-effect and first-differencing 
model to eliminate the correlation between errors and independent variables may not be 
able to generate valid estimates. Further, I examine the relation between CEO pay-
performance sensitivity and firm value using quantile regression approach. More 
specifically, I estimate the coefficients on all the independent variables across the 
percentiles of the conditional distribution of firm value and compare the differences in 
the coefficients estimates for CEO pay-performance sensitivity. 
Drawbacks in the Fixed-Effect Model and 
First-Differencing Model 
Consider the following liner two-way model: 
ylt =<xt+x'lt0 + tt + ett iE{l,2,....N}, t E {1,2. ...,T} (6) 
where ex. is random individual-specific effects and is permitted to be correlated with 
independent variables, tf is the dummy variable for year and represents time effect, and 
Elt is an idiosyncratic error. 
The correlation between ocE and independent variables violates OLS assumption 
therefore bias the estimation results. Fixed-effect model removes the fixed effects of « 
by using mean-differenced data. More specifically, oc. can be eliminated by subtracting 
the individual means for each observation, leading to the mean-difference model 
yzt -yt = (xlt - xj'p - (ett - FJ (7) 
where y. = | E f = 1 r i r xt - I S L - ^ p and s. = ^ L ^ - A pooled OLS regression is then 
applied to generate coefficient estimates. 
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For the standard errors to be unbiased and the fixed effect estimator to be valid, 
the error should be serially uncorrelated across different time periods. To test whether 
this is indeed the case, I used a test discussed in Wooldridge (2002). Wooldridge's 
method uses the residuals from a regression in first-differences 
&ylt = AXlt& + Aslt. (8) 
where Aylt = vlt — y [ t-i, Ax[t = xtt — x^y, and A£lt — slt — £tt_i. It is proved that if the 
F.rare not serially correlated, then the serial correlation of Aelt will be equal to -0.50. 
Following this procedure, I take the first-difference for all the variables and run 
cross-sectional OLS using first-differenced data. The estimated residuals from this 
regression are further regressed on their lags to test whether the coefficients on the lagged 
estimated residuals is equal to -0.5. The standard error is clustered at the firm level to 
account for the within correlation in the estimated residuals. The results strongly reject 
the null hypothesis of no serial correlation with F-statistics of 206.872, which is 
statistically significant at any reasonable confidence level. This strong serial correlation 
in the idiosyncratic errors therefore seriously reduces the validity of the coefficient 
estimates. 
The first-differencing model removes the fixed effects of oc, using first-
differenced data. Like the fixed effect estimator, the first-difference estimator provides 
consistent estimates when the individual effects are fixed. The regression function is 
presented in the form of Eq. (8). The test statistics is valid when the assumption that the 
first-differenced errors are uncorrelated over time is satisfied. To test whether the 
differenced errors are serially uncorrelated, I estimate Eq. (8) by pooled OLS and obtain 
the estimated first-differenced residuals. Then, I run the regression again with the lagged 
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estimated first-differenced residuals as an additional explanatory variable. The 
coefficient on the lagged first-differenced residuals is an estimate of the serial correlation 
of first-differenced errors. The estimated coefficient on the lagged first-differenced 
residual is -0.22 with a t-statistic of-10.52. The null hypothesis of no serial correlation in 
the first-differenced errors is also strongly rejected, which leads to questions about the 
validity of test statistics. In addition, first-differencing data can greatly reduce the 
variation in the explanatory variables. In my sample, CEO pay-performance sensitivity 
has a time-series averaged cross-sectional variation of 1.41, but the first-differenced CEO 
pay-performance sensitivity has only a variation of 0.91, which is about only 64% of the 
variation of original data. Little variation leads to large standard errors for the estimated 
coefficients, and may result in invalid statistically insignificant estimates. 
Findings 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 present my empirical results. Table 2.2 focuses only on the 
linear relation between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and Tobin's Q. In Table 2.3, I 
include CEO pay-performance sensitivity squared to account for the potential nonlinear 
relation between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and firm value. In both tables, 
column 1 provides coefficient estimates from OLS regression with the control for firm 
and year effects. Column 2-10 present coefficient estimates from nine quantile 
regressions for r ranging from 0.1 to 0.9. 
The estimated coefficients on CEO pay-performance sensitivity and CEO pay-
performance sensitivity squared provide evidence of a significant inverted-U relation 
between CEO stock incentives and Tobin's Q for all the percentiles of the conditional 
distribution of Tobin's Q (Table 2.3). 
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This table reports quantile regression results for a sample of 19313 firm-year observations over the period 1992-2008 The dependent variable is Tobin's Q, 
defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus book value of common equity, divided by the book value of total assets CEO 
pay-performance sensitivity is the dollar change in CEO wealth for a percentage change in firm value, scaled by CEO total annual pay, then divided by 1000 
Leverage is the long-term debt scaled by total assets Sale growth is the current sales minus sales in the previous year, divided by sales in the previous year Soft 
capital is the ratio of the sum of research and development expenses and advertising expenses scaled by total assets Plant, property and equipment is the ratio of 
PPE to total assets Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets Cash flow is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets 
Earnings volatility is the standard deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets in the prior three years The /"-statistics are reported 
in parentheses ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively 
4^ 




















( - 6 
- 0 






( - 3 
- 0 










3 8 6 * * * 
96) 
0 2 3 * * * 
08) 
7 9 6 * * * 
81) 
7 4 8 * * * 
98) 
4 2 7 * * * 
95) 
3 7 2 * * * 
35) 
8 6 5 * * * 
33) 
0 3 0 * * * 
65) 
3 4 5 * * * 
45) 
4 0 3 * * * 
50) 
0 8 3 * * * 
51) 
1 9 3 1 3 
























1 5 4 * * * 
56) 
0 1 2 * * * 
66) 
1 8 3 * * * 
09) 
1 8 0 * * * 
87) 
0 7 7 * * * 
76) 
0 0 1 
05) 




2 0 1 * * * 
40) 
5 9 6 * * * 
48) 
6 7 7 * * * 
12) 
1 9 3 1 3 




( - 7 
- 0 
( - 9 
0 




( - 0 
- 0 










1 7 6 * * * 
83) 
0 1 3 * * * 
01) 
2 8 6 * * * 
17) 
2 5 7 * * * 
34) 








6 6 0 * * * 
62) 
3 9 0 * * * 
05) 
0 3 2 * * * 
40) 





( - 1 2 
- 0 






( - 0 
- 0 










2 2 6 * * * 
14) 
0 1 5 * * * 
14) 
3 6 1 * * * 
34) 
3 4 9 * * * 
24) 




1 0 2 * * * 
43) 
0 0 7 * * * 
85) 
9 5 3 * * * 
37) 
1 1 2 * * * 
69) 
4 2 5 * * * 
01) 





( - 5 
- 0 






( - 1 
- 0 










2 6 0 * * * 
65) 
0 1 7 * * * 
02) 
4 3 7 * * * 
59) 
4 4 2 * * * 
45) 
3 0 1 * * * 
10) 
0 3 6 * 
73) 
1 7 0 * * * 
40) 
0 1 2 * * * 
96) 
2 7 5 * * * 
16) 
o, 4 9* * * 
47) 
7 5 7 * * * 
67) 
1 9 3 1 3 
15 48°o 
0 






















3 4 2 * * * 
75) 
0 2 1 * * * 
66) 
5 1 7 * * * 
07) 
5 3 4 * * * 
61) 
0 6 3 * * * 
93) 
0 7 2 * * * 
73) 
2 3 3 * * * 
27) 
0 1 6 * * * 
41) 
5 6 8 * * * 
34) 
9 8 0 * * * 
60) 
0 9 0 * * * 
87) 





( - 6 
- 0 






( - 3 
- 0 










4 1 5 * * * 
56) 
0 2 6 * * * 
35) 
5 8 7 * * * 
45) 
7 2 6 * * * 
40) 
9 4 5 * * * 
42) 
1 0 4 * * * 
59) 
3 1 6 * * * 
89) 
0 2 1 * * * 
06) 
9 0 9 * * * 
04) 
4 3 8 * * * 
29) 
4 8 9 * * * 
24) 























( 1 1 
(7) 
4 8 8 * * * 
37) 
0 2 8 * * * 
84) 
7 1 3 * * * 
34) 
9 4 7 * * * 
64) 
9 1 0 * * * 
25) 
1 3 7 * * * 
04) 
4 4 1 * * * 
98) 
0 2 8 * * * 
02) 
0 9 1 * * * 
78) 
1 6 1 * * * 
62) 
1 0 1 * * * 
06) 





( - 6 
- 0 






( - 3 
- 0 










6 5 9 * * * 
53) 
0 3 5 * * * 
09) 
8 3 5 * * * 
39) 
2 6 8 * * * 
94) 
1 9 8 * * * 
88) 
1 7 2 * * * 
99) 
7 3 4 * * * 
54) 
0 4 7 * * * 
09) 
3 5 0 * * * 
06) 
2 3 1 * * * 
27) 
4 0 6 * * * 
56) 

























9 5 6 * * * 
18) 
0 6 4 * * * 
93) 
9 5 1 * * * 
69) 
6 9 5 * * * 
49) 
5 5 3 * * * 
33) 
3 9 3 * * * 
86) 
2 8 9 * * * 
29) 
0 8 1 * * * 
27) 
7 2 5 * * * 
06) 
8 7 2 * * * 
17) 
9 5 3 * * * 
77) 
1 9 3 1 3 
33 03°o 
This table reports quantile regression results for a sample of 19313 firm-year observations over the period 1992-2008 The dependent variable is Tobin's Q 
defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus book value of common equity, divided by the book value of total assets CEO 
pay-performance sensitivity is the dollar change in CEO wealth for a percentage change in fiim value, scaled by CEO total annual pay, then divided by 1000 
Leverage is the long-term debt scaled by total assets Sale growth is the current sales minus sales in the previous year, divided by sales in the previous year 
Soft capital is the ratio of the sum of research and development expenses and advertising expenses scaled by total assets Plant, property and equipment is the 
ratio of PPE to total assets Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets Cash flow is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total 
assets Earnings volatility is the standard deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets in the prior three years The ^-statistics are 
reported in parentheses ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively ^ 
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These results are consistent with the notion that CEO stock incentives increase 
firm value by aligning interests of managers with shareholders at lower levels but 
decrease firm value by increasing managerial risk aversion at higher levels. The OLS 
estimate of the conditional mean effect has coefficient estimates on CEO PPS of 0.386 
and on CEO PPS squared of-0.023 in Table 2.3. However, as is clear from the quantile 
regression results, the coefficient estimates vary across different percentiles. For 
example, the coefficient estimate on CEO PPS for the 10% percentile implies that given 
the set of independent variables, a one unit increase in CEO stock incentives is expected 
to increase Tobin's Q by 0.154 for a firm in the tenth percentile of the conditional 
distribution of Tobin's Q. This positive coefficient estimate rises up to 0.956 at the 90% 
percentile. Furthermore, the nonlinear relation between CEO PPS and Tobin's Q is more 
severe for firms with higher value, as indicated by the larger negative coefficient on CEO 
PPS squared for higher percentiles of Tobin's Q. It is noteworthy that the coefficient 
estimates on CEO pay-performance sensitivity and CEO pay-performance sensitivity 
squared from OLS regression are close to the coefficient estimates from quantile 
regression when firm value is located at its median. Therefore, the estimates of CEO-
stock-incentive effects on the conditional mean of Tobin's Q are not indicative of the size 
and the nature of the effects on the two tails of the firm value distribution. 
Most of the control variables also have varying relations with Tobin's Q across 
different percentiles. As one would expect, a large percentage of debt in capital structure 
and firm size reduce firm value, while growth opportunity, the portion of intangible 
assets in total assets and cash flow all have positive impacts on firm value. The concave 
relation between firm size and Tobin's Q holds for the whole distribution of Tobin's Q. 
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Firms with stable cash flows are more likely to be mature firms with less investment 
opportunities, and market takes this into account when forming expectations. This results 
in a positive relation between earnings volatility and Tobin's Q. 
Figure 2.3 plots quantile regression estimates from Table 2.3 for T ranging from 
0.1 to 0.9 as the solid curve. The shaded gray area depicts a 95% pointwise confidence 
band for the quantile regression estimates. For r larger than 0.3, the quantile regression 
estimates of both CEO pay-performance sensitivity and sensitivity squared lie outside the 
95% confidence interval of the OLS regression (not reported in the graph), suggesting the 
non-constant effect across the conditional distribution of the firm value cannot be 
captured by OLS regression. We can observe that the CEO pay-performance sensitivity 
increases Tobin's Q with smaller magnitude for conditionally low-value firms than for 
conditionally high-value firms, as indicated by the upward sloping of coefficient 
estimates across percentiles. The steeper downward slope of the CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity squared in the higher tail of the distribution suggests that the relation between 
CEO pay-performance and Tobin's Q is more concave for firms with higher value. In all 
of the panels of Figure 2.3, the quantile regression estimates change dramatically with the 
location of Tobin's Q, indicating that the effects of these variables may not be constant 
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Figure 2.3. Graphic Representation of Quantile Regression Estimates of the Coefficients 
The figure presents a summary of quantile regression estimates for a sample of 19313 firm-year observations over the period 1992-2008. The dependent variable 
is Tobin's Q. The independent variables include CEO pay-performance sensitivity, CEO pay-performance sensitivity squared, leverage, sale growth, soft capital, 
PPE, size, size squared, cash flow, and earnings volatility. 9 quantile regression estimates for T ranging from 0.1 to 0.9 are plotted as the solid curve. The 
shaded gray area depicts a 95% pointwise confidence band for the quantile regression estimates. 
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Koenker and Bassett (1982) and Hendricks and Koenker (1991) develop a 
methodology for testing the existence of heterogeneity in the quantile regression context. 
The null hypothesis of the test is pp.± = PPIT2, and the rejection of the null indicates that 
the coefficient estimates for different quantiles are statistically different. The test 
statistics can be written as 
Ttl = (f^ - 0~;2y myH-1) -HAL - Ail (9) 
where (H~1]H~1) _ 1 is the "sandwich" variance matrix. This statistics has an asymptotic 
F distribution after it is divided by its degree of freedom. When this test is used to test a 
single coefficient across a pair of quantiles, it can be simplified to 
Tn , ' / ^ , JL^--_ , (10) 
where /?p,ri and pv.r2 are the coefficient estimates of the testing variable at a given 
quantile. 
Table 2.4 presents the results of tests for significant differences in the coefficient 
estimates of CEO pay-performance sensitivity and CEO pay-performance sensitivity 
squared for all possible combinations of percentiles. For example, the F-statistic for 
testing whether there is a significant difference between 10% percentile and 30% 
percentile is 35.10, which is significant at the 1% level. In fact, almost all of the 
coefficients on CEO pay-performance sensitivity are significantly different from each 
other, suggesting that CEO pay-performance sensitivity increases firm value with 
different magnitude at different points in the conditional distribution of firm value. 
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Table 2.4 F-Statistics for Differences in Coefficients Estimates Across Percentiles 
Panel A: F-statistics for differences 
percentiles 
q l O 
q 2 0 
q 3 0 
q 4 0 
q 5 0 
q 6 0 
q 7 0 
q 8 0 
q 2 0 








q 3 0 q 4 0 
3 5 . 1 2 * * * 1 9 . 6 3 * * * 
1 3 . 1 7 * * * 1 1 . 1 5 * * * 






Panel B: F-statistics for differences 
squared across percentiles 
q l O 
q2 0 
q 3 0 
q4 0 
q 5 0 
q 6 0 
q 7 0 
q 2 0 







q 3 0 q 4 0 
7 . 9 1 * * * 3 . 8 2 * * 
4 . 4 4 * * 3 . 1 0 * 





. in coefficients on CEO pay-performance sensitivity across 
q 5 0 
5 7 . 3 6 * * * 
3 3 . 7 7 * * * 
2 8 . 4 7 * * * 





q 6 0 
6 5 . 5 9 * * * 
4 5 . 2 2 * * * 
4 1 . 6 9 * * * 
3 3 . 0 0 * * * 




q 7 0 
6 1 . 6 5 * * * 
4 8 . 2 4 * * * 
4 0 . 4 1 * * * 
2 9 . 4 6 * * * 
1 6 . 2 2 * * * 
6 . 2 1 * * 
-
-
q 8 0 
1 2 8 . 4 4 * * * 
1 1 9 . 3 9 * * * 
9 8 . 5 8 * * * 
8 5 . 8 1 * * * 
5 0 . 7 7 * * * 
3 7 . 4 4 * * * 
2 7 . 4 7 * * * 
-
q 9 0 
1 8 0 . 3 7 * * * 
1 6 1 . 0 9 * * * 
1 5 5 . 8 8 * * * 
1 3 1 . 9 8 * * * 
9 9 . 7 8 * * * 
7 7 . 8 8 * * * 
6 1 . 2 8 * * * 
2 5 . 8 1 * * 
in coefficients on CEO pay-performance sensitivity 
q 5 0 
1 6 . 0 3 * * * 
9 . 1 3 * * * 
6 . 6 7 * * * 




q 6 0 
1 4 . 1 6 * * * 
1 1 . 1 1 * * * 
8 . 4 0 * * * 
8 . 2 6 * * * 
2 . 3 3 
-
-
q 7 0 
8 . 9 3 * * * 
7 . 2 2 * * * 
5 . 2 5 * * 
4 . 0 3 * * 
1 . 9 1 
0 . 2 1 
-
q 8 0 
2 5 . 9 3 * * * 
2 2 . 8 3 * * * 
1 8 . 5 1 * * * 
1 7 . 0 1 * * * 
1 1 . 4 2 * * * 
5 . 8 5 * * 
4 . 9 6 * * 
q 9 0 
8 3 . 7 7 * * * 
7 2 . 6 6 * * * 
7 2 . 3 6 * * * 
6 4 . 7 8 * * * 
5 5 . 8 7 * * * 
4 2 . 9 6 * * * 
3 7 . 2 8 * * * 
q80 - - - - - - - 2 4 . 3 8 * * * 
This table reports F-statistics for testing differences in quantile regression coefficients estimates across 
different percentiles for T ranging from 0.1 to 0.9 for a sample of 19313 firm-year observations over the 
period 1992-2008. The dependent variable is Tobin's Q. The independent variables include CEO pay-
performance sensitivity, CEO pay-performance sensitivity squared, leverage, sale growth, soft capital, 
PPE, size, size squared, cash flow, and earnings volatility. Panel A reports the F-statistics for testing 
differences in quantile regression estimates of the coefficients on CEO pay-performance sensitivity. 
Panel B reports the F-statistics for testing differences in quantile regression estimates of the coefficients 
on CEO pay-performance sensitivity squared. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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The coefficients on CEO pay-performance sensitivity squared are also statistically 
significantly different from each other. This implies that concavity of the relation 
between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and Tobin's Q varies with the location of 
Tobin's Q in its conditional distribution. 
Robustness Tests 
For robustness, I first used different model specification to control for time-
invariant effect in the quantile regression. I also include additional control variables to 
account for the omitted variable bias. Finally, I conduct several tests to investigate 
causality. 
Alternative Model Specifications 
The findings in the previous section may result from the lack of controls for 
unobservable fixed effect in the regression model. Quantile regression might be 
capturing this effect that would have been captured if the fixed-effect model or first-
differencing model had been applied. If this is the case, quantile regression will not be 
superior to the traditional empirical methodologies used in this area. To that end, I used 
two alternative methodologies to control for firm and year two-way fixed effects in the 
quantile regression context and further test whether the coefficient estimates on CEO PPS 
are different for firms at different points in the conditional distribution of Tobin's Q. 
The estimation of quantile regression coefficients requires intensive computer 
capacity, the current statistics packages, such as STATA and SAS, are not able to 
generate coefficient estimates with the control for two-way fixed effects directly. 
Therefore, I manually mean-differenced the data for each observation, then used the 
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demeaned value in the quantile regression with the control for only year-fixed effect. 
More specifically, I compute the means of all the variables over time: 
S = ^Ef= 1y l f (11) 
*t = £5£=i*,t (12) 
where Tt is the number of measurements for each firm i. The firm-specific means are 
then subtracted from the original value of each variable for each fiscal year: 
y = rtt-yt (13) 
x'~ = x l t — x~z (14) 
This within transformation removes unobservable time-constant firm effect. I further 
regress v' on x* using quantile regression, with the year dummy variable to represent the 
effect of time. 
Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 reports the results without and with CEO pay-
performance sensitivity squared, respectively. It is clear that the coefficient estimates 
vary across different percentiles. One unit increase in CEO pay-performance sensitivity 
appears to have much larger positive impact on Tobin's Q when Tobin's Q is located at 
the 10 % percentile and the top tail of its distribution. When Tobin's Q is in the middle 
range of its distribution, CEO PPS has a quite uniform effect, suggesting a pure location 
shift effect on the conditional distribution. The concavity of the relation between CEO 
pay-performance sensitivity and Tobin's Q also varies with the location of Tobin's Q. 
The concavity is stronger when Tobin's Q is at both tails and weaker when Tobin's Q is 
in the middle range of its distribution. 
Table 2.5 Quantile Regression of Tobin's Q on CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity with Demeaned Data_Specification I 












0 . 1 5 8 * * * 
( 8 . 5 6 ) 
- 0 . 8 0 8 * * * 
( - 6 . 9 0 ) 
0 . 7 5 9 * * * 
(15 16) 
2 . 4 0 0 * * * 
( 4 . 8 9 ) 
- 0 . 3 8 1 * * * 
( - 3 . 4 4 ) 
- 0 . 8 7 9 * * * 
( - 5 . 3 8 ) 
0 . 0 3 1 * * * 
( 2 . 7 1 ) 
2 . 3 6 2 * * * 
( 1 5 . 5 7 ) 
0 . 1 0 7 * * * 
( 1 0 . 4 8 ) 
- 0 . 5 8 7 * * * 
( - 4 . 5 7 ) 
0 . 4 7 5 * * * 
( 1 3 . 5 3 ) 
2 . 4 4 4 * * * 
( 7 . 1 9 ) 
- 0 . 4 2 3 * * * 
( - 2 . 7 6 ) 
- 0 . 5 1 9 * * * 
( - 3 . 8 2 ) 
0 . 0 1 7 * 
( 1 . 8 2 ) 
2 . 1 7 2 * * * 
( 1 6 . 1 0 ) 
0 . 1 0 6 * * * 
( 6 . 7 1 ) 
- 0 . 5 5 4 * * * 
( - 5 . 8 8 ) 
0 . 4 0 0 * * * 
( 1 6 . 0 6 ) 
1 . 8 9 8 * * * 
( 6 . 5 8 ) 
- 0 . 3 1 5 * * * 
( - 3 . 5 7 ) 
- 0 . 6 3 0 * * * 
( - 7 . 1 0 ) 
0 . 0 2 8 * * * 
( 4 . 6 2 ) 
2 . 1 4 8 * * * 
( 1 8 . 5 2 ) 
0 . 1 1 6 * * * 
( 7 . 7 5 ) 
- 0 . 4 9 7 * * * 
( - 7 . 5 7 ) 
0 . 3 5 4 * * * 
( 1 8 . 2 1 ) 
1 . 8 0 0 * * * 
( 6 . 7 3 ) 
- 0 . 2 2 1 * * * 
( - 3 . 7 3 ) 
- 0 . 5 5 8 * * * 
( - 8 . 7 5 ) 
0 . 0 2 3 * * * 
( 5 . 5 4 ) 
2 . 1 3 7 * * * 
( 2 4 . 1 7 ) 
0 . 1 2 8 * * * 
( 7 . 5 1 ) 
- 0 . 4 4 7 * * * 
( - 1 0 . 3 2 ) 
0 . 3 4 2 * * * 
( 1 5 . 3 9 ) 
1 . 5 9 8 * * * 
( 6 . 6 4 ) 
- 0 . 2 2 3 * * * 
( - 3 . 8 5 ) 
- 0 . 5 6 8 * * * 
( - 1 0 . 5 3 ) 
0 . 0 2 3 * * * 
( 6 . 4 2 ) 
2 . 1 2 4 * * * 
( 2 5 . 1 1 ) 
0 . 1 3 3 * * * 
( 8 . 5 7 ) 
- 0 . 5 4 3 * * * 
( - 1 1 . 3 1 ) 
0 . 3 7 7 * * * 
( 1 3 . 2 5 ) 
1 . 3 5 8 * * * 
( 7 . 1 3 ) 
- 0 . 2 3 3 * * * 
( - 4 . 4 6 ) 
- 0 . 6 1 7 * * * 
( - 8 . 4 5 ) 
0 . 0 2 5 * * * 
( 5 . 4 6 ) 
2 . 0 5 8 * * * 
( 2 0 . 6 7 ) 
0 . 1 4 2 * * * 
( 1 3 . 1 0 ) 
- 0 . 5 7 8 * * * 
( - 1 2 . 0 3 ) 
0 . 4 2 7 * * * 
( 1 7 . 5 4 ) 
1 . 2 6 5 * * * 
(5 55) 
- 0 . 2 1 9 * * * 
( - 5 . 0 2 ) 
- 0 . 6 4 4 * * * 
( - 1 0 . 1 6 ) 
0 . 0 2 5 * * * 
( 6 . 3 5 ) 
2 . 0 6 3 * * * 
( 2 0 . 8 9 ) 
0 . 1 5 6 * * * 
( 1 1 . 9 6 ) 
- 0 . 7 2 2 * * * 
( - 1 3 . 6 0 ) 
0 . 5 2 8 * * * 
( 1 6 . 6 4 ) 
1 . 4 5 4 * * * 
( 5 . 2 5 ) 
- 0 . 2 1 2 * * * 
( - 4 . 5 4 ) 
- 0 . 6 5 3 * * * 
( - 6 . 8 3 ) 
0 . 0 2 3 * * * 
( 3 . 7 4 ) 
2 . 0 5 6 * * * 
( 1 9 . 3 4 ) 
0 . 1 7 1 * * * 
( 1 4 . 9 0 ) 
- 0 . 8 7 2 * * * 
( - 1 1 . 7 7 ) 
0 . 7 1 5 * * * 
( 1 7 . 4 0 ) 
1 . 3 7 0 * * * 
( 3 . 3 1 ) 
- 0 . 2 4 2 * * * 
( - 3 . 4 6 ) 
- 0 . 8 1 1 * * * 
( - 8 . 1 8 ) 
0 . 0 2 9 * * * 
( 4 . 2 7 ) 
2 . 0 1 4 * * * 
( 2 1 . 1 0 ) 
0 . 1 8 0 * * * 
( 9 . 1 9 ) 
- 1 . 0 8 3 * * * 
( - 1 0 . 7 0 ) 
0 . 9 7 2 * * * 
( 1 4 . 2 8 ) 
1 . 8 1 7 * * * 
( 2 . 9 9 ) 
- 0 . 4 2 3 * * * 
( - 4 . 1 1 ) 
- 0 . 9 3 2 * * * 
( - 6 . 1 8 ) 
0 . 0 2 5 * * 
( 2 . 4 8 ) 
2 . 1 2 5 * * * 
( 1 8 . 0 2 ) 
Earnings 
volatility 3.419*** 2.472*** 1.878*** 1.832*** 1.796*** 1.897*** 2.273*** 2.905*** 3.605*** 4.148*** 
(7.54) (6.26) (6.00) (8.08) (9.58) (7.70) (12.10) (8.31) (10.61) (9.49) 
Intercept -0.315*** -1.384*** -0.872*** -0.577*** -0.389*** -0.272*** -0.140*** -0.000 0.192*** 0.514*** 
(-9.79) (-14 89) (-14.25) (-20.37) (-13.05) (-15.19) (-6.37) (-0.00) (7.58) (15.03) 
N 19313 19313 19313 19313 19313 19313 19313 19313 19313 19313 
Pseudo R 
squared 26.71% 13.45% 12.11% 11.61% ll.38% 11.47% 11.95% 12.89% 14.99% 19.87% 
This table lepoits quantile legiession lesults foi a sample of 193 13 firm-year observations over the period 1992-2008 The first model is OLS regression Models (1) - (9) aie 
quantile legiessions tor r langing from 0 1 to 0 9 All the models contiol yeai effect All the variables aie demeaned by subtracting the time-series average value fiom the 
ongmal value loi each obseivation Tobin s O is the market value ot equity plus the book value of total assets minus book value ot common equity, divided by the book value 
of total assets CEO pay-peifoimance sensitivity is the dollar change in CEO wealth for a percentage change in firm value, scaled by CEO total annual pay, then divided by 
1000 Le\eiage is the long-teim debt scaled by total assets Sale growth is the current sales minus sales in the previous year, divided by sales in the previous year Soft capital 
is the latio ol the sum ot research and development expenses and advertising expenses scaled by total assets Plant, property and equipment is the ratio of PPE to total assets 
Size is the natuial loganthm of the book value of total assets Cash flow is the ratio of income before extiaoidinary items to total assets Earnings volatility is the standard 
deviation of the latio of income before extiaoidmaiy items to total assets in the prior three years The '-statistics are leported in parentheses ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1 peicent. 5 peicent. and 10 peicent levels, lespectively 




















0 . 3 8 6 * * * 
( 9 . 9 6 ) 
- 0 . 0 2 3 * * * 
( - 6 . 0 8 ) 
- 0 . 7 9 6 * * * 
( - 6 . 8 1 ) 
0 . 7 4 8 * * * 
( 1 4 . 9 8 ) 
2 . 4 2 7 * * * 
( 4 . 9 5 ) 
- 0 . 3 7 2 * * * 
( - 3 . 3 5 ) 
- 0 . 8 6 5 * * * 
( - 5 . 3 3 ) 
0 . 0 3 0 * * * 
( 2 . 6 5 ) 
2 . 3 4 5 * * * 
( 1 5 . 4 5 ) 
3 . 4 0 3 * * * 
( 7 . 5 0 ) 
- 0 . 2 9 5 * * * 
( - 9 . 2 7 ) 
(1) 
0 . 3 2 3 * * * 
( 1 0 . 8 2 ) 
- 0 . 0 2 2 * * * 
( - 6 76) 
- 0 . 5 3 3 * * * 
( - 4 . 1 5 ) 
0 . 4 6 8 * * * 
( 1 1 . 7 7 ) 
2 . 5 5 5 * * * 
( 5 . 7 9 ) 
- 0 . 4 7 7 * * * 
( - 2 . 7 3 ) 
- 0 . 5 9 2 * * * 
( - 3 . 8 9 ) 
0 . 0 2 3 * * 
( 2 . 0 9 ) 
2 . 2 0 1 * * * 
( 1 3 . 4 3 ) 
2 . 4 1 4 * * * 
( 5 . 8 0 ) 
- 1 . 4 1 3 * * * 
( - 1 4 . 4 8 ) 
(2) 
0 . 2 4 9 * * * 
( 9 . 3 8 ) 
- 0 . 0 1 5 * * * 
( - 5 . 7 5 ) 
- 0 . 5 3 9 * * * 
( - 6 . 7 5 ) 
0 . 3 9 5 * * * 
( 1 1 . 6 1 ) 
1 . 9 5 1 * * * 
( 5 . 8 3 ) 
- 0 . 3 1 8 * * * 
( - 3 . 1 0 ) 
- 0 . 6 4 9 * * * 
( - 7 . 8 5 ) 
0 . 0 3 0 * * * 
( 5 . 2 8 ) 
2 . 1 4 3 * * * 
( 2 3 . 7 6 ) 
1 . 8 0 9 * * * 
( 6 . 1 2 ) 
- 0 . 8 5 9 * * * 
( - 1 2 . 5 1 ) 
(3) 
0 . 2 6 3 * * * 
( 1 0 . 1 4 ) 
- 0 . 0 1 6 * * * 
( - 5 . 8 9 ) 
- 0 . 4 6 2 * * * 
( - 7 . 9 3 ) 
0 . 3 5 0 * * * 
( 1 6 . 0 6 ) 
1 . 7 8 4 * * * 
( 6 . 8 0 ) 
- 0 . 2 4 6 * * * 
( - 4 . 1 2 ) 
- 0 . 5 4 7 * * * 
( - 7 . 8 0 ) 
0 . 0 2 2 * * * 
( 5 . 0 0 ) 
2 . 1 1 8 * * * 
( 2 1 . 4 0 ) 
1 . 7 5 9 * * * 
( 6 . 7 1 ) 
- 0 . 5 5 9 * * * 
( - 1 4 . 6 1 ) 
(4) 
0 . 2 7 9 * * * 
( 1 0 . 4 5 ) 
- 0 . 0 1 7 * * * 
( - 7 . 1 1 ) 
- 0 . 4 4 3 * * * 
( - 1 2 . 2 0 ) 
0 . 3 3 2 * * * 
( 1 3 . 8 4 ) 
1 . 5 7 5 * * * 
( 7 . 0 4 ) 
- 0 . 2 1 9 * * * 
( - 5 . 3 3 ) 
- 0 . 5 6 1 * * * 
( - 1 1 . 4 8 ) 
0 . 0 2 3 * * * 
( 6 . 9 9 ) 
2 . 0 9 3 * * * 
( 2 6 . 6 1 ) 
1 . 7 4 5 * * * 
( 7 . 9 9 ) 
- 0 . 3 8 4 * * * 
( - 1 3 . 0 9 ) 
(5) 
0 . 2 7 7 * * * 
( 1 2 . 0 8 ) 
- 0 . 0 1 6 * * * 
( - 5 . 8 6 ) 
- 0 . 5 1 2 * * * 
( - 1 3 . 0 1 ) 
0 3 7 1 * * * 
( 1 5 . 6 5 ) 
1 . 3 4 9 * * * 
( 6 . 3 1 ) 
- 0 . 2 1 8 * * * 
( - 3 . 3 5 ) 
- 0 . 6 0 8 * * * 
( - 8 . 7 2 ) 
0 . 0 2 4 * * * 
( 5 . 4 2 ) 
2 . 0 3 6 * * * 
( 2 5 . 1 1 ) 
1 . 9 2 7 * * * 
( 9 . 5 2 ) 
- 0 . 2 6 6 * * * 
( - 1 4 . 9 0 ) 
(6) 
0 . 2 8 5 * * * 
( 1 2 . 7 0 ) 
- 0 . 0 1 6 * * * 
( - 6 . 0 9 ) 
- 0 . 5 7 2 * * * 
( - 1 4 . 7 7 ) 
0 . 4 2 9 * * * 
( 1 5 . 4 0 ) 
1 . 3 4 4 * * * 
( 6 . 0 1 ) 
- 0 . 2 1 9 * * * 
( - 4 . 5 5 ) 
- 0 . 6 4 7 * * * 
( - 9 . 9 4 ) 
0 . 0 2 6 * * * 
( 6 . 2 0 ) 
2 . 0 5 0 * * * 
( 2 1 . 5 9 ) 
2 . 2 6 4 * * * 
( 1 2 . 0 9 ) 
- 0 . 1 3 4 * * * 
( - 6 . 2 6 ) 
(7) 
0 . 3 1 1 * * * 
( 1 0 . 7 6 ) 
- 0 . 0 1 7 * * * 
( - 5 . 5 9 ) 
- 0 . 7 0 4 * * * 
( - 1 5 . 3 4 ) 
0 . 5 2 6 * * * 
( 1 5 . 7 9 ) 
1 . 4 0 7 * * * 
( 5 . 7 0 ) 
- 0 . 2 0 4 * * * 
( - 4 . 4 3 ) 
- 0 . 6 7 1 * * * 
( - 9 . 5 7 ) 
0 . 0 2 4 * * * 
( 5 . 3 6 ) 
2 . 0 7 4 * * * 
( 2 0 . 2 2 ) 
2 . 9 5 9 * * * 
( 1 2 . 3 4 ) 
0 . 0 0 5 
( 0 . 2 8 ) 
(8) 
0 . 3 5 5 * * * 
( 1 5 . 7 7 ) 
- 0 . 0 2 0 * * * 
( - 6 . 6 6 ) 
- 0 . 8 3 9 * * * 
( - 1 0 . 6 5 ) 
0 . 7 1 0 * * * 
( 1 5 . 2 1 ) 
1 . 4 3 7 * * * 
( 4 . 3 9 ) 
- 0 . 2 4 8 * * * 
( - 3 . 0 4 ) 
- 0 . 7 8 1 * * * 
( - 8 . 1 1 ) 
0 . 0 2 7 * * * 
( 4 . 2 9 ) 
1 . 9 8 1 * * * 
( 1 5 . 1 6 ) 
3 . 5 1 1 * * * 
( 9 . 2 0 ) 
0 . 1 9 1 * * * 
( 7 . 5 1 ) 
(9) 
0 . 4 0 7 * * * 
( 8 . 0 5 ) 
- 0 . 0 2 3 * * * 
( - 4 . 3 6 ) 
- 1 . 0 4 7 * * * 
( - 7 . 5 2 ) 
0 . 9 5 5 * * * 
( 1 2 . 5 2 ) 
1 . 7 3 6 * * * 
( 2 . 8 6 ) 
- 0 . 4 1 8 * * * 
( - 3 . 4 2 ) 
- 0 . 9 2 5 * * * 
( - 6 . 8 9 ) 
0 . 0 2 5 * * * 
( 2 . 7 9 ) 
2 . 1 3 3 * * * 
( 2 0 . 7 2 ) 
4 . 3 2 0 * * * 
( 8 . 4 3 ) 
0 . 5 2 7 * * * 
( 1 6 . 7 2 ) 
N 19313 19313 19313 19313 19313 19313 19313 19313 19313 19313 
Pseudo R sqiiaie 27.62% 13.94% 12.38% 11.86% 11.62% 11.68% 12.14% 13.13% 15.25% 20.13% 
This table lepoits quantile legiession lesults for a sample of 19313 firm-year observations over the period 1992-2008 The first model is OLS legression Models (1) - (9) are 
quantile legiessions foi r langing liom 0 1 to 0 9 All the models contiol yeai effect All the variables are demeaned by subtiacting the time-series average value from the 
oiiginal value foi each obseivation Tobin's Q is the market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus book value of common equity, divided by the book value 
ot total assets CEO pay-peitoimance sensitivity is the dollai change in CEO wealth for a percentage change in firm value, scaled by CEO total annual pay, then divided by 
1000 Leveiage is the long-teim debt scaled by total assets Sale giowth is the cuirent sales minus sales in the pievious yeai, divided by sales in the previous year Soft 
capital is the latio ot the sum of leseaich and development expenses and advertising expenses scaled by total assets Plant, property and equipment is the ratio of PPE to total 
assets Size is the natural logaiithm ot the book value of total assets Cash flow is the ratio of income befoie extraordinary items to total assets Earnings volatility is the 
standaid deviation ot the latio of income before extraordinary items to total assets in the prior three years The '-statistics are repoited in parentheses ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1 peicent, 5 peicent, and 10 peicent levels, respectively 
Table 2.7 F-Statistics for Differences in Coefficients Estimates Across Percentiles 
F-statistics for differences in coefficients on pay-performance sensitivity across percentiles 
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F-statistics for differences in coefficients on pay-performance sensitivity squared across percentiles 









This table reports F-statistics for testing differences in quantile regression coefficients estimates of the coefficients on pay-performance sensitivity across 
different percentiles for r ranging from 0.1 to 0.9 for a sample of 19313 firm-year observations over the period 1992-2008. All the variables are demeaned by 
subtracting the time-series average value from the original value for each observation. The dependent variable is demeaned Tobin's Q. The independent 
variables include demeaned CEO pay-performance sensitivity, demeaned CEO pay-performance sensitivity squared, demeaned leverage, demeaned sale 
growth, demeaned soft capital, demeaned PPE, demeaned size, demeaned size squared, demeaned cash flow, and demeaned earnings volatility. Year effect is 
controlled by including year dummy in all the quantile regressions. F-statistics for difference in coefficients on CEO pay-performance sensitivity are not 


























































It is important to note that the results from quantile regression when r is equal to 
0.8 or 0.9 are similar to those from the OLS regression based on conditional mean. This 
could make sense since the distribution of Tobin's Q is highly skewed to the right. 
I further test whether the differences in the coefficient estimates on CEO PPS and 
CEO PPS squared are significant across different percentiles of firm value and report the 
results in Table 2.7. 
The coefficient estimate when Tobin's Q is at 10% percentile is not significantly 
different from estimates when Tobin's Q is at higher percentiles. Neither are the 
estimates when Tobin's Q is at the middle range of its distribution different from one 
another. However, the estimates when Tobin's Q is at both tails are significantly 
different from those when Tobin's Q is at the middle range. Although the statistical 
significance level is reduced after I control for firm and year fixed effects, I still observe 
heterogeneity in the relation between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and firm value. 
Another methodology to remove individual unobservable effect is to use first-
differenced data. The model specification is the same as Eq. (8). The results for the 
quantile regression without and with the consideration for nonlinearity between CEO 
pay-performance and firm value are reported in Table 2.8 and Table 2.9, respectively. 
The year-by-year change in CEO PPS has a significantly positive effect on the 
contemporaneous changes in firm value across all the percentiles, and this positive effect 
declines as percentile increases. Table 2.10 shows that almost all of the coefficient 
estimates are significantly different from one another, indicating that the positive 
association between change in CEO PPS and change in Tobin's Q is different at different 
points in the conditional distribution. 
Table 2.8 Quantile Regression of Tobin's Q on CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity with First-Differenced Data_Specification I 
A CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity 
A Leverage 
A Sale growth 
A Soft capital 
A Plant, property 
equipment 
A Size 
A Size squared 








0 . 1 1 0 * * * 
( 5 . 7 5 ) 
- 0 . 6 6 7 * * * 
( - 5 . 5 8 ) 
0 . 3 5 0 * * * 
( 9 . 4 3 ) 
0 . 7 2 3 * 
( 1 . 7 8 ) 
- 0 . 6 7 8 * * * 
( - 9 . 0 8 ) 
- 0 . 7 4 1 * * * 
( - 2 . 6 1 ) 
- 0 . 0 0 1 
( - 0 . 0 6 ) 
1 . 0 5 1 * * * 
( 8 . 1 7 ) 
- 0 . 0 0 7 
( - 0 . 0 1 ) 
- 0 . 0 1 2 * * 
( - 1 . 9 7 ) 
1 6 9 2 1 
8 . 1 3 % 
(1) 
0 . 1 2 4 * * * 
( 4 . 5 8 ) 
- 0 . 4 6 3 * * * 
( - 2 . 7 7 ) 
0 . 5 5 3 * * * 
( 9 . 3 3 ) 
0 . 0 7 6 
( 0 . 1 8 ) 
- 0 . 8 8 5 * * * 
( - 9 . 6 3 ) 
- 2 . 8 1 8 * * * 
( - 8 . 9 4 ) 
0 . 1 0 8 * * * 
( 5 . 1 0 ) 
0 . 9 9 1 * * * 
( 9 . 6 3 ) 
- 0 . 4 1 5 
( - 0 . 7 0 ) 
- 0 . 6 7 9 * * * 
( - 5 0 . 2 9 ) 
1 6 9 2 1 
9 . 4 6% 
(2) 
0 . 1 2 2 * * * 
( 7 . 2 4 ) 
- 0 . 4 5 5 * * * 
( - 4 . 6 6 ) 
0 . 3 6 8 * * * 
( 9 . 2 4 ) 
0 . 1 1 8 
( 0 . 4 1 ) 
- 0 . 5 6 8 * * * 
( - 1 0 . 9 1 ) 
- 1 . 6 8 7 * * * 
( - 9 . 3 9 ) 
0 . 0 5 8 * * * 
( 4 . 8 1 ) 
0 . 8 6 2 * * * 
( 1 0 . 2 9 ) 
- 0 . 2 7 1 
( - 1 . 0 4 ) 
- 0 . 3 2 2 * * * 
( - 3 7 . 5 4 ) 
1 6 9 2 1 
7 . 11% 
(3) 
0 . 1 1 8 * * * 
( 7 . 5 9 ) 
- 0 . 4 7 7 * * * 
( - 7 . 7 8 ) 
0 . 2 9 1 * * * 
( 1 2 . 0 1 ) 
0 . 3 1 1 
( 1 . 1 8 ) 
- 0 . 5 3 1 * * * 
( - 9 . 7 5 ) 
- 1 . 2 8 9 * * * 
( - 8 . 7 9 ) 
0 . 0 4 7 * * * 
( 4 . 8 2 ) 
0 . 7 5 5 * * * 
( 1 1 . 9 0 ) 
- 0 . 1 9 5 
( - 0 . 7 5 ) 
- 0 . 1 7 2 * * * 
( - 3 0 . 8 5 ) 
1 6 9 2 1 
5 .60% 
(4) 
0 . 1 1 6 * * * 
( 1 0 . 6 6 ) 
- 0 . 4 7 4 * * * 
( - 9 . 6 6 ) 
0 . 2 2 6 * * * 
( 1 5 . 6 5 ) 
0 . 3 9 1 * 
( 1 . 8 7 ) 
- 0 . 4 5 6 * * * 
( - 1 4 . 7 2 ) 
- 0 . 7 8 5 * * * 
( - 7 . 6 7 ) 
0 . 0 2 2 * * * 
( 3 . 4 8 ) 
0 . 6 6 5 * * * 
( 1 4 . 8 0 ) 
- 0 . 3 0 1 * * 
( - 2 . 3 6 ) 
- 0 . 8 0 0 * * * 
( - 2 4 . 0 1 ) 
1 6 9 2 1 
4 . 4 8 % 
(5) 
0 . 1 0 0 * * * 
( 5 . 0 4 ) 
- 0 . 4 8 2 * * * 
( - 6 . 7 9 ) 
0 . 1 8 2 * * * 
( 1 1 . 2 9 ) 
0 . 3 8 8 * * 
( 2 . 2 9 ) 
- 0 . 4 5 1 * * * 
( - 1 3 . 9 3 ) 
- 0 . 5 3 6 * * * 
( - 4 . 8 1 ) 
0 . 0 1 1 * 
( 1 . 7 3 ) 
0 . 6 1 0 * * * 
( 1 1 . 1 7 ) 
- 0 . 3 1 0 * * 
( - 2 . 1 1 ) 
- 0 . 0 0 4 
( - 1 . 0 0 ) 
1 6 9 2 1 
3 . 3 8 % 
(6) 
0 . 0 8 0 * * * 
( 5 . 1 7 ) 
- 0 . 5 0 1 * * * 
( - 9 . 0 5 ) 
0 . 1 6 3 * * * 
( 1 3 . 9 0 ) 
0 . 3 3 6 * 
( 1 . 7 1 ) 
- 0 . 3 9 1 * * * 
( - 6 . 5 6 ) 
- 0 . 0 4 2 
( - 0 . 3 9 ) 
- 0 . 0 1 6 * * 
( - 2 . 1 1 ) 
0 . 5 3 9 * * * 
( 7 . 1 8 ) 
- 0 . 2 0 8 
( - 0 . 9 1 ) 
0 . 0 6 8 * * * 
( 1 9 . 7 4 ) 
1 6 9 2 1 
2 . 7 8 % 
(7) 
0 . 0 7 5 * * * 
( 7 . 5 9 ) 
- 0 . 5 2 3 * * * 
( - 9 . 5 0 ) 
0 . 1 6 0 * * * 
( 1 1 . 4 7 ) 
0 . 3 5 1 
( 1 . 1 2 ) 
- 0 . 4 2 0 * * * 
( - 8 . 3 0 ) 
0 . 2 6 8 * * 
( 2 . 1 9 ) 
- 0 . 0 3 4 * * * 
( - 4 . 2 9 ) 
0 . 5 6 1 * * * 
( 6 . 7 1 ) 
- 0 . 0 0 2 
( - 0 . 0 1 ) 
0 . 1 5 0 * * * 
(34 . 8 8 ) 
1 6 9 2 1 
2 . 5 3 % 
(8) 
0 . 0 7 7 * * * 
( 5 . 2 9 ) 
- 0 . 5 4 8 * * * 
( - 5 . 1 2 ) 
0 . 1 6 9 * * * 
( 9 . 8 0 ) 
0 . 6 4 0 * * 
( 2 . 3 2 ) 
- 0 . 4 9 8 * * * 
( - 7 . 9 3 ) 
0 . 6 6 1 * * * 
( 3 . 8 3 ) 
- 0 . 0 5 9 * * * 
( - 5 . 4 7 ) 
0 . 5 8 7 * * * 
( 7 . 9 2 ) 
0 . 1 2 1 
( 0 . 3 5 ) 
0 . 2 8 1 * * * 
( 4 1 . 8 1 ) 
1 6 9 2 1 
2 . 3 3 % 
(9) 
0 . 7 0 0 * * * 
( 2 . 9 2 ) 
- 0 . 7 2 6 * * * 
( - 5 . 2 8 ) 
0 . 1 7 9 * * * 
( 3 . 9 5 ) 
1 . 0 9 7 * * * 
( 3 . 1 9 ) 
- 0 . 5 5 7 * * * 
( - 5 . 2 0 ) 
1 . 3 7 4 * * * 
( 6 . 3 5 ) 
- 0 . 1 0 4 * * * 
( - 6 . 9 3 ) 
0 . 7 1 8 * * * 
( 6 . 2 3 ) 
0 . 6 8 0 
( 1 . 5 7 ) 
0 . 5 6 6 * * * 
( 4 2 . 3 1 ) 
1 6 9 2 1 
2 . 5 2 % 
This table reports quantile regression results for a sample of 19313 firm-year observations over the period 1992-2008. All the variables are first-differenced. 
Tobin's Q is the market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus book value of common equity, divided by the book value of total assets. 
CEO pay-performance sensitivity is the dollar change in CEO wealth for a percentage change in firm value, scaled by CEO total annual pay, then divided by 
1000. Leverage is the long-term debt scaled by total assets. Sale growth is the current sales minus sales in the previous year, divided by sales in the previous 
year. Soft capital is the ratio of the sum of research and development expenses and advertising expenses scaled by total assets. Plant, property and equipment 
is the ratio of PPE to total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. Cash flow is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to 
total assets. Earnings volatility is the standard deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets in the prior three years. The t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Table 2.9 Quantile Regression of Tobin's Q on CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity with First-Differenced Data_Specification II 





A Sale growth 
A Soft capital 
A Plant, property and 
equipment 
A Size 
A Size squared 




0 . 3 3 9 * * * 
(8 . 4 6 ) 
- 0 . 0 2 2 * * * 
( - 5 . 4 4 ) 
- 0 . 6 6 3 * * * 
( - 5 . 5 4 ) 
0 . 3 4 9 * * * 
( 9 . 4 4 ) 
0 . 7 5 1 * 
( 1 . 8 6 ) 
- 0 . 6 6 2 * * * 
( - 8 . 9 2 ) 
- 0 . 7 5 0 * * * 
( - 2 . 6 5 ) 
- 0 . 0 0 0 
( - 0 . 0 3 ) 
1 . 0 4 7 * * * 
( 8 . 1 9 ) 
0 . 0 0 6 
( 0 . 0 1 ) 
- 0 . 0 0 9 
( - 1 . 3 9 ) 
(1) 
0 . 3 9 6 * * * 
( 8 . 0 5 ) 
- 0 . 0 2 8 * * * 
( - 5 . 5 6 ) 
- 0 . 4 6 9 * * * 
( - 3 . 2 6 ) 
0 . 5 4 8 * * * 
( 1 0 . 1 9 ) 
- 0 . 0 0 6 
( - 0 . 0 1 ) 
- 0 . 8 9 1 * * * 
( - 1 0 . 4 8 ) 
- 2 . 9 0 9 * * * 
( - 8 . 6 3 ) ( 
0 . 1 1 5 * * * 
( 5 . 4 0 ) 
0 . 9 9 1 * * * 
( 7 . 5 9 ) 
- 0 . 3 7 3 
( - 0 . 6 7 ) 
- 0 . 6 7 9 * * * 
( - 3 8 . 4 4 ) ( 
(2) 
0 . 3 1 4 * * * 
( 9 . 1 3 ) 
- 0 . 0 2 1 * * * 
( - 5 . 0 9 ) 
- 0 . 4 9 0 * * * 
( - 4 . 8 1 ) 
0 . 3 6 4 * * * 
( 8 . 6 5 ) 
0 . 0 7 7 
( 0 . 2 3 ) 
- 0 . 5 5 0 * * * 
( - 9 . 9 6 ) 
- 1 . 7 4 1 * * * 
- 1 0 . 1 0 ) 
0 . 0 6 2 * * * 
( 5 . 1 6 ) 
0 . 8 6 5 * * * 
( 9 . 7 9 ) 
- 0 . 2 3 9 
( - 0 . 5 7 ) 
- 0 . 3 2 1 * * * 
- 4 5 . 1 6 ) 
(3) 
0 . 2 9 5 * * * 
( 1 0 . 0 2 ) 
- 0 . 0 1 9 * * * 
( - 5 . 6 2 ) 
- 0 . 4 7 8 * * * 
( - 8 . 6 9 ) 
0 . 2 9 7 * * * 
( 1 6 . 2 1 ) 
0 . 2 5 4 
( 0 . 7 3 ) 
- 0 . 5 2 6 * * * 
( - 1 6 . 0 5 ) 
- 1 . 2 6 7 * * * 
( - 8 . 9 1 ) 
0 . 0 4 5 * * * 
( 4 . 8 7 ) 
0 . 7 5 0 * * * 
( 9 . 1 7 ) 
- 0 . 1 9 7 
( - 1 . 1 4 ) 
- 0 . 1 7 1 * * * 
( - 3 2 . 2 3 ) 
(4) 
0 . 2 5 4 * * * 
( 9 . 8 0 ) 
- 0 . 0 1 7 * * * 
( - 6 . 2 0 ) 
- 0 . 4 6 2 * * * 
( - 7 . 2 9 ) 
0 . 2 2 2 * * * 
( 1 1 . 3 6 ) 
0 . 3 8 5 * 
( 1 . 7 1 ) 
- 0 . 4 5 1 * * * 
( - 1 3 . 2 7 ) 
- 0 . 7 7 2 * * * 
( - 7 . 0 1 ) 
0 . 0 2 1 * * * 
( 3 . 2 4 ) 
0 . 6 5 4 * * * 
( 1 0 . 9 9 ) 
- 0 . 3 2 6 * * 
( - 1 . 9 8 ) 
- 0 . 0 7 9 * * * 
( - 3 7 . 2 2 ) 
(5) 
0 . 2 5 2 * * * 
( 1 0 . 9 3 ) 
- 0 . 0 1 7 * * * 
( - 9 . 2 4 ) 
- 0 . 5 0 0 * * * 
( - 8 . 8 1 ) 
0 . 1 7 6 * * * 
( 8 . 8 6 ) 
0 . 4 0 1 * 
( 1 . 8 9 ) 
- 0 . 4 4 3 * * * 
( - 1 1 . 8 0 ) 
- 0 . 5 2 1 * * * 
( - 6 . 0 8 ) 
0 . 0 1 0 * 
( 1 . 9 4 ) 
0 . 6 0 7 * * * 
( 1 2 . 6 5 ) 
- 0 . 2 9 0 * * 
( - 1 . 9 7 ) 
- 0 . 0 0 3 
( - 0 . 7 3 ) 
(6) 
0 . 2 2 3 * * * 
( 1 0 . 0 1 ) 
- 0 . 0 1 5 * * * 
( - 6 . 4 3 ) 
- 0 . 4 9 3 * * * 
( - 9 . 7 3 ) 
0 . 1 6 3 * * * 
( 1 0 . 3 2 ) 
0 . 3 3 4 * 
( 1 . 6 7 ) 
- 0 . 4 0 2 * * * 
( - 6 . 5 9 ) 
- 0 . 0 2 1 
( - 0 . 2 2 ) 
- 0 . 0 1 8 * * * 
( - 2 . 7 0 ) 
0 . 5 2 6 * * * 
( 9 . 7 6 ) 
- 0 . 2 2 6 * 
( - 1 . 6 7 ) 
0 . 0 6 9 * * * 
( 2 1 . 8 5 ) 
(7) 
0 . 2 0 8 * * * 
( 8 . 5 6 ) 
- 0 . 0 1 4 * * * 
( - 5 . 3 9 ) 
- 0 . 5 3 6 * * * 
( - 1 1 . 5 9 ) 
0 . 1 6 2 * * * 
( 1 1 . 1 3 ) 
0 . 3 3 0 
( 1 . 5 1 ) 
- 0 . 4 0 9 * * * 
( - 9 . 5 3 ) 
0 . 2 3 8 * * * 
( 2 . 6 4 ) 
- 0 . 0 3 2 * * * 
( - 5 . 5 1 ) 
0 . 5 6 0 * * * 
( 8 . 9 5 ) 
0 . 0 2 0 
( 0 . 1 7 ) 
0 . 1 5 1 * * * 
( 4 1 . 6 4 ) 
(8) 
0 . 2 0 1 * * * 
( 6 . 0 5 ) 
- 0 . 0 1 4 * * * 
( - 5 . 3 2 ) 
- 0 . 5 7 3 * * * 
( - 5 . 6 0 ) 
0 . 1 7 0 * * * 
( 8 . 3 7 ) 
0 . 6 6 4 * * 
( 2 . 4 2 ) 
- 0 . 4 9 0 * * * 
( - 8 . 7 3 ) 
0 . 6 3 7 * * * 
( 5 . 3 8 ) 
- 0 . 0 5 7 * * * 
( - 7 . 4 6 ) 
0 . 5 9 0 * * * 
( 9 . 3 4 ) 
0 . 1 8 5 
( 0 . 9 2 ) 
0 . 2 8 1 * * * 
( 5 2 . 9 6 ) 
(9) 
0 . 2 2 4 * * * 
( 7 . 6 9 ) 
- 0 . 0 1 6 * * * 
( - 4 . 6 0 ) 
- 0 . 6 8 0 * * * 
( - 5 . 0 3 ) 
0 . 1 7 5 * * * 
( 4 . 3 2 ) 
1 . 0 3 2 * * 
( 2 . 2 3 ) 
- 0 . 5 8 9 * * * 
( - 6 . 4 7 ) 
1 . 3 7 0 * * * 
( 8 . 0 2 ) 
- 0 . 1 0 3 * * * 
( - 9 . 7 5 ) 
0 . 6 8 8 * * * 
( 5 . 7 1 ) 
0 . 7 8 0 * * 
( 1 . 9 8 ) 
0 . 5 6 4 * * * 
( 5 2 . 4 9 ) 
N 16921 16921 16921 16921 16921 16921 16921 16921 16921 16921 
Pseudo R square 10.06% 10.07% 7.45% 5.94% 4.78% 3.79% 3.07% 2.79% 2.61% 2.85% 
This table reports quantile regression results for a sample of 19313 firm-year observations over the period 1992-2008. All the variables are first-differenced. 
Tobin's Q is the market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus book value of common equity, divided by the book value of total assets. 
CEO pay-performance sensitivity is the dollar change in CEO wealth for a percentage change in firm value, scaled by CEO total annual pay, then divided by 
1000. Leverage is the long-term debt scaled by total assets. Sale growth is the current sales minus sales in the previous year, divided by sales in the previous 
year. Soft capital is the ratio of the sum of research and development expenses and advertising expenses scaled by total assets. Plant, property and equipment 
is the ratio of PPE to total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. Cash flow is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to 
total assets. Earnings volatility is the standard deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets in the prior three years. The t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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1 2 . 2 4 * * * 















. 4 3 * * * 
. 9 5 * * 
6 5 * * * 








. 9 3 * * * 
. 0 5 * * 
. 5 3 * * * 
. 0 5 
2 0 . 0 5 * * * 
1 1 . 2 8 * * * 
2 6 . 2 6 * * * 
5 . 5 8 * * 




2 2 . 5 0 * * * 
1 3 . 9 6 * * * 
2 4 . 1 0 * * 
5 . 0 8 * * 
7 . 5 4 * * * 
1 . 1 8 
-
-
2 4 . 7 5 * * * 
1 1 . 9 5 * * * 
1 5 . 9 6 * * * 
3 . 9 0 * * 
4 . 5 0 * * 
1 . 0 3 
0 . 1 8 
-
1 3 . 3 9 * * * 
4 . 7 1 * * 
4 . 1 8 * * 
0 . 7 8 
0 . 7 2 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 3 5 
1 . 1 7 
Table 2.10 F-Statistics for Differences in Coefficients Estimates Across Percentiles 
Panel A: F-statistics for differences in coefficients A pay-performance sensitivity across quantiles 









Panel B: F-statistics for differences in coefficients on A pay-performance sensitivity squared across 
quantiles 









This table reports F-statistics for testing differences in quantile regression coefficients estimates across 
percentiles for a sample of 19313 firm-year observations over the period 1992-2008. The dependent 
variable is first-differenced Tobin's Q. The independent variables include first-differenced CEO pay-
performance sensitivity, first-differenced CEO pay-performance sensitivity squared, first-differenced 
leverage, first-differenced sale growth, first-differenced soft capital, first-differenced PPE, first-
differenced size, first-differenced size squared, first-differenced cash flow, and first-differenced earnings 
volatility. Panel A reports the F-statistics for testing differences in quantile regression estimates of the 
coefficients on pay-performance sensitivity. Panel B reports the F-statistics for testing differences in 
quantile regression estimates of the coefficients on pay-performance sensitivity squared. The P-values 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. 
7 . 7 8 * * * 







9 . 9 2 * * * 
2 . 3 0 






8 . 2 5 * * * 
1 . 7 5 
1 . 9 3 





1 1 . 2 2 * * * 
4 . 1 7 * * 
6 . 1 7 * * 
2 . 9 4 * 




9 . 7 4 * * * 
3 . 7 3 * 
3 . 7 2 * 
1 . 0 1 
2 . 2 1 
0 . 0 8 
-
_ 
1 1 . 2 4 * * * 
3 . 5 1 * 
3 . 5 3 * 
1 . 1 0 
2 . 0 7 
0 . 2 5 
0 . 1 8 
_ 
8 . 0 3 * 
1 . 7 8 
1 . 1 9 
0 . 1 2 * 
0 . 2 2 
0 . 0 6 
0 . 2 1 
0 . 8 5 
I l l 
Omitted Internal Governance Variables 
The literature suggests that corporate governance mechanism may help to reduce 
agency conflicts between mangers and shareholders, and hence have an impact on 
compensation policy. The substitution hypothesis argues that executive compensation 
contracts represent one of a number of ways of aligning the incentives of managers and 
shareholders. Firms with weaker (stronger) corporate governance may use higher (lower) 
CEO pay-performance sensitivity as substitution. As a robustness test, I take the 
influence of internal governance into account. The corporate governance environment is 
captured by the degree of efficient monitoring and the quality of the board of directors. 
Shareholder monitoring is measured by institutional ownership, which is obtained from 
Thomson 13F (13F) database. I used board size, the percentage of independent 
directors, and CEO and board chair duality to measure board quality. These 
variables are obtained from RiskMetrics IRRC (IRRC) database. Due to data limitation 
in IRRC, board characteristics are only available from year 1996. 
•"* Hartzell and Starks (2003) demonstrate that increased institutional ownership structure is associated with 
a higher fraction of a CEO's salary that is paid in equity. 
j5
 Jensen (1993), Yermack (1996), and Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) argue that effective 
monitoring is reduced when the number of directors is high because it is easier for a CEO to capture the 
board, and individual board members are less likely to be held accountable. 
~'
6
 Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that independent directors are likely to have an incentive to ensure the 
effective running of a company because being directors of well run companies signals their competence of 
the market. Mehran (1995) finds that the percentage of annual compensation that is equity based increases 
with the fraction of outside directors. Yermack (1996) and Cyert, Kang, and Kumar (2002) find no 
evidence of an association between CEO compensation and the fraction of outside directors. Core et al. 
(1999) find that boards with more executive of the firm as directors pay their CEOs less. 
j7
 Jensen (1993) and Core et al. (1999) further argue that when the CEO also chairs the board, agency 
problems are more severe. Cyert et al. (2002) show that CEO compensation is higher when the CEO also 
chairs the board. 
112 
This results in a subsample of 12,999 firm year observations. Table 2.11 and 
Table 2.12 present results using additional governance variables. The results are robust; 
neither the signs nor the significance of the coefficient estimates changes. The 
coefficient estimates on CEO pay-performance sensitivity and CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity squared retain a similar pattern to that reported in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. 
However, the insignificant coefficient estimates on governance variables from OLS 
regression with the control for two-way fixed-effect is largely due to the fact that most 
governance variables are time-invariant. F-statistics indicate that the differences in the 
coefficient estimates of CEO PPS and CEO PPS squared are significantly different across 
different percentiles of Tobin's Q (Table 2.13). 
Exploring Causality 
It is possible that changes in firm value require an adjustment of CEO pay-
performance sensitivity to move towards the level that will increase firm value. From 
this perspective, the contemporaneous relation between managerial ownership and firm 
value is subject to the concern that changes in firm value lead to changes in CEO pay-
performance sensitivity. In order to avoid spurious inferences, the empirical design needs 
to disentangle how CEO stock incentives affect firm value from how firm value affect the 
compensation scheme of a CEO. This issue can be partially controlled by testing the 
lagged relation between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and firm value. If higher CEO 
PPS induces managers to work harder and increase firm value, we would observe a 






L o r ~ o c s i r H c \ j c o m r H r - c o ^ x ) L O L n r - o c T i O L o r - ^ i ^ r m 
co OD cn Csj ^r ^r 


















c n i . n ' - H c o i - n L n c n ' : 
c M c o o o r - c M r o L O o o c M 
r o u o i T j c o o o i n r o r o ^ o c n c o u o c o o o r ^ c o r o 
uo r- r- cn r- CM ^H 
,—i cn o oo 
oi o uo CM r-
o oo o o o 
cn -— uo 
LO CM o ro -^  cn oo o vH ro O CM o CM cn 
o <^r o LO o LO 
o — co -—. 
0 0 < - H O O O P 3 0 t - H O r O P 3 
r - c M r o t - H L o c n u o u o c n L o u o 
- r - —- co 
CM CM cn cn i—i uo 
m u o o o a o u o i — i r - -
uo _ , oo 
O CM O o LO LO cn oo 
U O U O O C O O L O O L O L O 
cn CM Ld 
—* r - — cn — LO — i—i — uo 
co r - uo t—i uo r - LO o r - o 
L n C M r H O t D U O C M T — I C O O 
LO CM r--
uo uo r -




L o c o r o ^ i — i c M c o c n u o o c M ^ ! — i c o r o 
UO LO U0 LT) CM C M O ^ C M r — i o u o i _ n c n u o 
rH LO O U0 
O C O O L O L O C M O C M O O -^ LO vH 
r - uo p -
O O CO LO 
O O LO O U0 t-H CO 
O C O U O C O C O r O O u ^ C O ^ C O C O C D O O C M O U O r O L O L n r O O 
CM r o r - uo ^p 
co o o ^ • r^ 
O L O O C T i O T H O C M ' ^ C O 



















uo LO co r- cn cn >-H 
O — LO 
r - t - O O c o c o o o o o L O 
oo ro r - co ^r c M O ^ o c n c D L o r -
ro LO o o o 
r - L o r o ^ c n o o o o c M 
C M O C M C O O C M O O O 
co — ro CO —- o 
co cn CM 
LO o co ro CO CD o o o 
r ~ c M r - c M c n ^ H C M O 
o —• uo 
o O i - H r O t - n r - r M C M O i — i o ^ O ^ CM i l l 
r ~ u o c n ^ c o o c M C M r -
u o o r o o r - o u o o t — i 
CO CM co o o ^ o LO T—I r-
r- uo CM uo 
CM o cn CD cn 
LO cn cn 
cn co CM 
CM o ro en co o 
o LO o r-
rH CM CO U0 U0 
o o o o c o c n o c M c o r o o r o o o o 
cn — ^ — c 
c O ' ^ r m u o L O C o c o r -
cn CM ^ uo ,-H LO O 
c M c n r o u o o r o ^ c o o 
^r1 r - LO cn o 
r o uo o co <—I ^ O CM r o ro 
u o r o c o c o i — i r o o c M 
O U O O O O r H O O L O 






2 « o 
00 
T^ C 
U CO £ C £ _ 
Table 2.11 (Continued) 
N 12999 12999 12999 12999 12999 12999 12999 12999 12999 12999 
Pseudo R square 17.12% 11.33% 13.41% 15.51% 17.69% 19.96% 22.42% 25.35% 28.85% 33.93% 
This table reports quantile regression results for a subsample of 12999 firm-year observations over the period 1992-2008. Board size is the 
number of directors on the board. Independent directors is the number of non-employee directors divided by board size. Duality is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the CEO is also the board chair, and zero otherwise. All the other variables are as defined in Table 2.2.The /-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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6 7 3 * * * 
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4 4 9 * * * 
08) 
0 0 9 * * * 
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48) 
0 2 9 * * 
18) 
0 0 1 * * * 
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9 1 1 * * * 
24) 














4 1 5 * * * 
49) 
0 1 0 * * * 
07) 
1 1 8 * * * 
54) 
0 5 9 * * * 
83) 
0 0 2 * * * 
85) 
1 8 5 * * * 
46) 
1 2 9 9 9 
15 69% 
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4 9 2 * * * 
90) 
0 1 1 * * * 
15) 
0 7 7 * 
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0 7 0 * * * 
96) 
0 0 2 * * * 
19) 
4 5 7 * * * 
46) 
1 2 9 9 9 
17 84% 
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This table reports quantile regression results for a subsample of 12999 firm-year observations over the period 1992-2008 Board size is the number of 
directors on the board Independent directors is the number of non-employee directors divided by board size Duality is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
CEO is also the board chair, and zero otherwise All the other variables are as defined in table 3 The '-statistics are reported in parentheses ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1 percent 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively 
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This table reports F-statistics for testing differences in quantile regression coefficients estimates across percentiles for a subsample of 12999 firm-year 
observations over the period 1992-2008. The dependent variable is Tobin's Q. The independent variables include CEO pay-performance sensitivity, CEO 
pay-performance sensitivity squared, leverage, sale growth, soft capital, PPE, size, size squared, cash flow, earnings volatility, board size, independent 
directors, CEO duality, and institutional ownership. Panel A reports the F-statistics for testing differences in quantile regression estimates of the coefficients 
on CEO pay-performance sensitivity. Panel B reports the F-statistics for testing differences in quantile regression estimates of the coefficients on CEO pay-
performance sensitivity squared. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Tables 2.14 and 2.15 present coefficient estimates from regressing Tobin's Q on 
lagged CEO pay-performance sensitivity and contemporaneous control variables. I used 
lagged CEO PPS as the independent variable since I am interested in whether past CEO 
stock incentives affect future firm value rather than the contemporaneous movement of 
CEO stock incentives and firm value. The coefficient estimates on CEO PPS and CEO 
PPS squared are smaller than those reported in Tables 2.2 and 2.4, but the sign and the 
significance remain unchanged in all the percentiles. F-statistics in Table 2.16 indicate 
that, as those in Table 2.4, the coefficient estimates are significantly different from each 
other for almost all of the possible combination percentiles, indicating significant 
heterogeneity in the relation between lagged CEO PPS and Tobin's Q. 
Under the assumption that CEO stock incentives are exogenous, the inverted-U 
relation between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and Tobin's Q is consistent with 
agency theory in that CEO stock incentives can align interests of managers with 
shareholders at lower levels of ownership, but increase managerial risk-aversion and 
decrease firm value at higher levels of ownership. Under the assumption that a firm's 
stock incentives are set at optimal levels, any observed empirical cross-sectional relation 
between managerial ownership and firm performance is spurious. Therefore, no firm 
could increase its value by adjusting its CEO pay-performance sensitivity. Yet, CEO 
pay-performance sensitivity could positively relate to Tobin's Q because the optimal 
level of CEO PPS is higher for firms with higher value. Thus far, my findings are 
consistent with both notions. 
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N 17167 17167 17167 17167 17167 17167 17167 17167 17167 17167 
Pseudo R square 20.31% 8.33% 10.53% 12.39% 14.22% 16.24% 18.43% 20.98% 24.14% 29.13% 
This table reports quantile regression results for a sample of 19313 firm-year observations over the period 1992-2008. The dependent variable is Tobin's Q, 
defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus book value of common equity, divided by the book value of total assets. CEO 
pay-performance sensitivity is the dollar change in CEO wealth for a percentage change in firm value, scaled by CEO total annual pay, then divided by 1000. 
Leverage is the long-term debt scaled by total assets. Sale growth is the current sales minus sales in the previous year, divided by sales in the previous year. Soft 
capital is the ratio of the sum of research and development expenses and advertising expenses scaled by total assets. Plant, property and equipment is the ratio of 
PPE to total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. Cash flow is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets. 
Earnings volatility is the standard deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets in the prior three years. The /-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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This table reports quantile regression results for a sample of 19313 firm-year observations over the period 1992-2008 The dependent variable is Tobin's Q, 
defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus book value of common equity, divided by the book value of total assets CEO 
pay-performance sensitivity is the dollar change in CEO wealth for a percentage change in firm value, scaled by CEO total annual pay, then divided by 1000 
Leverage is the long-term debt scaled by total assets Sale growth is the current sales minus sales in the previous year, divided by sales in the previous year 
Soft capital is the ratio of the sum of tesearch and development expenses and advertising expenses scaled by total assets Plant, property and equipment is the 
ratio of PPE to total assets Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets Cash flow is the latio of income before extraordinary items to total 
assets Earnings volatility is the standard deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets in the prior three years The /-statistics are 
reported in parentheses ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively 
Table 2.16 F-Statistics for Differences in Coefficients Estimates Across Percentiles 
Panel A: F-Statistics for differences in coefficients on lagged CEO pay-performance sensitivity across percentiles 
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Panel B: F-statistics for differences in coefficients on lagged CEO pay-performance sensitivity squared across percentiles 









This table reports F-statistics for testing differences in quantile regression coefficients estimates across percentiles for a subsample of 12999 firm-year 
observations over the period 1992-2008. The dependent variable is Tobin's Q. The independent variables include lagged CEO pay-performance sensitivity, 
lagged CEO pay-performance sensitivity squared, leverage, sale growth, soft capital, PPE, size, size squared, cash flow, earnings volatility, board size, 
independent directors, CEO duality, and institutional ownership. Panel A reports the F-statistics for testing differences in quantile regression estimates of the 
coefficients on lagged CEO pay-performance sensitivity. Panel B reports the F-statistics for testing differences in quantile regression estimates of the 
coefficients on lagged CEO pay-performance sensitivity squared. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. 
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The following examination focuses on whether the identified correlation between 
CEO pay-performance sensitivity and firm value is fully driven by the tendency of high-
value firms to choose high CEO stock incentives or is at least partly due to agency 
problems. Tables 2.17 and 2.18 display the results of regressions similar to those shown 
in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 with the addition of one-year lagged Tobin's Q, respectively. The 
lagged Tobin's Q controls for the level of Tobin's Q that the firm had prior to 
determining CEO pay-performance sensitivity. Column 1 is the pooled cross-sectional 
regression with the control for firm and year effect. In column 2, I also ran Fama-
MacBeth cross-sectional regression, where I reported the average coefficients of 17 
annual cross-sectional regressions, to take care of the potential autocorrelation. Columns 
3-11 are the coefficient estimates from quantile regression. In Table 2.14, CEO pay-
performance sensitivity remains positively and CEO pay-performance sensitivity squared 
remains negatively associated with Tobin's Q even after controlling for lagged Tobin's 
Q. Compared to the results in Table 2.3, the coefficients on CEO PPS and PPS squared 
are smaller but retain the similar pattern across different percentiles. The robustness of 
the positive but decreasing association between Tobin's Q and CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity indicates that this association is more consistent with the agency theory. Table 
2.19 reports the F-statistics for the coefficient estimates on CEO PPS and CEO PPS 
squared for all the percentiles. It remains clear that CEO stock incentives have different 
impact on firm value for firms with higher values versus lower values. 
Table 2.17 Quantile Regression of Tobin's Q on CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity with Lagged Tobin's g .Specification I 
CEO PPS 




























0 9 9 * * * 
20) 
3 7 7 * * * 
18) 
5 8 0 * * * 
46) 
4 2 0 * * * 
81) 
2 5 2 * * * 
84) 
4 0 6 * * * 
84) 

























0 4 5 * * * 
59) 
6 8 8 * * * 
04) 
1 2 9 * 
10) 
1 9 1 * * * 
96) 




]_ 97 * * * 
92) 
0 1 3 * * * 
93) 





















0 1 5 * * * 
68) 




0 3 2 * * 
08) 
0 0 5 * * * 
77) 
0 5 0 * * " 
61) 
0 6 3 * * * 
76) 
0 0 2 * * 
16) 





















0 2 3 * * * 
34) 
4 4 8 * * * 
11) 




0 4 2 * * * 
92) 
0 7 3 * * * 
22) 
0 4 5 * * 
96) 
0 0 1 
96) 





















0 2 6 * * * 
98) 
5 5 6 * * * 
89) 
1 3 0 * * * 
17) 
0 3 8 * * * 
71) 
g 94 * * * 
02) 
0 7 2 * * * 
54) 
0 3 1 
64) 
0 0 1 
77) 





















0 2 0 * * * 
31) 
6 3 3 * * * 
34) 
1 5 1 * * * 
90) 
0 7 1 * * * 
50) 
0 8 8 * * * 
81) 



























0 2 8 * * * 
86) 
7 1 1 * * * 
35) 
1 6 2 * * * 
61) 
1 0 9 * * * 
73) 
2 1 0 * * * 
74) 




0 0 1 
19) 



















( 1 1 
(6) 
0 2 8 * * * 
74) 
8 0 0 * * * 
83) 
1 7 5 * * * 
09) 
1 5 1 * * * 
51) 
3 2 2 * * * 
30) 
0 1 6 
30) 
0 2 1 
84) 
0 0 1 
85) 





















0 3 1 * * * 
63) 
8 8 9 * * * 
03) 
2 0 7 * * * 
72) 
1 9 9 * * * 
36) 
4 8 7 * * * 
95) 
0 0 5 
24) 
0 7 2 * * 
45) 
0 0 4 * * 
14) 













( - 0 
- 0 






0 4 2 * * * 
36) 
g47 * * * 
72) 
2 4 1 * * * 
49) 
2 4 6 * * * 
57) 




1 0 2 * * * 
72) 
0 0 5 * * * 
85) 











( 1 1 
- 0 
( - 0 
- 0 






0 8 6 * * * 
52) 
0 7 0 * * * 
72) 
2 8 2 * * * 
83) 
3 7 7 * * * 
06) 
9 7 2 * * * 
08) 
0 1 6 
59) 
2 0 7 * * * 
94) 
0 1 1 * * * 
36) 
4 9 0 * * * 
00) 
Earnings 
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Pseudo R square 41 39% 70 29% 21 73% 29 05% 34 73% 39 48% 43 87% 48 09% 52 47% 56 88% 61 83% 
This table reports quantile regression results for a sample of 19313 firm-year observations over the period 1992-2008 The dependent variable is Tobin's Q, 
defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus book value of common equity, divided by the book value of total assets CEO 
PPS is the dollar change in CEO wealth for a percentage change in firm value, scaled by CEO total annual pay, then divided by 1000 Leverage is the long-
term debt scaled by total assets Sale growth is the current sales minus sales in the previous year, divided by sales in the previous year Soft capital is the ratio 
of the sum of research and development expenses and advertising expenses scaled by total assets Plant, property and equipment is the ratio of PPE to total 
assets Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets Cash flow is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets Earnings 
volatility is the standard deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets in the prior three years The '-statistics are reported in 
parentheses *** ** and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively 
Table 2.18 Quantile Regression of Tobin's Q on CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity with Lagged Tobin's Q _Specification II 
OLS FM (_1) (2) (_3) [4J (5_) (_6) (7J [8) (9) 
C E O PPS 0 .276*** 0 .153*** 0 .099*** 0 .099*** 0 .095*** 0 .094*** 0 .093*** 0 . 1 0 1 * * * 0 .107*** 0 .157*** 0 .240*** 
(8 .22) (7 .82) (4 .86) (12.44) (7 .97) (8 .58) (7 .92) (5 .50) (5 .89) (5 .81) (4 .07) 
C E O PPS 
squared 
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( 1 2 . 6 4 ) 
0 . 0 1 0 
( 0 . 6 3 ) 
- 0 . 0 5 7 * * 
( - 1 . 9 9 ) 
0 . 0 0 3 
( 1 . 6 1 ) 
0 . 5 9 6 * * * 
( 1 0 . 2 3 ) 
- 0 . 0 1 2 * * * 
( - 4 . 1 0 ) 
0 . 9 4 4 * * * 
(144 . 9 4 ) 
- 0 . 2 3 1 * * * 
( - 8 . 2 2 ) 
0 . 2 4 1 * * * 
( 7 . 5 4 ) 
2 . 1 7 9 * * * 
( 1 3 . 2 5 ) 
- 0 . 0 1 5 
( - 0 . 7 8 ) 
- 0 . 1 0 0 * * * 
( - 3 . 3 1 ) 
0 . 0 0 5 * * 
( 2 . 5 3 ) 
0 . 6 0 7 * * * 
( 9 . 0 4 ) 
- 0 . 0 1 8 * * * 
( - 2 . 9 3 ) 
1 . 0 5 8 * * * 
( 6 5 . 1 7 ) 
- 0 . 2 6 6 * * * 
( - 7 . 8 5 ) 
0 . 3 7 6 * * * 
( 7 . 1 3 ) 
3 . 0 6 4 * * * 
( 9 . 1 5 ) 
- 0 . 0 3 1 
( - 0 . 9 9 ) 
- 0 . 2 0 7 * * * 
( - 4 . 0 9 ) 
0 . 0 1 1 * * * 
( 3 . 4 4 ) 
0 . 4 4 6 * * * 
( 4 . 8 5 ) 
Earnings 
v o l a t i l i t y 1 . 3 6 2 * * * 1 . 5 9 0 * * - 1 . 1 6 0 * * * - 1 . 0 3 9 * * * - 0 . 7 3 8 * * * - 0 . 3 1 5 * * 0 . 0 7 0 0 . 6 3 2 * * * 1 . 1 8 8 * * * 2 . 0 3 6 * * * 4 . 2 8 7 * * * 
( 3 . 6 1 ) ( 2 . 8 0 ) ( - 6 . 2 7 ) ( - 6 . 3 2 ) ( - 4 . 9 2 ) ( - 2 . 3 5 ) ( 0 . 4 8 ) ( 4 . 3 7 ) ( 7 . 9 8 ) ( 6 . 0 8 ) ( 9 . 0 3 ) 
Intercept 4 . 2 2 5 * * * 1 . 0 5 7 * * * 0 . 2 9 9 * * * 0 . 3 1 1 * * * 0 . 2 8 9 * * * 0 . 3 4 7 * * * 0 . 4 1 5 * * * 0 . 3 9 0 * * * 0 . 4 7 6 * * * 0 . 6 8 7 * * * 1 . 0 6 6 * * * 
( 8 . 6 8 ) ( 6 . 0 0 ) ( 3 . 1 8 ) ( 3 . 9 7 ) ( 4 . 4 9 ) ( 4 . 3 4 ) ( 5 . 4 2 ) ( 4 . 2 6 ) ( 4 . 3 9 ) ( 5 . 7 6 ) ( 5 . 2 6 ) 
N 17167 17167 17167 17167 17167 17167 17167 17167 17167 17167 17167 
Pseudo R Square 41.61% 70.47% 21.93% 29.23% 34.86% 39.61% 43.95% 48.16% 52.54% 59.67% 61.90% 
This table reports quantile regression results for a sample of 19313 firm-year observations over the period 1992-2008. The dependent variable is Tobin's Q, 
defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus book value of common equity, divided by the book value of total assets. CEO 
PPS is the dollar change in CEO wealth for a percentage change in firm value, scaled by CEO total annual pay, then divided by 1000. Leverage is the long-
term debt scaled by total assets. Sale growth is the current sales minus sales in the previous year, divided by sales in the previous year. Soft capital is the ratio 
of the sum of research and development expenses and advertising expenses scaled by total assets. Plant, property and equipment is the ratio of PPE to total 
Table 2 18 (Continued) 
assets Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets Cash flow is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets Earnings 
volatility is the standard deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets in the prior three years The '-statistics are reported in 
parentheses ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively 
Table 2.19 F-Statistics for Differences in Coefficients Estimates Across Percentiles 









q20 q30 q40 q50 q60 q70 q80 q90 
0 00 0 12 0 26 0 24 0 01 0 19 4 81** 8 27*** 
6 75*** 8 77*** 
8 84*** 9 75*** 
9 37*** 10 07*** 
11 17*** 10 94*** 
8 77*** 9 69*** 































Panel B F-statistics for differences in coefficients on CEO pay-performance sensitivity squared across percentiles 
q20 q30 q40 q50 q60 q70 q80 q90 
qlO 0 00 0 19 0 09 0 3 0 04 0 00 2 67* 3 68* 
q20 - 0 42 0 17 0 29 0 05 0 00 2 91* 3 69* 
q30 - - 0 04 0 05 0 01 0 12 3 96** 4 21** 
q40 - - - 0 19 0 00 0 09 4 12** 4 15** 
q50 - - - - 0 14 0 32 5 07** 4 78** 
q60 - - - - - 0 13 4 86** 4 46** 
Table 2.19 (Continued) 
q 7 0 _ _ _ _ _ _ 4 . 8 2 * * 4 . 1 2 * * 
q 8 0 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 . 6 7 
This table reports F-statistics for testing differences in quantile regression coefficients estimates across percentiles for a subsample of 12999 firm-year 
observations over the period 1992-2008. The dependent variable is Tobin's Q. The independent variables include lagged CEO pay-performance sensitivity, 
lagged CEO pay-performance sensitivity squared, leverage, sale growth, soft capital, PPE, size, size squared, cash flow, earnings volatility, board size, 
independent directors, CEO duality, and institutional ownership. Panel A reports the F-statistics for testing differences in quantile regression estimates of the 
coefficients on lagged CEO pay-performance sensitivity. Panel B reports the F-statistics for testing differences in quantile regression estimates of the 




I employ quantile regression to examine the relation between firm value and CEO 
pay-performance sensitivity. I documented significant heterogeneity in the relation 
between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and firm value across the conditional 
distribution of firm value. More specifically, I found a significant inverted-U relation 
between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and Tobin's Q for all percentiles of the 
conditional distribution of Tobin's Q. Additionally, the positive coefficient estimates on 
CEO pay-performance sensitivity and the magnitude of the negative coefficient estimates 
on CEO pay-performance sensitivity squared monotonically increase in the percentiles of 
Tobin's Q. The difference in coefficient estimates is also statistically significant across 
the entire distribution of Tobin's Q. My results are robust to alternative methodologies to 
control for unobservable firm fixed-effects, alternative model specifications that include 
proxies for board quality and effective monitoring, and alternative specifications that 
address causality. 
This study contributes to the literature by extending the debate in the managerial 
incentive literature from traditional questions asking are CEO equity-based incentives 
important in a new direction that asks if CEO equity-based incentives influence firm 
value differently for firms with different values. In doing so, I find that the effect of CEO 
pay-performance sensitivity on firm value and the concavity of the relation increase in 
the conditional distribution of firm value. This suggests that while the incentive 
alignment effect of higher CEO pay-performance sensitivity is more pronounced in firms 
with higher firm value, so is the risk aversion effect of excess managerial ownership. 
CHAPTER 3 
CONCLUSION 
In both essays, I documented that CEO pay-performance sensitivity can be used 
as an effective tool in aligning interests of managers with shareholders. In the first essay, 
I examined the effect of CEO pay-performance sensitivity on corporate payout policies. I 
found that the propensity to pay dividends is increased in CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity for firms that paid dividends in the previous year. Dividend payout decisions 
depend on the tradeoff between the increases in the costs of external financing and the 
reductions in the agency costs. For firms that paid dividends in the prior year, the weight 
on the need to reduce the costs of external financing is greater than the need to reduce the 
agency costs of free cash flow. Therefore, with the premise that equity-based 
compensation can reduce agency problems, CEOs with strong stock incentives prefer to 
maintain dividend payouts to avoid a negative market reaction to dividend omissions. 
For firms that did not pay dividends in the prior year, the need to reduce the agency costs 
of free cash flow overcomes the need to reduce the costs of external financing. To the 
extent that dividends payout and equity-based compensation can both be used as effective 
mechanisms to reduce agency problems, CEOs with strong stock incentives may choose 
not to initiate dividends. Consistent with this substitution hypothesis, I documented that 
the likelihood of dividend payout is decreasing in CEO pay-performance sensitivity for 
the subsample of firms that did not pay dividends in the previous year. 
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I also found that the level of dividend payout is decreasing in CEO pay-
performance sensitivity for dividend paying firms. The negative relation is nonlinear, 
stronger for CEOs with substantial high pay-performance sensitivity, and stronger for 
firms with greater potential for agency problems of free cash flows. Lastly, I documented 
that CEOs with high pay-performance sensitivity smooth dividends less. CEOs with 
greater equity-based incentives tend to deviate from past dividend levels to accommodate 
future investment opportunities. My results are robust to alternative sample selection 
procedures and model specifications that address causality. My models also performed 
well in both in-sample and out-of-sample predictions. 
In the second essay, I employed quantile regressions examining the effect of CEO 
pay-performance sensitivity on firm value across the entire distribution of firm value. I 
documented a significantly inverted-U relation between CEO pay-performance sensitivity 
and Tobin's Q for all percentiles of the conditional distribution of Tobin's Q. The 
positive relation between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and firm value supports 
interest alignment hypothesis that at lower level of CEO stock ownership, CEO pay-
performance sensitivity increases firm value by aligning interests of managers with 
shareholders. The negative relation between CEO pay-performance sensitivity is 
consistent with risk aversion hypothesis that at higher level of CEO stock ownership, 
CEO pay-performance sensitivity decreases firm value by increasing managerial risk 
aversion level. 
Moreover, I documented that the strength of the coefficients on CEO pay-
performance sensitivity and its square are significantly increasing in the percentiles of the 
conditional distribution of Tobin's Q. The difference in the coefficient estimates is also 
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statistically significant across the entire distribution of Tobin's Q. The results indicated 
that both the incentive alignment effect of CEO pay-performance sensitivity at lower 
level of CEO ownership and the risk aversion effect of CEO pay-performance sensitivity 
at higher level of CEO ownership are more pronounced in firms with higher firm value. 
From a policy standpoint, the boards of directors for firms with higher value should be 
vigilant in monitoring whether increase in CEO pay-performance sensitivity lead to better 
interest alignment or encourage CEOs to avoid taking on risky projects. My results are 
robust to alternative methodologies to control for unobservable firm fixed-effects, 
alternative model specifications that include proxies for board quality and effective 
monitoring, and alternative specifications that address causality. 
APPENDIX A 
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
131 
Appendix A 
Definition of Variables 
Exhibit I reports the definitions of the dependent variables and independent variables 
used in the analysis. 





Total payout dummy 
Dividend payout ratio 
Repurchase payout 
ratio 
Total payout ratio 
A dummy variable that equals one if the regular cash 
dividends on common stock from Compustat is positive in a 
given fiscal year, and zero otherwise. 
A dummy variable that equals one if the adjusted open 
market repurchase is positive in a given fiscal year, and zero 
otherwise. The adjusted open market repurchases are 
calculated the increase in common treasury stock when it is 
positive. When it is negative, it is measured as the 
difference between repurchases and stock issuances. The 
negative values from the above calculation are set to zero. 
A dummy variable that equals one if the sum of cash 
dividends and adjusted open market repurchase is positive in 
a given fiscal year, and zero otherwise 
The regular cash dividends on common stock scaled by 
market value of equity, multiplied by 100. 
The adjusted open market repurchase scaled by market value 
of equity, multiplied by 100. 
The sum of dividend payout ratio and repurchase payout 
ratio. 
Independent Variables Definition of the Variables 
CEO Pay-performance 
sensitivity (CEO PPS) 
CEO option 
Earned equity to 
common equity 
ROA 






The dollar change in total CEO wealth for a percentage 
change in firm value, scaled by total annual pay, divided by 
1000. 
The percentage of shares underlying option holdings of the 
CEO to common share outstanding, multiplied by 100. 
Calculated for firms with positive book equity and equals 
retained earnings divided by total book value of common 
equity. 
Earnings before extraordinary items plus interest and income 
statement deferred tax, scaled by total assets. 
The change on sales divided by the previous year's level. 
The market value of total assets scaled by the book value of 
total assets 
The logarithm of total assets. 
Cash scaled by total assets. 
Log of Gindex, which is based on anti-takeover provisions 
(from GIM, 2003). 








Net operating cash 
flow 
Net cash flow 
Leverage 
Earnings volatility 
Earnings per share 
Log of the number of directors on the board. 
Directors who are not related to the company scaled by the 
total number of directors on board. 
A dummy variable that equals to one if CEO is also the 
chairman of the board. 
The percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional 
investors.From Thomson 13F 
Operating income minus capital spending scaled by total 
assets. 
Operating income before depreciation minus taxes, interest 
expense, common dividends, and preferred dividends scaled 
by total assets. 
The ratio of long-term debt and debt due in first year to total 
assets. 
The standard deviation of income before extraordinary item 
based up to 12 quarters of data. 
From Compustat. 
APPENDIX B 
CALCULATION OF CEO PAY-PERFORMANCE 
SENSITIVITY 
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Appendix B: Calculation of CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity 
I used percent-percent incentives as a proxy for CEO pay-performance sensitivity, 
which is defined as the dollar change in CEO wealth for a percentage change in firm 
value, scaled by CEO total compensation. The formulation of this percent-percent 





 _____ ^_ p i = total delta x p x i , (1) 
MnFu-m Value SWags 85 w w 
where W denotes total CEO wealth, S is the market value of the firm, P is stock price, 
and w is the expected flow pay. Total delta refers to the delta of the CEO's stock 
portfolio. The delta for each share is 1, and the delta for each option is the derivative of 
the value of each option with 
1 
WPS = — [number of shares owned + (number of stock options owned) 
w 
Xe'dTN(Z)]XP, ' (2) 
and 
Z = [ l ogg ) + T(r - d - az/2)] fuT^\ (3) 
where N is the cumulative probability function for the normal distribution, P is the price 
of the underlying stock, X is the exercise price of the option, T is the time to maturity of 
the option in years, r is the risk-free interest rate, d is the dividend yield, a is the expected 
stock return volatility over the life of the option. 
Execucomp database is used to compute CEO stock incentives at the end of each 
fiscal year. The option delta is estimated using the methodology of Core and Guay 
(2002). The methodology includes the calculation for the new option grants and the 
estimation for the options granted in the previous years. In order to compute delta of new 
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options granted in a given fiscal year, I obtain the information on the number of options 
granted for each grant series, the strike price of the option, the expiration date for each 
option, and the closing price of the firm's stock for the fiscal year. I obtain volatility and 
dividend yield (FASB 123R) from Compustat. When these values are missing, I 
estimated return volatility using standard deviation of monthly stock returns over past 36 
months using CRSP database and the firm's average dividend yield over the past three 
years from Compustat database. Missing values for volatility or dividend yield are set 
equal to the sample median each year. All volatility and dividend yield values are 
winsorized annually at the 1% tales. The risk-free interest rate is the approximate 
average yield that could have been earned in a particular year by investing in a U.S. 
Treasury bond carrying a term equal to the term of each option grant after taking a 30% 
T O 
haircut. I calculated the delta for each new option grant, multiply it by the number of 
options in each grant, and sum across all the grants to get the total delta for all the new 
grants in each fiscal year. 
The strike price and maturity of previously granted options are not directly given 
in Execucomp therefore needed to be estimated. To estimate the strike price for the 
previously granted unexercisable options, I first computed the ratio of the difference 
between the intrinsic value of the unexercisable in-the-money options held at fiscal year 
end and the intrinsic value of the newly granted options to the difference between the 
j8
 Other studies have used the rate of interest on a ten-year constant -maturity Tieasury bond as the risk-
free iate(Paha, 2001, Brick, Paha, and Wang, 2005) I believe that matching the term on the risk free rate 
to the early exeicise behavior of executives is more appiopnate (Carpenter, 1998, Huddart and Lang, 1997, 
and Biziak, Bettis, and Lemmon, 2003) 
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number of unexercisable options held at year end and the number of new grants, and then 
subtract this ratio from the stock price at fiscal year end. The formula is given as:39 




 7^ = '—" • (4) 
opt_un.0X_unexer_6st_mj.7n — numnewop v J 
The strike price is set to zero when this calculation generates a negative strike 
price. To estimate the strike price of previously granted exercisable options, I first 
compute the ratio of the intrinsic value of the exercisable in-the-money options held at 
fiscal year end to the number of exercisable in-the-money options at year end, and then 
subtract this ratio from the stock price at fiscal year end. The formula is given as: 
op t_mn BX _ex e ?-_ sst_ va I 
•BX X — P . (5) 
opt_H7i8x _sxBr_num 
These calculations yield average estimates for the strike price of exercisable and 
unexercisable options. I set the time-to-maturity for the unexercisable options equal to 
one minus the time-to-maturity of the current year's new option grants. The time-to-
maturity of exercisable option is set to three minus the time-to-maturity of the 
unexercisable options. Following Gore and Guay (2002), when no grant is made in the 
current year, I set the time-to-maturity of unexercisable and exercisable options to nine 
and six years, respectively. 
39
 When the number of newly granted options exceeds the number of unexercisable options at year end, 
such as inthe case of immediate vesting of some or all new grants, the strike price and the number of 
options is deducted from the number and realizable value of exercisable options. 
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